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In 2012, Kansas Republicans, led by Governor Sam Brownback, passed a radical supply-
side tax cutting package that cut income tax rates, eliminated the top income tax bracket, 
eliminated various deductions and credits, and (most controversially) fully eliminated state 
income tax on many business owners. However, five years later, a supermajority of Republicans 
and Democrats voted over Brownback’s veto to repeal the tax cuts. This research asks: What 
would lead tax cutting Republicans to embrace a tax increase? To answer this question, this 
dissertation draws on over two years of ethnographic material, including 110 in-depth interviews, 
ethnographic observations, and newspaper and legislative document analysis. This project argues 
the tax cuts in Kansas could not be sustained because there are social limits to supply-side tax 
reforms. In this project, I examine the structural and institutional conditions under which 
neoliberal tax reforms provokes a countermovement for social protection. I argue that this occurs 
in the absence of financialization, which has allowed Republicans nationally to continue to 
pursue massive tax cuts while paying very little political cost. However, in Kansas, the 
Republican Party paid a large political price for their devotion to the tax policy. As a 
consequence of this, economic policies were repoliticized and brought into the realm of public 
debate, thus fostering a renewed sense of ‘fiscal citizenship’ across the state. This dissertation 
explores this process of repoliticization and countermovement in three critical institutional areas 
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Timeline of Events 
June 1, 2010 ~ Sam Brownback officially announces run for Kansas Governor 
 
November 2, 2010 ~ Brownback wins general election over Democrat Tom Holland 
 
November 2, 2010 ~ School funding lawsuit (Gannon v. Kansas) is filed 
 
May 20, 2011 ~ Brownback announces review of the Kansas tax code 
 
May 28, 2011 ~ Brownback cuts budget including over $100M from public schools; eliminates 
funding for the Kansas Arts Commission 
 
Tax Cuts Introduced and Passed 
 
September 21, 2011 ~ Brownback announces income tax cut 
 
January 11, 2012 ~ In state of the state address, Brownback asks legislature to enact his tax cut  
 
January 19, 2012 ~ Arthur Laffer testifies in support of the Brownback tax cut 
 
March 13, 2012 ~ House version passes 68-52 
 
March 21, 2012 ~ Senate kills the bill then resurrects it and passes it, 29-11 
 
May 9, 2012 ~ House votes to concur with the senate and passes the tax bill to Governor 
 
May 22, 2012 ~ Brownback signs HB 2117 into law 
 
August 7, 2012 ~ Moderates defeated in Republican primaries  
 
January 1, 2013 ~ Brownback tax cuts take effect 
 
January 11, 2013 ~ Kansas district trial court rules school funding levels are unconstitutional 
 
June 13, 2013 ~ Brownback signs second round of income tax cuts and signs sales tax increase 
 
March 7, 2014 ~ Kansas Supreme Court rules school funding is unconstitutional 
 
April 21, 2014 ~ Brownback signs HB 2506, addressing the Supreme Court ruling 
 
May 1, 2014 ~ Moody’s downgrades Kansas’ credit rating  
 
August 6, 2014 ~ S&P downgrades Kansas’ credit rating 
 




Signs of Crisis 
 
November 10, 2014 ~ Consensus Revenue Estimates show budget shortfall of $715 million 
 
December 30, 2014 ~ Kansas district trial court again rules school funding unconstitutional 
 
March 25, 2015 ~ Brownback signs SB 7 replacing the old school funding formula with block 
grants 
 
June 5, 2015 ~ State workers receive notification of possible furloughs because of unbalanced 
state budget 
 
June 16, 2015 ~ Brownback signs sales tax increase to end record 113-day legislative session 
 
June 26, 2015 ~ Kansas District trial court rules block grant school funding unconstitutional 
 
October 6, 2015 ~ Kansas pays $2.6M to Alvarez & Marsal to perform an efficiency study  
 
November 6, 2015 ~ Consensus Revenue Estimating Committee lowers revenue estimates again 
by $159M 
 
December 16, 2015 ~ KDOT announces it issued a record $400M in bonds 
 
January 12, 2016 ~ Alvarez & Marsal releases results of efficiency study 
 
February 11, 2016 ~ Kansas Supreme Court finds the block grant school funding scheme 
unconstitutional   
 
April 7, 2016 ~ Brownback signs HB 2655, addressing the Supreme Court ruling 
 
April 20, 2016 ~ Consensus Revenue Estimating Committee revises revenue projections down 
another $286M 
 
May 3, 2016 ~ Moody’s again downgrades Kansas’ credit outlook from stable to negative 
 
May 27, 2016 ~ Kansas finds block grant school funding scheme unconstitutional  
 
June 23, 2016 ~ Special session of the Legislature is called to address school funding 
 
June 27, 2016 ~ Brownback signs latest bill addressing school funding 
 
July 26, 2016 ~ S&P again downgrades Kansas’ credit rating 
 




August 2, 2016 ~ Moderates see big gains in the Republican primaries 
 
November 10, 2016 ~ Consensus Revenue Estimating Committee lowers revenue estimates 
again by $355M 
 
February 17, 2017 ~ Kansas Legislature passes repeal of the Brownback tax cuts 
 
February 22, 2017 ~ Brownback vetoes the repeal bill 
 
February 22, 2017 ~ Legislature fails to override the governor’s veto 
 
March 2, 2017 ~ Kansas Supreme Court again rules the state is unconstitutionally underfunding 
schools 
 
April 26, 2017 ~ Trump Administration releases its plan to cut taxes. Many see parallels with 
Kansas 
 
June 5/6, 201 ~ Kansas Legislature again pass a bill to repeal the Brownback tax cuts 
 
June 6, 2017 ~ Brownback announces he will veto the bill 
 
June 6, 2017 ~ Kansas Legislature successfully overrides the veto and repeals the tax cuts 
 




July 26, 2017 ~ Brownback nominated to be Ambassador-at-large for religious freedom 
 
October 2, 2017 ~ Supreme Court rules Kansas still not in compliance with school funding 
 
October 4, 2017 ~ Brownback confirmation hearing held 
 
December 20, 2017 ~ Republicans pass the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) 
 










“If justice ever existed in Kansas’ scheme of taxation, time and change have wrought sad havoc 
with it…” (Boyle 1908:10). 
 
 
This dissertation is about one of the most significant trends in American politics: tax cuts. 
Specifically, this dissertation is about supply-side tax cuts and their social aftermath. In this 
dissertation I examine the critical case of Kansas which, in 2012, embarked on a self-described 
“experiment” in supply-side economics. Governor Sam Brownback, who proposed the policy, 
promised it would be a “shot of adrenaline” into the state’s economy by incentivizing businesses 
to expand and hire more workers. Instead of the policy delivering on its supply-side promises, 
the state was thrown into fiscal crisis and five years after the policy was implemented, the 
Republican supermajority in the Kansas legisalture repealed it. The primary question I seek to 
address in this study is: Why did Republicans in Kansas abandon their signature policy?  
The surprising thing about supply-side tax policy in Kansas is not that Republicans 
implemented it, but that they repealed it. For decades, the Republican Party has been oriented 
towards lowering or eliminating taxes. On an even larger scale, since the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, anti-tax groups and activists have tried to repeal the federal income tax 
(Martin 2010, 2013). In Kansas, these historical forces collided in a way that saw the Republican 
Party achieve a version of a long-standing policy goal: eliminating the income tax. Why, after 
achieving a monumental policy victory, would Republicans reverse course and vote (over the 




Following Karl Polanyi, I argue that explaining the policy reversal requires paying 
attention to the constraints imposed by institutional and social arrangements. The tax cuts in 
Kansas created widespread social and economic instability. As Kansans grappled with 
understanding the fiscal crisis created by the tax cuts, they also grappled with the political and 
social forces found in the economy. Neoliberalism, understood broadly as free-market based 
economic reforms, depoliticizes the economy (Block 1990) and erodes citizenship (Somers 
2008). Neoliberalism equates “the economy” with free-markets and citizenship with market 
exchange and in so doing, obfuscates the role of politics and the state in supporting even free-
market economies. However, by destabilizing social and economic institutions, I argue that the 
Kansas tax cuts repoliticized the economy by revealing the role of politics in free-market 
reforms. Further, supporters of the tax cuts recognized the destabilizing impact of the policy and 
attempted to obfuscate the connection between policy and effect. However, these efforts fell 
short as Kansans connected the budget crisis directly with the tax cut policy. Thus, by 
repoliticizing the economy, the tax cuts promoted a resurgence of fiscal citizenship across the 
state.  
I identify three main areas that institutionally contributed to the policy reversal. First, 
small businesses in the state forced the reversal of the policy by rejecting the tax cuts. 
Rhetorically, the tax cuts were aimed at boosting small businesses. In practice, the tax cuts 
benefited only a few business owners in the state. Moreover, the ensuing budget cuts damaged 
core institutions that business, especially small businesses, rely on. Chief among these 
institutions were schools. Schools forced the reversal of the policy in two ways. Budgets cuts 
caused by the tax cuts resulted in school districts in Kansas suing the state to restore funding, a 
lawsuit which put an absolute limit on how far Republicans could shrink education spending. 
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However, because schools are central community organizations, the visible effects of budget cuts 
on schools reverberated throughout local communities, including impacting businesses. The 
Brownback administration attempted to obfuscate these negative effects in various ways by 
releasing statistics and economic projections showing the tax cuts were working. However, the 
administration’s use of data in defense of the tax cuts lost its sway over many lawmakers and 
citizens and, as a result, the tax cuts could no longer withstand political pressure and were 
reversed. While these three areas do not exhaust every explanation for the reversal, they emerged 
as most prominent and relevant over the course of the tax cutting episode.  
This dissertation illuminates the structural, social, and institutional constraints to market 
liberal policy initiatives. My argument is that these three areas represent critical “sites” in 
understanding the Kansas tax cuts. Further, I argue that these three sites are important because of 
their institutional relation to each other and to taxation. In other words, the tax cut’s effects on 
any one site are not enough to explain the policy’s reversal. I also argue these three areas are 
primary sites for understanding neoliberalism more generally. Tax cuts are not the only 
neoliberal policy, but tax cuts, and supply-side tax cuts in particular, have arguably been the 
most important instantiation of American neoliberalism (Prasad 2012; Campbell 2001). A focus 
on businesses (Akard 1992; Harvey 2005), a focus on public spending (Prasad 2006; Pierson 
1994), and a focus on ideas and knowledge (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Brown 2015; Peck 
2010) have all been examined with respect to neoliberalism and tax cuts. Further, these three 
areas roughly align with the three main “faces” of neoliberalism: its political face, bureaucratic 
face, and its intellectual face (Mudge 2008:704-707; see also Centeno and Cohen 2012). A 
novelty of this study is that I examine all three sites simultaneously with one case using a multi-
sited ethnographic case study approach. Following the program of fiscal sociology, I highlight 
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the links between these areas in order to emphasize the “social embeddedness of fiscal relations” 
(Martin 2019) created by taxes. Thus, this study brings forward how these sites are assembled 
and entwined with the tax structure of the state. 
 
Kansas and the Republican Tax Cutting Legacy 
 In an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, Governor Sam Brownback declared that the 
Kansas tax policy was “rooted in the Reagan formula” (Brownback 2014). At the signing 
ceremony for the law, Brownback remarked, “[W]hen Ronald Reagan cut taxes in the early ‘80s, 
many people called the tax cuts too big, too bold, too expensive. But those cuts ignited an era of 
prosperity in America. By enacting them, Reagan showed his faith – but not in the government. 
It was in the American people. Reagan proved that given a bit of economic freedom and 
opportunity, the American people would accomplish things no government program could ever 
imagine. And they did. My faith is in the people of Kansas, not its government. I believe the 
people will do incredible things.” By linking his tax cuts to Reagan, Brownback situated the 
Kansas tax cuts firmly in the supply-side, tax-cutting legacy of the modern Republican Party.  
The Republican Party has not always been the party of tax cuts. Prior to Reagan, the 
Republican Party was the party of balanced budget (Prasad 2012). However, Republicans found 
electoral success in tax cuts and, building off their perceived popularity following Proposition 13 
(Martin 2008), they have followed a tax-cuts-at-all-costs approach to tax reform. This is most 
clearly seen in the GOP’s embrace of supply-side economics. Free-market, supply-side ideas 
initially consisted of a variety of non-inflationary policy proposals, from worker trainer programs 
to deregulation (Krippner 2011:93). Tax cuts were one of four noninflationary policy suggestions 
offered by the Republican Study Committee, chaired at the time by future Heritage Foundation 
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president Ed Feulner (Jones 2012:264). Moreover, supply-side economics was associated with a 
view of monetary policy that suggested a combination of stimulus (tax cuts) and restraint (tight 
monetary policy). However, over time, and particularly during the Reagan administration, 
supply-side ideas narrowed to mean essentially tax cuts and tax cuts alone (Krippner 2011:93). 
Tax cuts were, according to supply-side economist Robert Mundell, supposed to provide an 
economic stimulus by freeing up capital for business to invest in hiring which would both lower 
unemployment as well as reduce inflation. Supply-siders also claimed tax cuts would boost 
productivity and savings rates. However, Keynesian economists held that large tax cuts would 
sharply increase the deficit, something Republicans at the time were keen to avoid. The “Laffer 
Curve” solved this conundrum, at least in theory. By claiming that tax cuts will stimulate 
economic activity, and thus generate more revenue for the tax state, the government would have 
more revenue to fund essential services. In other words, the tax cuts would pay for themselves.  
However, instead of providing the economic stimulus that supply-siders had predicted, as 
Reagan advisor David Stockman explained, “even the most outlandishly optimistic forecast 
available [showed] triple-digit deficits… as far as the eye could see into the future” (Stockman 
2013[1986]:361). After Reagan, the U.S. entered an “age of deficits” (Morgan 2009:2). The 
deficit under Reagan ballooned from $700 billion in 1981 to over $3 trillion by the end of his 
presidency. Increasing deficits were exactly what business groups had feared and why, as Prasad 
(2006:61) points out, businesses initially lobbied against the broad-based tax cuts for individuals. 
Business groups and others were worried that increased deficits would create a “crowding out” 
of the market that would put government and capital in competition, ultimately raising interest 
rates (Krippner 2011:94). However, this scenario never occurred. In the land of deficits, the 
Reagan administration found a savior in global capital markets. The Reagan administration 
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inadvertently stumbled on a way to finance deficits by opening to foreign (mostly Japanese) 
capital. 
Republicans were spooked by the size of the deficit and the Reagan administration began 
considering tax increases a mere two months after the passage of the ERTA tax cuts (Brownlee 
2016:188). However, in the 1990s, Republicans in state government rediscovered the political 
potential of tax cuts and eventually the local-level “tax cut fever” found its way into the national 
GOP (Prasad 2018:150-153). Politically, the lesson that Republicans learned from the Reagan 
tax cuts was, as Dick Cheney purportedly said, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter” (Martin 
2008:133). However, the enormous deficits produced by the supply-side strategy meant global 
finance became more important. The tension, or contradiction, inherent in the tax state was not 
resolved, but rather delayed. Indeed, financialization has become so critical in delaying fiscal 
crisis that Wolfgang Streeck suggests the tax state has given way to a “debt state” meaning “a 
state which covers a large, possibly rising, part of its expenditure through borrowing rather than 
taxation, thereby accumulating a debt mountain that it has to finance with an ever greater share 
of its revenue” (Streeck 2017:72-73). In some ways, the “debt state,” is another term for the 
“neoliberal” state since, as Harvey points out, neoliberalization “has meant the financialization of 
everything” (2005:33).  
Reliance on debt creates the eventual conditions for extreme austerity, or the “voluntary 
deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public 
spending to restore competitiveness” with the purported goal of “restoring” business confidence 
(Blyth 2013:2). Austerity is a form of politics as well as an economic program (Streeck 2013). 
Artificially constraining the fiscal capacity of the state through the combination of low taxes 
coupled with sustained or increasing expenditures has created a climate of “permanent austerity” 
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(Pierson 2002). Debt operates similarly to inflation by allowing the state to commit resources not 
yet available (Streeck 2017:36). Debt also, like inflation, gives the illusion of economic growth 
which can be used to tame legitimation crises (Streeck 2017:45-46). However, in the long-term, 
debt can also exacerbate legitimation crises by making it difficult or unattractive for 
policymakers to allocate resources from old to new programs since mandatory expenditures tend 
to consume most of the budget (Schäfer and Streeck 2013:2). The consequence of this is an 
overall decline in fiscal discretion as more and more of the budget gets taken up by mandatory 
spending on previous programs with slow maturation rates (Streeck and Mertens 2013:28). Less 
discretion over spending results in diminished “fiscal democracy,” or capacity for the public to 
exercise choice over spending (Genschel and Schwarz 2013). Debt is an attractive option for 
lawmakers because of the public often wants both government services and low taxes (Block 
2009). As sociologist Monica Prasad notes, “when a democracy is not forced to choose between 
higher taxes and lower spending, it chooses neither” (2018:15).  
The case of Kansas, however, represents what happens when a democracy is forced to 
choose. The comparison to the Reagan tax cuts is important for revealing the critical factor for 
explaining the reversal of the tax cuts: institutional context. In many ways, the Kansas tax plan is 
similar to other Republican tax cuts. For instance, the Kansas tax cuts both lowered the marginal 
rates for the personal income tax brackets as well as eliminated the top bracket entirely. This 
mirrored Reagan’s 1981 tax reform, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), which saw the 
top marginal rate reduced from 50 percent down to 28 percent and saw the total number of 
brackets reduced from 15 to just two. However, one of the critical differences between Kansas 
and previous supply-side tax policies is the institutional constraints of limited deficit capacity. In 
the absence of finance and its capacity to depoliticize tax cuts, social institutions are exposed to 
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the full effects of austerity. The inability to finance the tax cuts with debt, I argue, helps explain 
why the experience of the tax cuts in Kansas became more salient and thus provoked a 
movement to reverse the policy. As sociologist Bob Jessop explains, “whenever the naïve belief 
in the principle of efficient markets is confounded by experience, neoliberals pragmatically 
endorse a state of economic emergency that authorizes state action and the creation of fiat 
money” (2014:217). The U.S. federal government employs debt to delay fiscal crisis at the 
national-level, but most state governments are constitutionally obligated to balance their budgets 
annually and are unable to run massive deficits. Republicans, including Sam Brownback, often 
positively endorsed the state level limits to debt. As Brownback said during his infamous 
Morning Joe interview, “Fortunately, at the state level, you’ve got to balance your budget. You 
can’t just print money yet or anything else.” But “just printing money” through issuing debt is 
the crucial factors which allows Republicans to pursue and politically survive massive supply-
side tax cuts.  
However, the level of government is only one way the Kansas tax cuts differed from 
previous conservative tax policies. Significantly, this policy was an attempt to fully eliminate the 
income tax. Except for Alaska, no other U.S. state has repealed their income tax. And, with the 
case of Alaska, the 1980 repeal occurred because of dramatic changes in the state’s political 
economy as a massive influx of oil revenue found its way into state coffers after the completion 
of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline.1 The Kansas tax plan was more ideologically driven. Kansas 
eliminated the income tax solely on the promise of future supply-side gains. This is what makes 
the Kansas tax cutting experiment the clearest attempt yet to make supply-side true.  
                                                                   
1 After Alaska repealed the state income tax in 1980, there have been various attempts to reinstate it. A joint special committee in 
1986 did not recommend reinstating it, in 1987 and 1989 two different bills also died. More recently, with the fall in oil prices, 
Alaskans have again been grappling with whether to reinstate an income tax. As of the writing of this dissertation, that debate is 
still ongoing.  
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Secondly, the Kansas tax cuts represent something new in that they provoked widespread 
backlash and were eventually repealed by a Republican-dominated state legislature. Mostly state 
and local tax reductions fail to make national news; yet because of the boldness of the Kansas tax 
plan, the state had a great deal of attention placed on it. This is no doubt due in part to the fact 
that the Governor described his tax reform as “a real live experiment” in conservative supply-
side economics. Brownback was clear that this tax plan was supposed to be a model; a “red-state 
model,” as he put it. "My focus is to create a red-state model that allows the Republican ticket to 
say, 'See, we've got a different way, and it works,'" he told the Wall Street Journal (King, Jr. and 
Peters 2013). Not only was this the goal of Brownback, but the Republican Party and anti-tax 
activists all were excited to point to Kansas. Speaking on the Kansas tax cuts, Senate Republican 
leader Mitch McConnell said, “This is exactly the sort of thing we want to do here, in 
Washington, but can't, at least for now” (King, Jr. and Peters 2013). Similarly, Grover Norquist, 
President of Americans for Tax Reform, pointed to Kansas saying, “Kansas is the future. Kansas 
is the model” (ReasonTV 2015). And Arthur Laffer, who was a consultant on the Kansas tax cuts 
along with Stephen Moore, declared the tax cuts “A revolution in a cornfield… Truly 
revolutionary” (Gowen 2011). So the expectations for the Kansas reform was very high and all 
involved expressed a great deal of confidence. Brownback, in the same Wall Street Journal 
interview confidently said, “We've got a series of blue states raising taxes and a series of red 
states cutting… Now let's watch and see what happens” (King, Jr. and Peters 2013).  
These high expectations made the reversal of the tax cuts merely five years after they 
passed all the more difficult for supply-side adherents. For instance, only two years after 
Norquist declared that “Kansas is the model,” he reversed course, saying, “Kansas is an outlier… 
If you’re a Republican looking for a model, Kansas is not the model” (Berman 2017). And 
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Arthur Laffer, after praising the “revolution in a cornfield,” also reversed course, saying the state 
“sucks.” “Look at it,” he continued, Kansas “doesn’t have beaches, it doesn’t have palm trees. It 
doesn’t really have a low tax, what is it now, 4.9%, something like that. Take a look at my state, 
Tennessee. We have the lowest tax burden of any state in the nation, we have the highest growth 
in employment as a percentage of population of any state in the nation in the last 12 months, we 
have a budget surplus of $2 billion. Two billion dollars in this little crappy state!” (Rushe 2017). 
In Kansas, the visibility of the policy, coupled with the visibility of the policy’s negative effects, 
created the structural conditions for a counter-movement. 
 
Fiscal Sociology and Countermovements 
Fiscal sociologists argue that taxes are important for understanding social relations 
(Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009). Taxes form the basis of a dynamic and ongoing 
relationship between citizens and the state. In short, taxes are the manifestation of the social 
contract (Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009). But taxes are more than just a medium of 
relations. Tax relations illuminate important aspects of social life and help “define the social and 
cultural meaning of citizenship” (Mehrotra 2017:285). As Isaac Martin explains, tax policy can 
“reorient social relations and redirect social exchange” (2019). It follows, then, that specific 
fiscal approaches reorient social relations and redirect social exchanges in specific, differing 
ways. This study is particularly interested in understanding how supply-side policy approaches 
impact or transform social relations. Understanding this process is important because, since 
Reagan, supply-side has become the leading approach to tax reform for the Republican Party.2 
                                                                   
2 To be sure, the Republican Party is not alone in embracing tax policies that could be called neoliberal or supply-side (Berman 
and Pagnucco 2010). Sociologist Stephanie Mudge (2018), for instance, argues that traditionally leftist parties came to embrace 
the expansion of the market in the 1980s, bringing the left and right closer together in terms of economic policies.2 While this is 
true, there are still important differences between the GOP’s embrace of supply-side and the fiscal policies of Democrats and 
moderate Republicans. Among the most salient difference is the emphasis on the growth potential of tax cuts, meaning lowering 
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While supply-side is politically narrow in this sense, it is still worth understanding because it 
produces such massive effects. Supply-side tax reforms often result is drastic changes to a tax 
structure, from lowering rates to eliminating high-income tax brackets and eliminating 
deductions and credits. The result of drastic supply-side tax reforms translates into dramatic 
changes to everything government funds. As Monica Prasad explains, “tax cuts affect everything 
the state can do, by threatening state capacity itself” (2012:352). But more than altering a state’s 
tax structure, supply-side reforms also change the social relations between the “tax state,” public, 
and the economy. In other words, it instantiates a new form of social contract.  
In addition to altering the structure of the tax state, supply-side tax reforms fundamentally 
alter the social relations of the tax state. Where the Keynesian tax state is one that attempts to 
navigate the twin perils of accumulation and legitimation (O’Connor 2002), a neoliberal tax state 
attempts to maintain legitimation through accumulation. As a paradigm, supply-side relocates 
political and social relations to markets, rather than public institutions. This does not necessarily 
mean that supply-side is anti-state. On one level, supply-side actually aspires to be pro-tax state. 
Chief supply-side economist Arthur Laffer, for instance, famously predicted tax cuts will 
generate more in tax revenue for the government. However, in practice supply-side is very much 
anti-tax state, a mechanism used for “starving the beast” by restricting government revenues so 
much that government is forced to shrink. This view is best associated with anti-tax activist 
                                                                   
the rates or eliminating tax brackets will result in increased economic activity which will result in economic growth. Importantly, 
this view also necessitates the elimination of the type of tax policies that Democrats and moderates tend to favor: special tax 
breaks and incentives. The tax code is full of “loopholes,” favored by Democrats and Republicans alike (Howard 1997). Tax 
incentives and tax deductions, such as the home mortgage interest deduction or the state and local tax (SALT) deduction, eat into 
the tax base. These carve outs go against the dominant “efficiency-based” tax perspective of conservative economists; that of 
“lowering the rates and broadening the base” (Christensen 2017). As opposed to the efficiency-based perspective on tax policy, 
supply-siders “promoted a distinct and rather extreme set of ideas about tax policy, which only to a limited degree overlapped 
with mainstream efficiency-centered economic analysis” (Christensen 2017:40). 
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Grover Norquist who famously said his goal is to shrink government enough to drown it in a 
bathtub.  
Economic and political sociologists following the work of Karl Polanyi have long noted 
that economic life is deeply embedded in social relations and therefore there are social limits to 
market-based reforms. Yet, the long-term project of market liberals has been to disembed the 
market to create an autonomous, self-regulating market. However, as Polanyi noted, attempts to 
disembed economic relations are a “stark utopia” (2001:3) and are doomed to fail. The central 
tension in Polanyi’s thought is between his view that market liberalism attempts to disembed 
market relations from social arraignments and that economic relations are always embedded 
(Gemici 2007). However, according to sociologist Fred Block and Margaret Somers, Polanyi did 
not suggest market relations could ever be truly disembedded; rather they are “ideationally 
disembedded,” meaning that markets are re-embeded in different institutional, social, and 
political arrangements (Block and Somers 2014:155). In other words, dis-embedding is a creative 
act on the part of market liberalism. Polanyi saw market-liberalism of his day, a precursor to 
modern-day neoliberalism (Fraser 2011:139), as potentially a source of reembedding that creates 
institutional arrangements that expose people to increasingly harsh market forces that require 
them to adjust without public assistance. In other words, market relations are always embedded, 
but they can be embedded in different institutional arrangements that expose people to the 
harshness of the market to different degrees.  
Dis- or re-embedding creates enormous social, political, and economic instability. 
Consequently, Polanyi argues, as people are exposed to the effects of neoliberal re-embedding, 
there is always the possibility of a countermovement for social protection from market forces. 
“Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions,” Polanyi writes (2001:76), “human 
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beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute 
social dislocation.” The countermovement, Polanyi explained, “can be personified as the action 
of two organizing principles in society… The one was the principle of economic liberalism, 
aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market… the other was the principle of social 
protection aiming at conservation of man and nature” (2001:138-139). The clash of these two 
principles leads to “deep-seated institutional strain” (2001:140). However, Polanyi’s concept of a 
countermovement was historically situated and meant to explain a specific historical juncture 
(Kentikelensi 2018:41). As Michael Burawoy importantly notes, “We should not turn Polanyi’s 
double movement into an inexorable law. We need to examine the conditions for its operation” 
(2003:244). John Dewey also suggests a similar reading of a countermovement, writing “it is not 
instructive to say that a social movement to one extreme always ends by calling out a swing of 
the pendulum in the other direction, that there are radicals as well as conservative reactions. The 
question is one of specific fact.” (1929:816).3 In other words, while a double-movement may be 
a more generalized process, any given double-movement is specific and context-dependent. Any 
analysis of a double-movement must ground that analysis in that movement’s context. However, 
Polanyi’s insight also affords a greater understanding of contemporary responses to market 
liberalism. As Block and Somers summarize, the double-movement is created as “market 
fundamentalists and their allies attempt to construct their ideal world of a self-regulating market 
system, the destabilizing consequences set off countervailing movements by other groups in 
society who recognize the need to protect themselves and others from exposure to unmediated 
market forces” (2014:10).  
                                                                   
3 Dewey’s point here is more general and not in direct response to Polanyi.  
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A countermovement does not mean a social movement (Burawoy 2003; Kentikelenis 
2018). Rather, it refers to broader social and cultural responses to marketization. Polanyi’s 
concept of the countermovement has been critiqued for being overly normative (Konings 2015), 
functionalist (Offe 1998:40) and fetishizing society (see Block 2008). Indeed, Polanyi 
contributes to this misunderstanding by writing that the “countermove against economic 
liberalism and laissez-faire possessed all the unmistakable characteristics of a spontaneous 
reaction” (2001:156). However, the ambiguities in Polanyi’s thought has proven to be 
constructive for theorizing contemporary market liberalism (Holmes 2012:471). By suggesting a 
countermovement is the result of a “spontaneous reaction,” Polanyi ignores how this response 
occurs. In other words, he obscures what social mechanisms bring the countermovement about 
(Kentikelenis 2018:41). In this study, rather than view the social response to the fiscal crisis in 
Kansas as arising spontaneously, I argue this countermovement is supported by a pragmatist-
inspired social mechanism of collective problem solving. 
A pragmatist mechanism is thus “composed of chains or aggregations of actors 
confronting problem situations and mobilizing more or less habitual responses” (Gross 
2009:368). In the case of Kansas, the “chains or aggregations” are seen in the relations between 
various institutions. The tax cut created a massive problem for many Kansans. Had the effects of 
the tax cut been isolated only to schools, for example, it is possible the experience of the policy 
would not have been problematic enough to provoke a larger social response. According to 
Gross, understanding how mechanisms operate “requires that we grasp how the relevant 
individuals understand the situations before them and act on those understandings, helping 
thereby to enact the mechanism” (2009:369).  
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The analysis in this dissertation proceeds along this line. Taxation is “one of the most 
widely and persistently experienced relationships that individuals have with their government” 
(Mehrotra 2017:285). But the centrality of taxes means attempts at institutional change face 
important constraints. As a formal institution, taxation supports a number of other institutions 
and organizations which must adapt in response to changes in taxation. I argue the process of 
adaptation can support or constrain changes in the dominant institution (taxation) based on how 
that change is experienced by relevant individuals in other institutions and organizations. In the 
case of the Kansas tax cuts, no sector benefited from the change, thus in every sector, individuals 
understood the tax cuts as creating a problematic situation which needed to be solved. The effect 
of this collective problem-solving, in Kansas at least, resulted in a countermovement. By tracing 
how the tax cuts were experienced in different institutional sectors, I follow recent Polanyian-
inspired work which argued analysts “need to adequately trace the micro-foundations of 
countermovements by grounding analyses in actors’ purposive behavior” (Kentikelenis 2018:42). 
Actors in Kansas understood the tax cuts as creating a problematic situation. Brownback himself 
even understood the problematic situation created by the tax cuts, which is why he tried to 
desperately to obfuscate the effects. Actors in Kansas understood the tax cuts as problematic 
precisely because of closely knit institutional arrangements at the local level.  
Recent theoretical work on countermovements has suggested the concept should be 
grounded in an understanding of concrete social practices. Empirically, this has meant grounding 
the analysis of countermovements in local contexts (Kentikelenis 2018). For Polanyi, reactions 
against the market are rooted in the local (Burawoy 2003:240). And in Kansas, localized 
experiences of the fiscal crisis, exemplified by the responses of local businesses and schools, 
shaped the response across the state and hastened the policy’s reversal.  
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 But if extreme supply-side tax cuts provoke responses for social protection, why have 
other large tax cuts, such as the Reagan or Bush tax cuts, not created the same response? Afterall, 
the Bush tax cuts had a broad base of public support despite the tax cuts only benefiting the 
economic elite (Bartels 2005; Hacker and Pierson 2005). Following Burawoy’s call to examine 
the conditions under which a type of countermovement arises (2003:244), I ask under what 
conditions do tax cuts provoke a countermovement? My argument is supply-side punctures the 
social limits of fiscal relations in the absence of the depoliticizing capacity of financialization. 
As Krippner notes, depoliticization removes certain questions from the realm of debate “to the 
realm of fate” (2011:145). And the politics of the economy is particularly susceptible to 
depoliticization when the market is invoked as a quasi-natural force or even as a deity (Cox 
2016). In Kansas, the severity of the fiscal crisis, coupled with the lack of financialization, 
repoliticized the economy by bringing economic policy back into the realm of political debate.  
 
Fiscal Citizenship 
In repoliticizing the economy, the Kansas tax cuts reinvigorated a sense of fiscal 
citizenship across the state. Fiscal citizenship, originally coined by economist Richard Musgrave 
in 1996, but recently elaborated by Lawrence Zelenak (2013), refers to the practice of taxpaying 
as well as becoming informed about tax and spending policies (Zelenak 2013:17). As Zelenak 
argues, the process of taxpaying serves “the important civic purpose of recognizing and 
formalizing the financial responsibilities of citizenship” (2013:4). Neoliberalism broadly 
opposed a fully democratic idea of citizenship (Somers 2008; Brown 2015). According to 
political philosopher Wendy Brown, “when the domain of the political itself is rendered in 
economic terms, the foundation vanishes for citizenship concerned with public things and the 
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common good” (2015:38). The Kansas tax cuts were an assault of fiscal citizenship in two main 
ways. First, the tax cuts fully exempted business owners from paying the highly visible income 
tax, thus eliminating owner’s capacity to exercise fiscal citizenship. But secondly, Brownback 
began promoting less visible sales and consumption taxes. Visibility and invisibility of taxes 
have consequences for fiscal citizenship because it is the visibility of a tax which “calls the 
taxpayer’s attention to his [sic] status as a taxpayer and a purchaser of civilization” (Zelenak 
2013:4). 
Taxation has often been neglected in contemporary understandings of citizenship, but the 
erosion of the tax base through neoliberal economic policies corresponds with a weakening of 
citizenship (Turner 2016:685). Neoliberalism and market liberalism contractualizes citizenship 
and “collapses the boundaries that protect the public sphere and civil society from market 
penetration” (Somers 2008:2-3). Somewhat paradoxically, the tax cuts in Kansas promoted a 
citizenship concerned with public things and reestablished the boundary between the public 
sphere and the market.4 Both the design of the policy, as well as its discursive components (“shot 
of adrenaline,” “experiment”), Kansans were primed to identify and trace the fiscal crisis back to 
the tax cuts, despite the variety of techniques the Brownback administration used to claim 
otherwise. 
 
Data and Methods 
I conducted an ethnographic case study in Kansas between 2006 and 2009. Case studies 
are an in-depth research approach that utilizes various methods and data sources to investigate 
                                                                   
4 Wendy Brown (2015) also notes the neoliberal erosion of citizenship. According to Brown, the “replacement of citizenship 
defined as concern with the public good by citizenship reduced to the citizen as homo oeconomicus also eliminates the very idea 
of a people, a demos asserting its collective political sovereignty” (2015:39). 
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and capture the complexity of the object of study and situate it within its broader context (Yin 
2014:16; Stake 1995). Though a case study is an investigation of a single social phenomenon, 
cases are often an “instance of a broader phenomenon” (Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991:2). It is 
up to the researcher to distinguish what the larger issues the case informs (Luker 2008:51-75). A 
case is always an instance of something and single case studies are appropriate when the given 
case is a critical or extreme case of a culturally or sociologically important phenomenon (Yin 
2014:51-53). Cases can be an instance of a population or a case can be an instance of a 
conceptual property (Abbott 1992:53).  
For this dissertation, I view Kansas as an exemplary instance of supply-side economics 
and neoliberal policies. The tax policy passed in Kansas is the clearest attempt yet to make the 
idea of supply-side economics true (Mazerov 2018). Moreover, case studies are often crucial for 
“anticipating the range of objective possibilities that could follow” from the case (Sjoberg, 
Williams, Vaughn, and Sjoberg 1991:67). While the tax policy in Kansas was repealed, several 
elements were adopted nationally by the Republicans in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). 
As such, Kansas is not only a critical case in understanding neoliberal politics it is also crucial 
for understanding the possible effects of the TCJA.  
Even though cases are often a single phenomenon, they are also multi-faceted. Thus, case 
studies rely on various sources of data that are brought into conversation with each other and 
used to understand each facet of the case. Data for this dissertation are drawn primarily from 110 
interviews conducted over the course of my field work with a variety of informants, consisting of 
Brownback administration officials, current and former Kansas lawmakers, school district 
officials, local chambers of commerce, think tank staff, and staff of special interest and lobbying 
firms. Table 1 provides an overview of my informants. Interviews were conducted both in-
19 
 
person and by phone and were recorded with participant’s consent. The average length of an 
interview was 61 minutes, though interviews ranged from 148 minutes to the shortest of 10 
minutes. In cases where my informant declined to be recorded, notes were taken during the 
interview or immediately following the conclusion of the interview. I also asked participants if 
they consented to have their full name used in this project. In cases where my informant 
declined, I have used an anonymized pseudonym or simply refer to their organization. 
Additionally, because this fieldwork took place over two years, the context in which informants 
provided information changes in ways that might make it difficult or impossible to know what 
may prove harmful (Pacewicz 2016:319). As such, I have exercised an abundance of caution and 
used my best judgement to anonymize respondents even in cases where they granted permission 
to be identified at the time. The study was submitted and approved by the IRB at the University 
of Kansas.5  
Table 1 Research Participants 
Sector Number Percent of Total By Type Number 
School 
Organizations 




School Officials 18 
Business 
Organizations 
26 24% Chambers of 
Commerce 
21 
Other Business 5 
Advocacy 
Organizations 








8 7% N/A 8 
Miscellaneous  5 5% N/A 5 
TOTAL 110 100%  110 
 
                                                                   




I sampled participants differently depending on their affiliation. However, my sampling 
strategy broadly followed the “theoretical sampling” technique of grounded theory. This 
approach highlights that it is “concepts and not people” that are sampled (Corbin and Strauss 
2015:135). Marcus notes a similar technique called “follow the practice” (Marcus 1995:105-113) 
where you follow the movement of your case through different contexts. This process is 
essentially question-driven; researchers “go to places, persons, and situations that will provide 
information about the concepts they want to learn more about” (Corbin and Strauss 2015:135). 
This sampling technique allows for flexibility in answering the research question because it 
allows the researcher to adjust the parameters of the study in light of either new information or 
the occurrence of new events. This flexible research design also allows for “abduction,” allowing 
me the opportunity to incorporate surprises or anomalous during the research process (Tavory 
and Timmermans 2014). I continued interviewing until I reached saturation, meaning that no 
new categories, themes, or theoretical leads were emerging. My research design focused on the 
policy domain of the Kansas tax cuts. Within this domain, my analysis focused on actors, 
organizations, and practices centrally involved in the policy. I allowed the policy actors most 
crucial to understanding the policy to emerge inductively and abductively over the course of my 
research. 
Respondents were drawn from different institutional groups that emerged over the course 
of my research. Once these themes, or groups, emerged as important to the study, they 
transformed from themes to sites. This multi-sited approach (Macrus 1995) then allowed me to 
investigate the relationship actors and organizations in each site had with the state’s fiscal crisis. 
To study these sites more systematically, I purposively sampled actors in each area using 
theoretical sampling as well as with other well-known sampling strategies. For instance, I 
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purposively sampled policymakers by identifying key lawmakers associated with fiscal policy. I 
focused on members of the Kansas House and Senate taxation committees. Of the possible 23 
lawmakers on the House Tax Committee and 9 on the Senate Tax Committee, I conducted 
interviews with 17 representatives and four senators. Additionally, I interviewed former 
lawmakers sampled primarily through a snowball technique. I also used snowball sampling for 
interviews conducted with representatives of many of the policy and advocacy organizations. 
Kansas is a small state and the number of lobbyists is small enough that I was able to gain 
referrals from respondents. I sampled local chambers of commerce using criterion sampling. My 
focus on chambers emerged abductively (Tavory and Timmermans 2014) from observations in 
tax committee. The criteria I imposed for sampling chambers was based on their political activity 
and their representation of local business communities. The chambers I interviewed were the 
largest and most politically active chambers across the state. Finally, school district officials 
were randomly sampled.6 Using a list of all districts in Kansas, districts were randomly sampled 
based on their student population and the change in enrollment. This produced six different 
categories (small/increasing; medium/increasing; large/increasing; small/decreasing; 
medium/decreasing; large/decreasing) from which districts were sampled.  
Interviews, however, are not the only data source I rely on. I triangulated my interview 
data with ethnographic observations conducted at Kansas House and Senate tax committee 
hearings as well as rallies and other events centered around the tax cuts. I also conducted 
numerous informal conversations around the state and around the Kansas statehouse. 
Additionally, I collected and analyzed local newspaper accounts, blog posts, and Twitter posts 
over the period of the policy (2009-2017). I collected budget documents and policy handouts 
                                                                   
6 This portion of the project was done with the collaboration and support of Emily Rauscher. 
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produced by state agencies and other policy actors, such as think tanks. Finally, I also use public 
opinion and survey data produced by the Docking Institute at Fort Hays State University.  
Interviews were transcribed and coded for emergent themes using Atlas.ti. According to a 
grounded theory approach, coding usually proceeds in three main phases. Open coding, the 
search for themes that can be developed further, is followed by axial coding where the researcher 
systematically examines a promising theme (Tavory and Timmermans 2014:53-54). Axial 
coding then gives way to selective coding “in which the researcher works out one theme in a 
more formal theoretical way” (Tavory and Timmermans 2014:54). However, coding is also a 
“cyclical act” (Saldaña 2016:9). Thus, the findings of selective coding often motivated me to 





How We Got Here 
 
 Sam Brownback came into office committed to reforming the state’s income tax. To 
understand how dramatic the 2012 tax cut was, both politically and in terms of policy, this 
chapter traces the history of the Kansas income tax and the legislative process of how 
Brownback got the tax cuts passed. This chapter shows two things. First, in terms of policy, the 
tax cuts diverged sharply from the historical development of the income tax. Kansas has 
historically relied on the “three-legged stool” approach to taxes, exemplified by an 
approximately even distribution of property, sales, and income taxes. The 2012 tax reforms 
essentially removed one of the legs of the stool. And second, while Republicans are committed 
to lowering taxes, in Kansas, intra-Republican splits between moderates and conservatives 
created a legislative hurdle for Brownback. Instead of tax cuts gaining majority Republican 
support, the size of the tax cuts split the Party, forcing conservative legislators to enact 
innovative maneuvers to ensure the passage of the tax cut policy. 
 
Establishing the Kansas Income Tax 
Kansas’s tax structure consists largely of three main taxes: sales tax, income taxes, and 
property taxes. Established in 1859, the property tax is the oldest tax in the state. Indeed, 
property tax is the oldest tax in America. And like the country as a whole, at one point the state 
financed its whole operation solely on property taxes. However, a combination of economic 
crises, changing expectations about the role of government, and federal policies eventually led to 
changes in the general property tax, and thus a diversification of the overall tax structure of the 
state. By the early 1900s, there was a general trend away from funding government 
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administration towards funding state services. For instance, Eric Englund’s 1925 report, The 
Trend of Real Estate Taxation in Kansas from 1910 to 1923, details that, while taxes levied for 
the purposes of administration increased 6.5 percent during those years, taxes levied for the 
purposes of education rose 84.8 percent and for roads by 100.1 percent (Fischer 1996:151). As 
expenditures on schools and highways increased, so too did property taxes, particularly on farm 
land. Between 1910 and 1923, tax on farms increased 167.8 percent (Fischer 1996:150). As a 
result of high farm taxes, farmers – an important constituency in Kansas – began rallying for 
lower property taxes.  
In 1929, the Kansas Tax Commission released another report which, unlike an earlier 
1901 report, focused not on how to remake the property tax, but instead focused on identifying 
other potential sources of revenue, specifically an income tax and a severance tax on oil and gas 
(Fischer 1996:156). Eric Englund’s report concluded by recommending Kansas adopt an income 
tax (Fischer 1996:147). The merits of the income tax, according to the Commission report, rested 
on the taxpayer’s ability to pay based on income as well as its ability to tax money not captured 
under the property tax (Fischer 1996:155). They recommended implementing a graduated 
income tax starting at 1.5 percent on the first $1,000 of income and increasing to 5 percent on 
income greater than $10,000 (Fischer 1996:156). In addition to an income tax, the commission 
also recommended implementing a 2 percent severance tax on oil and gas and mineral 
production. This tax would help fund schools (the commission recommended using one-third of 
the collected revenue to return to school districts) thus lowering the property tax (Fischer 
1996:156). The commission also considered, but ended up rejecting, recommending a sales tax 
and a bank tax. These taxes, particularly the sales tax, were said to have merit, but in the end the 
commission decided they would be nearly impossible to implement effectively (Fischer 
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1996:157). Not all of the 1929 Commission’s recommendations were taken up immediately. The 
recommendations in the report, nonetheless, laid the foundation for the modern Kansas tax 
structure.   
Beginning in the 1930s, partially as a result of the commission report and partially 
because of other political factors, Kansas’ tax system began to change and become more 
diversified. The development of the Kansas income tax is strongly tied to the emergence of 
Kansas populism in the late 1880s and early 1980s. Populists emerged in Kansas in the wake of 
agricultural collapse in the early 1880s. Faced with drought which caused crops to fail, grain 
prices and land values to all fall, many farmers, already saddled with debts,7 lost their farms to 
foreclosure.  
 Motivated by a sentiment that the state had not done enough to help during the farm 
crisis, farmers began to organize a political movement aimed at creating egalitarian reforms and 
challenging Republican dominance in the state. The movement, which eventually became the 
People’s Party, advocated for a variety of political and economic reforms. Among the list of 
reforms the populists wished to advanced included tax reform. Specifically, the populists 
believed existing tax policy unfairly benefited the wealthy. The property tax, which was still the 
only tax at the time, fell heaviest on farmers while other major landholders, especially the 
                                                                   
7 Two major agricultural disasters struck Kansas prior to the rise of populism. First, was the drought of 1860 and second was the 
grasshopper invasion of 1874. These disasters might have put people off from migrating to Kanas except pamphlets and 
brochures sent to people back east convinced enough people that the drought was an anomaly – a once-in-a-lifetime event. And, 
for a time it seemed like it might be the case. In the late 1870s and early 1880s, the amount of rain did increase. This, by 
accounts, lead to a general overabundance of confidence in the future. As McNall explains, “Convinced that their prosperity 
depended on the railroad line, towns would compete with one another over the size of the bond issue they were willing to 
underwrite” 1988:75). As such, some towns held amounts of debt that exceeded the assessed value of the entire town (McNall 
1988:75). Farmers, too, felt comfortable taking on huge amounts of debt. McNall notes that in 1890, for instance, 60.23 percent 
of all acres in Kansas were mortgaged (Compared to 28.86 percent nationally). Further, the amount of debt on Kansas farmland 
stood at $175 million compared to just $90.5 million in neighboring Nebraska. This bubble eventually burst, setting up the state 
for the populist farmer movement.   
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railroads, were usually not taxed. Populists advocated for taxes on railroads and bondholders, 
but, additionally, they also strongly advocated for a graduated income tax.  
In the 1890s, the populists swept into power in Kansas. However, it would take time 
before they would attempt to implement their ideas into policy, particularly with taxes. Indeed, 
“Kansas progressives… showed little interest in a state income tax before 1919” (Flentje and 
Aistrup 2010:177). By 1919, however, Progressive Republican Governor Henry Allen proposed 
enacting a graduated income tax and the legislature passed an amendment that would have 
allowed the state to levy a personal income tax. But in 1920, Kansas voters rejected the 
amendment (Flentje and Aistrup 2010:177). Another income tax amendment was proposed in 
1923 by Democratic governor Jonathon Davis. However, this time the legislature, dominated by 
Republicans, rejected the idea (Flentje and Aistrup 2010:177).  
 By 1924, however, major agricultural lobbying groups, such as the Kansas Farm Bureau, 
became involved in the fight for the income tax and began lobbying lawmakers to enact an 
income tax as a way to appease the property tax burden on farmers (Flentje and Aistrup 
2010:177). As a result of this lobbying pressure, progressive Republican Clyde Reed, elected 
governor in 1928, promised to enact an income tax. The legislature approved an amendment to 
be put to Kansas voters who again rejected it in a 1930 referendum. The Farm Bureau, aided by 
the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, however, continued to lobby hard for the legislature to 
resubmit the amendment to voters. In 1930, Democrat Harry Woodring was elected and the 
called for resubmission of the income tax question to voters. The appeal for resubmission 
succeeded in passing the legislature again. The income tax vote was held in 1932, which was 
also a gubernatorial election year. Woodring and his opponent, Republican Alf Landon who 
would win the election. When the income tax question was finally voted on, the fourth attempt at 
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passing it, voters approved the adoption of a state income tax with 58 percent of the vote (Fischer 
1996:159). Landon took the income tax vote as a mandate and, while the income tax ran into 
resistance from business groups who lobbied instead for a sales tax, on the last day of the 
session, Governor Landon signed the bill and introduced a personal income tax and a corporate 
income tax (Flentje and Aistrup 2010:178). The initial income tax was a graduated income tax 
from 1 percent of income up to $2,000 up to 4 percent on income over $7,000 (Fischer 
1996:160). Corporate income was taxed at 2 percent (Fischer 1996:16). 
 
The Three-Legged Stool 
 The new state income tax, as well as the state sales tax which was introduced in 1937, 
effectively diversified the state’s tax structure, reducing Kansas’ dependence on the property tax. 
For instance, in FY 1930, the property tax comprised 82 percent of state and local taxes in 
Kansas. In FY 2017, however, property taxes comprised only 34 percent (Kansas Legislative 
Research Department 2017). While there were adjustments over time, the state’s income, sales, 
and property tax rates remained largely unchanged for decades. However the most impactful 
changes that have occurred to the tax structure have occurred largely due to school finance 
litigation, and in particular the 1992 school finance lawsuit. The 1992 lawsuit is noteworthy 
because it creates the tax structure that Brownback tried to change in 2012. The 1992 lawsuit 
will be discussed further in Chapter Five, however, for now it is worth explaining that the 1992 
lawsuit established what is known as the “three-legged stool.”  
 Prior to the 1992 school funding lawsuit, school property tax rates across the state varied 
dramatically, from a low of 9.12 mills in Burlington, where the state’s only nuclear power plant 
is located, to a high of 97.69 mills in Parsons, Kansas (Kansas Legislative Research Department 
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2017:1). This discrepancy in mill rates meant that taxpayers in Burlington were paying 
significantly less than taxpayers in Parsons to generate the same amount of property tax dollars. 
For instance, for a property in Burlington with an assessed valuation of $50,000, the property tax 
bill would be around $456. However, the same valued property in Parsons would generate a 
property tax bill of around $4,885.8 The 1992 school finance legislation removed this 
discrepancy by establishing a uniform mill levy across the state. In equalizing mill rates, the 
1992 school funding law fundamentally changed the composition of the Kansas tax structure, 
particularly from the point of view of the taxpayer. The post-1992 tax system established an 
approximately even distribution of tax burden across state and local property, sales, and income 
taxes. In FY 2000, for instance, property taxes accounted for 31.3 percent of state and local tax 
revenue while income taxes accounted for 27 percent and sales taxes accounted for 28.6 (Kansas 
Legislative Research Department 2000:8).  
 This relative balance between the three taxes resulted from the 1992 school finance law, 
but it was also institutionalized by the 1995 Governor’s Tax Equity Task Force. The Task Force 
set out several objectives and recommendations for policymakers. Among the eleven objectives, 
the Task Force emphasized Kansas needs to “maintain its enviable reputation as a fiscally 
responsible state” and any future “tax revision should not unduly erode the tax base” because 
“Kansans should be able to rely upon a stable tax policy” (1995:13). The Task Force summarized 
their findings by stressing “The state and local tax system should be balanced and diversified. A 
diversified tax system offers a blend of economic tradeoffs. Because all revenue sources have 
their weaknesses, a balanced tax system will reduce the magnitude of problems caused by over 
reliance on a single tax source. It will also result in lower rates on each tax and reduce the 
                                                                   
8 For a discussion of the politics of property tax assessment, see Martin (2008:) 
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pressure of competition from other states that have lower rates for a particular tax” (1995:13). 
The balanced and diversified approach to tax policy in Kansas, established by the 1992 school 
funding lawsuit and institutionalized in 1995 persisted, more or less unchanged, until the election 
of Sam Brownback.  
 
“There gets to be a point in time when the consequences of not raising taxes is greater than 
raising them.” 
The 1995 Report on Tax Equity also highlighted that “revenue system must be able to 
weather economic recessions to preserve some stability in the funding of essential services” 
(1995:12). A three-legged stool approach to fiscal policy “should help stability in times of 
economic uncertainty,” the Report suggested. However, the size and scope of the Great 
Recession pushed this claim to its limit.  
Like many other states, the Great Recession hit Kansas hard. In FY 2010, 34 states, 
Kansas included, had budget imbalances greater than 10 percent of their budget (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2009). Job losses exacerbated budget deficits. Between 
November 2007 and July 2009, Kansas’ unemployment numbers doubled from 4 percent to 
nearly 8 percent. With mounting unemployment, states lost out on revenue from income tax 
revenues. With the loss of jobs came a loss of revenue for the state in the form of lost income tax 
receipts. Reduced purchasing power among the public also translated into lower sales tax 
receipts. States across America responded to the Recession in a variety of different ways, either 
by enacting mid-year across-the-board budget cuts or increasing revenue through increased 
taxation (Campbell and Sances 2013). Lawmakers responded to Kansas’ fiscal situation by 
enacting both tax increases and budget cuts. However, Kansas was also forced to resort to short-
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term borrowing. Short-term borrowing usually takes the form of a certificate of indebtedness 
which operates essentially as an “IOU” for certificate holders.  
On Monday February 16, 2009, state budget director Duane Goossen indicated that the 
state had only $10.4 million in the state treasury – well short of the $24 million needed by that 
Friday for the state to make payroll and begin issuing income tax refunds. Democratic Governor 
Kathleen Sebelius, who had indicated she did not want a tax increase, requested from the State 
Finance Council a certificate of indebtedness to transfer $225 Million from other state funds into 
the State General. However, her request, which would usually be routine, faced stiff opposition 
from Republican leaders in the House and Senate. The Republican leadership, Steve Morris in 
the Senate and Mike O’Neal in the House, exploited the partisan makeup of the State Finance 
Council (6 Republicans and 3 Democrats) to force Sebelius to sign the GOP’s budget-
rescission bill, cutting $300 million from the current year’s budget, before the transfer would be 
approved. The Republican leadership’s argument was that it was illegal for the governor to issue 
new debt before the budget was balanced.9 The bill, which Sebelius claimed awaited a veto, 
made large, across-the-board cuts to all state spending (3.4 percent reduction in total), including 
K-12 education. It was the K-12 cuts that Sebelius declared unacceptable, particularly because 
there was only four months left in the school year. However, not wanting to be responsible for 
being unable to issue tax refunds or pay public employees, Sebelius signed the budget cuts, but 
line-item vetoing some of the steepest cuts to education. 
 During the 2009 legislative session, rumors were circulated widely that Sebelius could be 
tapped as Obama’s Secretary of Health and Human Services. Those rumors proved to be true and 
Sebelius resigned her position as Kansas governor on April 28, 2009. She was succeeded by her 
                                                                   
9 However, the council had previously allowed the state to borrow twice before during that fiscal year in the amounts of $550 
million and $250 million (the Governor had requested $400M, but the GOP only allowed $250M). 
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lieutenant Governor Mark Parkinson, former chairman of the Kansas Republican Party who 
switched to the Democratic Party to be Sebelius’ running mate in 2006. Sebelius had succeeded 
in balancing the budget through a combination of budget cuts and other transfers before her 
departure. However, the following year’s budget was still projected to be unbalanced. The rest of 
the 2009 session was devoted to resolving the projected $328 million dollar projected budget 
shortfall. In his first and only address10 to the legislature, Parkinson urged “shared sacrifice” to 
balance the budget (Carpenter 2009a). A week later the senate sent Parkinson a budget bill which 
included a mix of budget cuts (2.75 percent across-the-board cut) and tax increases ($61 million) 
and revenue pulled from other sources.11 
By June 2009 it was clear Parkinson’s proposal would be inadequate and even more 
budget cuts would be needed. Parkinson decided to address the budget cuts himself rather than 
call a special legislative session. On the last day of the 2009 fiscal year, Parkinson announced 
another round of budget cuts, followed in quick succession by a further 2 percent cut to 
government agencies and still another round of cuts ($259 million) in November 2009. In total, 
over five rounds of allotments, approximately $1 billion was cut from the budget in 2009 under 
Democrats Sebelius and Parkinson. The last round of budget cuts, however, hit what Parkinson 
called “basic services,” prompting him to apologize to Kansans, saying he was “genuinely sorry” 
(Associated Press 2009). These cuts hit public employees and education spending particularly 
hard, forcing public employees to take unpaid furloughs and schools to absorb another $36 
million in cuts. In response to the extreme austerity caused by the fiscal crisis, Parkinson urged 
                                                                   
10 The speech was seen as hugely successful not least because he delivered it without the help of a teleprompter. Many of the 
legislators remarked how passionate the governor seemed, passion which no doubt helped his legislative agenda during this tough 
time.  
11 “The legislation includes a series of one-time revenue enhancements, including $50 million in casino development fees and the 
withholding of $25 million promised to local governments to offset business tax cuts. The last-minute $61 million tax measure is 




Kansans to “dig deep” and contribute to churches and charities to lessen the impact (Rothschild 
2009).  
After several rounds of budget cuts, however, discussions began in the Kansas legislature 
over the question of whether a tax increase would be necessary to fund basic government 
services. Parkinson, who still was faced with a budget shortfall of $300 million on the eve of the 
2010 legislative session, promised to not cut education further and indicated he would entertain 
the idea of a tax increase to help balance the budget. “There gets to be a point in time,” 
Parkinson said, “when the consequences of not raising taxes is greater than raising them” 
(Carlson 2010).  
When the 2010 legislative session began, Parkinson proposed a temporary one-cent sales 
tax increase as well as an increase to the cigarette tax. Parkinson’s tax bill raised an estimated 
$308 million in sales tax by taking the sales tax from 5.3 percent to 6.3 percent. After three 
years, the sales tax was schedule to drop to 5.7 percent with 0.4 percent going to further fund the 
state highway fund. In addition to the sales tax increase, Parkinson also requested $69 million in 
extra tobacco taxes in the form of a 79 cent per pack increase to the cigarette tax. Along with 
Kansas, thirteen other states (and the District of Columbia) adopted temporary tax measures 
between 2008 and 2011 in response to the recession (Francis and Moore 2014). However, for 
Democrats and Republicans, adopting a sales tax increase was cause for concern. Democrats 
objected to the state relying on regressive sales taxes to further fund government. Republicans, 
such as House Speaker Mike O’Neal, asserted, “Raising taxes, either directly or through 
elimination of tax incentives for business expansion and development, would stifle growth and 
recovery by taking precious capital out of the hands of the businesses that remain” (Carpenter 
2010a). In contrast to O’Neal’s view, however, Wichita State University economist John Wong 
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produced a report which claimed that the economic consequences of more budget cuts would 
outweigh any job losses from increasing the sales tax. According to the report, a higher sales tax 
would diminish economic output by $363 million compared to $420 million if the state pursued 
further budget cuts. Wong’s report was met with resistance from conservative economists, such 
as Art Hall, who would have input in the development of Brownback tax policy. The powerful 
Kansas Chamber of Commerce also came out against the tax increase and criticized legislators 
who supported it, saying, “the Legislature has failed to address the needs and wishes of the 
business community. It has instead catered to the needs of those at the government trough” 
(Rothschild 2010a). Despite these political challenges, the reality of the budget became nearly 
overwhelming. In April 2010, for instance, revenue forecasts were revised downward which 
showed a larger projected shortfall of $510 million, up from $450 million. For supporters of 
Parkinson’s plan, the budget shortfall made the case for passing the temporary sales tax. 
Opponents, however, continued to insist raising the sales tax, even temporarily, would hurt small 
businesses and dissuade them from hiring.  
In the end, Parkinson’s plan prevailed and the legislature enacted the sales tax increase. 
Conservative Republicans, who had been united against the tax increase, continued to oppose it 
as a job killer. House Speaker, Mike O’Neal said after the sales tax increase passed that it was 
just “big government digging into the pockets of hard-working Kansans in an attempt to make 
government stronger at the expense of the private sector” (Carpenter 2010b). Conservative 
Senator Susan Wagle argued that a higher sales tax would encourage sales tax avoidance in the 
form of people crossing the border to do their shopping in Missouri. The sales tax hike also riled 
the Kansas Chamber, who vowed to punish those lawmakers who voted it: “In the coming 
weeks, we will be working tirelessly to expose those who voted to impose higher taxes on job 
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creators and families” (Rothschild 2010b). Likewise, the state director for the Kansas chapter of 
the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) said “Our members are furious with 
lawmakers for raising taxes now” (Rothschild 2010c). Moderate Republicans and Democrats, 
however, praised the Governor and the tax increase. Indeed, after casting his vote in favor of the 
tax increase, Democrat Tom Hawk remarked, "Perhaps I won't be popular, but I think perhaps it's 
my chance to do what is right” (Hollingsworth 2010). The new sales tax rate took effect July 1, 
2010.  
The political battle over the temporary sales tax increase is an important episode because 
it directly establishes the context in which the Brownback tax cuts take place. While 
conservative lawmakers and political groups railed against Parkinson’s proposed sales tax, these 
same actors would quickly change their tune. As Brownback would begin to make the case for 
the radical reduction in state income tax, many of the same conservative lawmakers and 
lobbyists would shift towards advocating for higher sales taxes as a way to buy down the state 
income tax.  
 
The Election of Sam Brownback 
 Governor Parkinson stayed true to his word and refused to run for Governor in 2010. 
Instead, Democratic state senator Tom Holland ran against the U.S. Senator from Kansas, Sam 
Brownback. Brownback is a seasoned and ambitious politician. He got his political start in 1986 
when he was appointed as the Secretary of Agriculture for the State of Kansas. In 1994 
Brownback was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Then, in a special election in 1996 
to replace Senator Bob Dole’s vacated seat, Brownback was elected to the U.S. Senate defeating 
both Sheila Frahm (who was appointed to that seat by Bob Dole and backed by the GOP 
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establishment) and Democrat Jill Docking in the general election. In 1998 Brownback again ran 
for the Senate seat, winning reelection for a full six-year term. He was reelected again 2004. In 
2006, Brownback took aim at the presidency. During his presidential campaign, he described 
himself as “an economic, a fiscal, a social and a compassionate conservative” (Sidoti 2007). 
Brownback’s presidential run, however, was lackluster and ended even before the Iowa 
caucuses. He dropped out and ended up endorsing John McCain.  
 After his unsuccessful 2008 presidential campaign, Brownback turned his attention back 
to Kansas. Brownback had promised to only serve two terms in the U.S. and towards the end of 
2008, he announced he would be retiring in 2010. But he was not done with political office. On 
June 1, 2010 Brownback officially announced he was running for governor of Kansas. As his 
running mate, Brownback chose Jeff Colyer, a medical doctor who had previously served in the 
Kansas House of Representatives and Senate.   
 Brownback easily12 won the GOP primary and during his victory speech declared, “We 
can’t keep going down the path of more taxes, more regulation and more litigation” 
(Diepenbrock 2010). As the general election campaign began, Brownback unveiled the 
“Roadmap for Kansas,” which included five goals Brownback would prioritize as governor. 
These goals included increase net personal income, increase private sector employment, increase 
the percentage of fourth graders reading at grade level, increase the percentage of high school 
graduates who are college or career ready, and decrease the percentage of Kansas’ children who 
live in poverty. Tom Holland, for his part, labeled Brownback’s plan the “roadmap to ruin.” In 
addition to the “Roadmap,” Brownback also indicated that he would rewrite the school finance 
formula, freeze state spending, and establish an “Office of the Repealer.” Indeed, the Office of 
                                                                   
12 Brownback’s primary opponent was Joan Heffington. Brownback won the primary with over 80 percent of the vote. 
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the Repealer garnered national media attention and was a centerpiece of his campaign. “People 
just love the idea,” Brownback said remarked (Davey 2010).  
Brownback had made his name nationally championing socially conservative causes, 
such as opposition to abortion or same-sex marriage. However, during the gubernatorial 
campaign, Brownback made regulatory and fiscal policy his main priority. For instance, during 
his campaign bus tour around the state, Brownback told a group of real estate agents in Wichita 
that he wanted to reform the tax system and in Manhattan he laid out his plan for rural ‘free 
opportunity zones’ (Associated Press 2010a). However, his view on taxes was not unfamiliar. 
While he was still a U.S. Senator and chairman of the Senate Appropriations committee, 
Brownback proposed using the District of Columbia as a “laboratory” for testing out the merits 
of a ‘flat tax.’13 Washington, D.C., Brownback said, would be a perfect location to try out this 
experiment because it was not a state, though he did suggest that “If D.C. feels bad about being a 
laboratory in the federal district sense of it, then I would offer to pair them with Kansas,” 
(Washington Times 2006). Brownback would later echo this type of language, famously 
referring to his tax policy as an “experiment.”  
In the end, the campaign for governor was never very close. Brownback never polled 
below 50 percent and he also out-fund raised his Democratic opponent $1.2 million to $282,741 
by the end of July 2010 (Associated Press 2010b). Brownback won the election decidedly, 
winning with 63.3 percent of the vote (to Holland’s 32.2 percent).14 Brownback’s campaign and 
subsequent victory was seen, even at the time, as a turning point in Kansas politics. The state was 
moving away from its politically moderate roots. Indeed, popular imagery from political 
commentators like Thomas Frank (2004) aside, Brownback was the first conservative elected to 
                                                                   
13 A flat tax refers to a regressive tax system that applies the same tax rate to every taxpayer regardless of their level of income. 
14 Brownback also outraised and outspend Holland; Brownback spent 2.68 million compared to $660,000 for Holland.  
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the governorship “in at least half a century” (Sulzberger 2010). Moderates and conservatives in 
the Republican Party in Kansas have battled for the soul of state for decades, but Brownback’s 
victory seemed so decisive that out-going governor Mark Parkinson15 declared, “there will never 
again, ever, be a moderate Republican governor. Those days are over” (Sulzberger 2010).  
 
Brownback Takes Aim at Taxes 
 After his victory, Governor-elect Brownback saw his number one priority as establishing 
a “growth agenda” for a state which was still reeling from the Great Recession (Carpenter 
2010c). Indeed, in January 2011, prior to Brownback’s swearing-in, Kansas’ projected budget 
shortfall stood at $550 million. However, the state’s economy was starting to recover and tax 
receipts began to come in above forecasted projections. In February 2011, for instance, the 
projected deficit was lowered to $492 million. However, in line with conservative economic 
principals, Brownback identified the state’s tax policy as ripe for reform. “What I have said is we 
need to look at the overall tax structure in this state and see whether we’ve got the right mix of 
income, sales and property taxes, which I’m not convinced we have the right mix to have a pro-
growth position,” he said after his election victory (Rothschild 2010d). State income taxes are 
not a particularly hated tax. Indeed, public opinion polls have “routinely indicated that the public 
rates [the state income tax] as the most acceptable form of taxation” (Brunori 2016:81). Of the 
portfolio of taxes that state and local governments use to generate revenue, the property tax has 
the longest history of being the most hated (Martin 2008; Fisher 1996). However, Brownback 
was focused on the income tax, explaining “I'm interested in is reducing those taxes that hinder 
                                                                   
15 Parkinson had, earlier in the Brownback/Holland campaign, tried to sway the electorate towards moderation by stating at a 
fundraiser, "The future of the state is great provided that we stay on this path that we've been on, which is a centrist government 
that is pretty reasonable, that balances budgets, but makes wise investments… If we continue on that path as opposed to bumper-
sticker solutions of the far left or the far right, I think we will do very well as a state” (Associated Press 2012a).  
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growth in Kansas, and not all tax cuts are created equal when it comes to growth policies… The 
individual income tax is, probably of any thing, the most sensitive area to growth” (Milburn 
2010).  
During the transition period before he took office, Brownback appointed a variety of 
officials to help develop the policies he would pursue as governor, including the tax policy. 
Among those officials serving on the transition team was Nick Jordan, who the Governor would 
later appoint as Secretary of Revenue. Jordan was an enthusiastic supporter of the Governor and 
the tax plan. During the transition, Jordan was quoted as saying "Our tax policy will play an 
important role in making our state's economy globally competitive" (Carpenter 2010d). It was 
during this transition period that the foundation of Brownback’s tax policy began to take shape. 
Jordan, who served on the transition team, recalled,  
 
During the transition time period and other times, we looked at other states across the 
country, and what states are really seeing growth in their economy, meaning jobs, 
company relocations and entrepreneurship, which is another thing I was big on in the 
Kansas Senate… So we looked around the country on those three facts: Who’s doing 
the job creation? How’s the population in-migration and out-migration? And then 
how do you develop an environment for small business that really helps them grow? 
We saw that the states like Florida, Texas in particular… and South Dakota, all of 
those states have a zero personal income tax… So, we thought, okay, how do we 
move that way, how do we start moving that way, and started developing this package 
to lower personal income taxes and particularly on small business.16  
 
Another important actor in the development of the tax policy was Brownback’s Budget Director, 
Steve Anderson. Anderson, who had previously worked at Americans for Prosperity (AFP) 
preparing “model” state budgets, often criticized states, such as Kansas, for “unconstrained” state 
spending and promoted deep income tax cuts (Rothschild 2011a). Anderson and Jordan, along 
with others, would become the team responsible for crafting the Governor’s plan.  
                                                                   
16 Interview conducted March 29, 2016 
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During his first State of the State, Brownback declared a “reset” to the tax code: “[W]e 
need a tax code that encourages investment, income growth, and job creation. I pledge to work 
with the Legislature on resetting our tax code, particularly with an eye toward lowering income 
tax rates” (Kansas State Library n.d.). Keeping with his campaign promise to freeze state 
spending, Brownback suggested cutting total state spending by $750 million declaring, "Our 
public finances strain under the weight of commitments beyond our present means,” (Hanna 
2011a).   
To fulfil his ambitious conservative agenda, Brownback pursued several different 
proposals, such as cutting state employee pay by 7.5 percent, eliminating state funding for the 
arts, move the state’s Human Rights Commission into the Attorney General’s office, repeal in-
state tuition for undocumented students, reduce the EITC, and abolish the State Board of 
Education and the University Board of Regents. Many of these types of proposals went nowhere 
and were primarily meant to “send a message” or signal to state agencies that government had 
changed. The newly elected conservatives were testing out their ideas and seeing what was 
possible. While many of these proposed rules were not passed, or even introduced, legislatively 
there was a flurry of rule changes. For instance, the House altered a rule which now allowed 
caucus meetings to be held secretly, away from the public or press. The House also adopted a 
pay-as-you-go, or “paygo,” rule which would require spending increases to be matched by cuts 
elsewhere (Rothschild 2011b). All of this was part of what one reporter for Stateline described as 
“the boldest agenda of any governor in the nation” (Gramlich 2012).  
As the momentum towards tax income tax cuts increased, the Brownback administration 
and its political allies, such as the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, began to shift their rhetoric 
regarding other taxes. For instance, while the Kansas Chamber of Commerce had struggled 
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against the temporary sales tax in 2010, the Chamber shifted towards favoring the sales tax in 
order to reduce or eliminate the income tax. This change in tone surprised even many 
conservatives who had made repeal of the sales tax their top priority (Rothschild 2011c). 
Additionally, there was a shift in rhetoric among lawmakers regarding the overall 
competitiveness of Kansas’ economy. Some outside organizations, such as the Council on State 
Taxation, issued state rankings showing Kansas near the bottom on business tax competitiveness. 
House Speaker Mike O’Neal said the report “really points to the fact that Kansas needs to get 
more competitive.” O’Neal began to push for a bill that “would cut individual and corporate 
income taxes as tax revenues to the state grow. Under the bill, the top corporate tax rate could 
drop from 7 percent to 3.5 percent, and the individual income tax could be phased out 
completely” (Rothschild 2011d). This was the initial bill that would eventually become the 
“march to zero.”  
 
Building Support for the Tax Cuts 
 Policymaking is not a straightforward process, and this is particularly true with the 
Kansas tax cuts. On May 20, 2011, at the end of his first legislative session, Brownback 
announced he would begin reviewing the tax code. As mentioned above, during the 2012 session 
there was a proposal to lower corporate taxes and eliminate the income tax. That proposal, 
however, stalled before the end of the session. "I think there's a combination of things that need 
to be looked at,” Brownback said in announcing the review of the tax code. “[B]ut to me the tax 
that's one of the most sensitive for economic growth is the state income tax… To look at the total 
picture is what we want to do, with an eye toward getting the state income tax down” (Hanna 
2011b). The review was being led by Revenue Secretary Nick Jordan and Commerce Secretary 
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Pat George. However, Brownback also said he would be consulting “leading thinkers” (Hanna 
2011c) from Kansas and nationally during the process.  
Brownback began drafting a proposal in May 2011 in preparation for the 2012 session. 
Mike O’Neal, who had been pushing for tax cuts during the 2011 session, indicated that House 
Republicans would “really want to push” for this plan in the 2012 session (Hanna 2011c). The 
Senate, however, was much more cautions. Senate President Steve Morris, for instance, did not 
believe there was enough support in the Senate for such a drastic tax reduction plan. Morris, for 
instance, had said the 2011 House proposal was “was not exactly well received” (Hanna 2011c). 
Whereas O’Neal and Morris had been in sync in opposing Sebelius’ request for the certificate of 
indebtedness, the income tax proposal was creating division between the two chambers. The 
House, under O’Neal, was ready to push the Governor’s tax plan. The Senate, under the control 
of moderate Republicans, was ready to resist what they saw as a reckless policy.   
 By July 2011, Nick Jordan had formed the group tasked with reviewing the tax code. The 
group included, among others, Richard Cram, the head of policy and research at the Kansas 
Revenue Department, Steve Stotts, the director of taxation, leaders of the House and Senate tax 
committees, and various agency heads (Rothschild 2011e). Additionally, national-level 
conservative tax reformers were also consulted. Chief among them were Arthur Laffer and 
Stephen Moore, supply-side gurus who helped craft the original supply-side tax reforms under 
Reagan. Laffer and his associates never produced any tailored reports or analyses for the Kansas 
tax policy. Instead, Laffer drew on more general supply-side analyses he had completed in the 
annual “Rich States, Poor States,” report produced for the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC). In 2011, Sam Brownback wrote the foreword to “Rich States, Poor States,” 
writing that the report should be “required reading” for governors who “can and must start to 
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change our country’s economic course by providing an environment that rewards our citizens for 
their efforts and their risks” (Laffer, Moore, and Williams 2011:viii). This was the course 
Brownback had charted for Kansas. Kansas’ tax reform was being cast squarely in the supply-
side tradition. “To those who doubt their research,” Brownback noted, “I encourage you to watch 
Kansas during the next few years as we work to reset the state’s course on taxes and let our 
citizens once again be the engine of economic growth.”  
In the Fall of 2011, Brownback began to lay out more clearly his vision of tax reform as 
well as its justification. In August, Brownback was the keynote speaker at the Kansas Policy 
Institute’s (KPI) annual dinner banquet.17 During his speech, entitled “Creating Jobs Through 
Fundamental Tax Reform,” (Rothschild 2011f)18 Brownback laid out his vision of tax reform as 
well as the justification. The justification was clearly couched in neoclassical economics. 
Brownback, at the event, said, “People act economically rational. We’ve got to create a rationale 
for people to grow here and be here” (Rothschild 2011f). Brownback put great faith in the 
income tax’s ability to modify people’s behaviors. Indeed, one of the first tax plans Brownback 
signed was the elimination of income taxes for residents of small towns. That bill designated 50 
of the state’s counties as “rural opportunity zones,” was Brownback’s approach to incentivizing 
people to move to rural areas of the state.19  
 Meanwhile, the work of the tax review committee had commenced. Their deliberations, 
however, were kept secret and details were scant. Local media, such as the Lawrence Journal-
World, made Kansas Open Records request regarding the committee’s deliberations, only to be 
                                                                   
17 The KPI is a conservative, free-market think tank thought to be primarily funded by the Wichita-based Koch Brothers. 
18 “Tickets to the event are $3,000 for a “personal freedom sponsor,” which includes a reception, dinner, a copy of “Rich States, 
Poor States” with a foreword written by Brownback, and top listing in the program; $2,000 for a “free market sponsor,” which 
includes the same features except prominent listing in the program. A “limited government sponsorship” includes reception and 
dinner and listing in the program, and individual tickets for a general reception and dinner are $85 each” (Rothschild 2011f). 
19 People who moved to those counties from outside of Kansas were exempt from paying Kansas income tax from 2012 to 2016. 
Additionally, those counties could opt in and join the state in subsidizing those new residents’ college loans. 
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denied. In an editorial, the Lawrence Journal-World wrote, “because no meetings of the tax 
group have been announced or open to the public, work on a potential major change in how 
Kansas does business — and the names of those working on the plan — apparently will remain 
secret, at least for the time being” (Lawrence Journal-World 2011). Other lawmakers also 
expressed concern over the lack of transparency. Senate President Steve Morris, for instance, 
announced he would be forming his own tax study committee and would seek public input on 
how to reduce taxes. “Right now, there are a lot of ideas being floated around, but what they all 
seem to be missing is citizen input. This isn’t something that should be done behind closed doors 
by a bunch of bureaucrats” (Rothschild 2011g). In response to these allegations of secrecy, 
Brownback felt the need to respond, saying the tax plan was “not being developed 
clandestinely,” (Rothschild 2011h).  
 While the details of the plan were not forthcoming, the Brownback administration was 
building support for the plan. A group called “Kansans for No Income Tax,” headed by Ashley 
McMillan, a former executive director of the Kansas Republican Party, was created to “educate” 
Kansans about the benefits of eliminating the income tax. The group never attracted many 
members, only about 260, but they did engage in a statewide bus tour (Associated Press 2011). 
Revenue Secretary Nick Jordan also went on listening tour in across Kansas to build support for 
the tax cuts. And by late September 2011, the tax committee announced it was close to offering 
up its proposals. The head of the commission, Revenue Secretary Nick Jordan excitedly 






The Plan is Revealed 
 In January 2012, the Kansas legislature reconvened in Topeka, marking the start of the 
2012 legislative session. On January 11, 2012, Brownback delivered his annual State of the State 
address, where he formally unveiled the details of the tax plan. Brownback announced 
 
I’m proposing a major step in overhauling our state tax code to make it fairer, flatter, and 
simpler. My tax plan will lower individual income tax rates for all Kansans. It brings the 
highest tax rate down from 6.45 percent to 4.9 percent, the second lowest in the region — 
and lowers the bottom tax bracket to 3 percent. My plan also eliminates individual state 
income tax on most small business income. As we modernize our tax code and lower 
everyone’s rates, it is also time to level the playing field and simplify state taxes by 
eliminating income tax credits, deductions, and exemptions ─ while expanding assistance 
to low-income Kansans through programs that are more effective and accountable. I 
firmly believe these reforms will set the stage for strong economic growth in Kansas – 
and will put more money into the pockets of Kansas families and businesses. Growth that 
will allow us to further reduce tax rates and increase our competitiveness. Growth that 
will see people move to Kansas instead of leaving our state. With that in mind, I ask the 
legislature to limit further growth in government expenditures to no more than 2 percent a 
year — and devote all additional revenues to reductions in state tax rates. This will get us 
ever closer to the pro-growth states with no state income taxes — which are among the 
country’s strongest economic performers. It also will enable us to keep the lid on state 
sales tax and property tax rates by providing robust economic growth. Let’s put our “lost 
decade” in the rear view mirror and speed ahead — at 75 miles per hour — to make this 
decade the decade of growth and job creation. 
 
Brownback’s original plan called for lowering personal income tax rates, eliminating business 
income taxes, and eliminating 23 tax credits, exemptions, and itemized deductions, such as the 
EITC, the rebate for sales tax on food, the tax credit for families that adopt, the child care and 
dependent care deductions, the charitable contributions deduction, and the home mortgage 
interest rate deduction, among others (Milburn 2012a). The plan also made permanent the 
temporary sales tax passed by Parkinson in 2010. 
 Proposing to eliminate almost every itemized deduction and credit in the Kansas tax code 
was “Reagan-style reform on steroids” (Sullivan 2012). Anti-tax groups hailed Brownback’s 
proposal, saying it would boost the economy and give a pay raise to all Kansans. Democrats and 
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moderate Republicans, however, were warier of the plan, particularly the elimination of the 
EITC and other programs for the poor and low income. Numbers produced by the Kansas 
Department of Revenue, and released by the Democrats, showed Kansas taxpayers with incomes 
of $25,000 or less would see their taxes increase $156 on average while filers with incomes of 
$250,000 or more would pay $5,239 on average less (Rothschild 2012a). The Brownback 
administration attempted to downplay this, though, with Revenue Secretary Nick Jordan 
claiming it was “inaccurate to say that this is hurting low-income people” because the analysis 
did not take into account the extra money that the state would be investing into social service 
programs (Hanna 2012a). Arthur Laffer, who was paid $75,00020 by the state to advise the tax 
plan and make celebrity appearances, came to the state at different points during the 2012. Much 
of the questioning turned on the tax increases on the poor as a result of Brownback’s plan. Laffer 
brushed this aside, arguing that criticism was unfounded because everyone would benefit from 
the jobs created by the new business-friendly tax plan. “It’s not a class warfare issue,” Laffer 
alleged, “It’s how you get to prosperity for everyone” (Rothschild 2012c).  
As the legislative session began, the coming success of Brownback’s tax plan was far 
from given. Opposition from school groups, religious groups, and labor groups intensified as the 
effects of the tax plan became clearer. In fact, House Republicans released a statement saying 
they were in favor of lowering taxes, but they also wanted a plan that did not increase taxes on 
“lower-income Kansans” (Rothschild 2012d). And in February 2012, House Democratic leader 
Paul Davis confidently asserted “The governor’s legislative agenda, basically, is in the 
emergency room right now” (Carpenter 2012a).  
 
                                                                   
20 One Democratic lawmaker suggested this amount be deducted from Brownback’s budget (Rothschild 2012b). 
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Competing Versions of the Bill 
Kansas House Republicans released their version of the Governor’s tax plan towards the 
end of January and there were familiar elements to Brownback’s proposed tax policy, though the 
House plan did not eliminate the EITC. The House plan also kept Parkinson’s temporary sales 
tax expiring as scheduled while Brownback had proposed making permanent the new 6.3 percent 
rate. Brownback said he was open to suggestions, but maintained that income tax rates needed to 
be lowered to spur economic growth (Rothschild 2012d).  
By March, there were several different versions21 of the tax plan in circulation. The first 
version of the tax bill passed the House on March 13 after a five hour debate.22 However, the 
Senate was still not on board, so the House’s strategy was to pass something palatable enough to 
moderate Senate Republicans to begin conference committee negotiations. “The bill I like is the 
bill that gets agreed to in conference committee, because that means that we’ve got the Senate 
onboard with tax reform,” House Speaker Mike O’Neal remarked (Milburn 2012b). However, 
conservative Republicans in the House expressed disapproval at this tax bill and they began 
crafting another version which would accelerate income tax rate reductions. One Representative 
was quoted, saying, “In reality, this bill is not a sprint to zero income tax but rather an apathetic, 
dawdling saunter” (Milburn 2012c).  
In the Senate, the Committee on Assessment and Taxation endorsed a tax cut plan that 
would have cut revenue by $1.89 billion, far more than both the House and Governor’s tax 
plans.23 This bill advanced out of committee and, on March 20, the Senate began a contentious 
                                                                   
21 In response, House Republicans unveiled a new plan, this time keeping the EITC but lowering the state’s contribution from 19 
percent to 9. The House plan, though, also included a provision that would sweep $351 million from the Kansas Department of 
Transportation (KDOT) program known as T-Works (Transportation Works for Kansas). Analysis of the House GOP plan, 
though, also showed that it hit the poorest Kansans like the Brownback plan. The amended House GOP plan early in the process 
kept taxes from going up on all income groups except those who earned $25,000 or less. 
22 This vote was 68-53. 
23 The Senate plan was $15 million more expensive than the Governor’s plan and $1.89 billion more expensive than the House 
plan, cutting income tax revenue by $1.89 billion compared to $776 million in the House plan 
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floor debate during which many of the deductions and credits Brownback had proposed to 
eliminate were reinstated through floor amendments. Senators offering these amendments were 
deliberately attempting to increase the overall cost of the tax cut in order to kill the bill, a 
practice known in the statehouse as “Christmas-treeing” a bill. As Senate President Morris 
remembered, “That bill came to the Senate floor, and we knew that it was bad public policy, that 
we wouldn’t support it, but during debate on the floor there were several amendments that were 
offered, mainly by moderate Republicans and Democrats. One of those amendments was to put 
back in the deduction for mortgage interest… probably a couple more, but that made the fiscal 
impact even worse than what it was when it came out of the Senate Tax Committee.”24 In other 
words, moderates believed if the tax cut bill was more expensive than projected, the Governor 
would be forced to veto the bill. And the Senate tax plan became very expensive. Indeed, one 
legislative memo revealed that Kansas would have to attract 420,000 new people to the state with 
enough disposable income to equal the lost revenue from the tax cuts (Rothschild 2012e). 
Supporters of the Brownback plan were appalled at the moderate’s strategy. Conservative 
senator Julia Lynn, for instance, bemoaned, “This body has systematically and deliberately 
picked apart a bill that is meant to address serious issues in our state. It’s not a joke” (Rothschild 
2012f).  
 
The Death and Resurrection of Brownback’s Tax Policy 
 After the bill had been “Christmas-treed” up, senators began to vote and at first the 
moderate’s strategy appeared successful. The bill was defeated by a 20-20 tie. However, two 
hours later, Senator Brungardt made a motion to reconsider the bill. The motion was approved 
                                                                   
24 Interview conducted June 26, 2017. 
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and there was a second vote. This time, several senators switched their votes and the bill passed, 
29-11 (see Table 2). What happened in those intervening hours is the subject of some 
controversy. However, what is generally agreed upon by all parties is that Brownback exerted a 
considerable amount of pressure on Morris. As Brownback recalled, “We were pushing every bit 
we could. And I have been for about two years pushing on tax reform. We’re not [making 
threats], but we are pushing every bit we can” (Rothschild 2012g). Moderates described 
Brownback’s influence slightly differently. Senator Brungardt, for instance, indicated many 
some of his moderate Republican colleagues “felt like they were getting beat up a little bit” 
(Rothschild 2012g). Senate President Steve Morris recalled those intervening hours as a 
desperate attempt by Brownback to keep the tax cuts afloat. According to Morris, 
[W]hen we finished debate they ended up killing the bill, but I was presiding, and my 
assistant shortly after the vote came to tell me that the governor had to talk to me on the 
phone. So I stepped down and Vice-President Vratil took the chair, and I went into my 
office, got on the phone with the governor. He immediately started pleading with me for 
us to reconsider. With the Senate rules at the time—and I assume it’s the same way 
today—if you pass something you have 24 hours to reconsider or if you kill something 
you have 24 hours to reconsider and do another vote. And he pleaded and pleaded with 
me to reconsider. He was saying, “I know it’s terrible public policy. It would bankrupt 
the state. We can’t have that for the coming while, but we just need something to go to 
conference.” As I mentioned it was toward the end of the session, and there were no other 
tax bills in conference. And he said, “We have to have a bill in conference so that we 
have something to work with.” And we talked for several minutes, and I finally agreed to 
ask our colleagues to reconsider with the understanding that this bill would never become 
law. It was just a means to try to negotiate something better.25 
 
Morris’ recollection of Brownback’s appeal matches O’Neal’s view that the best tax bill is the 
one “that gets agreed to in conference committee.” However, both the House and the Senate 
were aiming for different outcomes in the conference committee. According to Morris, he 
believed getting the bill to a conference committee could moderate the tax cuts. For House 
                                                                   
25 Interview conducted June 26, 2017 
49 
 
members, however, the conference committee presented an opportunity to pass even more 
dramatic tax cuts. 
Table 2 Senators Who Switched Their Votes 
 Vote 1 Vote 2 
 Yeas Nays Yeas Nays 
1 Abrams Brungardt Abrams Faust-Goudeau 
2 Apple Emler Apple Francisco 
3 Bruce Faust-Goudeau Bruce Haley 
4 Donovan Francisco Brungardt* Hensley 
5 King Haley Donovan Holland 
6 Love Hensley Emler Kelly 
7 Lynn Holland Huntington* Kultala 
8 Marshall Huntington* Kelsey Owens* 
9 Masterson Kelly King Reitz 
10 Merrick Kelsey Longbine A. Schmidt 
11 Olson Kultala Love Vratil* 
12 Ostmeyer Longbine Lynn  
13 Petersen McGinn* Marshall  
14 Pilcher-Cook Morris* Masterson  
15 Pyle Owens* McGinn*  
16 V. Schmidt* Reitz Merrick  
17 Schodorf A. Schmidt Morris*  
18 Steineger Teichman Olson  
19 Taddiken Umbarger Ostmeyer  
20 Wagle Vratil* Petersen  
21   Pilcher-Cook  
22   Pyle  
23   V. Schmidt*  
24   Schodorf*  
25   Steineger  
26   Taddiken  
27   Teichman  
28   Umbarger  
29   Wagle  
(*) = senators targeted for defeated by the Kansas Chamber of Commerce (Rothschild 2012h).  
 
Conference committees are ad hoc committee formed in order to reconcile differences in 
legislation between the House and the Senate. The conference committee on taxation began 
March 27, just prior to the legislature’s spring recess. While the legislature was adjourned, 
50 
 
however, the Consensus Revenue Estimating Group (CRE) released its revised revenue forecast. 
The Consensus Revenue Estimating group is composed of state officials from the Division of the 
Budget, Kansas Legislative Research Department, Department of Revenue, as well as consulting 
economists from three of the state’s universities (University of Kansas, Kansas State University, 
and Wichita State University). This groups convenes twice each year, in the fall and the spring, 
to issue a revenue forecast for the state. The fall forecast, released before December 4, is 
adjusted in the spring, before April 20. While lawmakers were on break, the CRE released their 
revised forecast, adjusting their projections upwards by $252 million. At that point, Kansas had 
already received $72 million above the December forecast, so the CRE’s upward adjustment 
appeared fitting. However, the April forecast adjustment was not able to incorporate any possible 
effects from the tax cut bill being debated in the conference committee. Yet, the improved 
revenue forecast made a case for conservatives that Kansas had additional revenue to pay for the 
cut.   
 While the legislature was still adjourned, Brownback appeared on a panel titled “Tax 
Policies for 4% Growth,” hosted by the George W. Bush Presidential Center (2012). During his 
appearance, Brownback spoke enthusiastically about the policy he was crafting in Kansas. In 
particular, Brownback described what he saw as the most exciting aspect of the tax policy: the 
pass through exemption. “A flat tax with a small business accelerator, where you take the tax 
totally off of your Sub S’s or LLCs so you really get your acceleration. This is like shooting 
adrenaline into the heart of growing the economy by taking that tax off of small business where 
most of your job creation is,” Brownback said.26 Brownback concluded his talk by suggesting the 
                                                                   
26 George W. Bush Presidential Center. 2012. "Tax Policies for 4% Growth: Evidence From the States, American History, 
Markets, and Nations." April 10 (http://bushcenter.imgix.net/legacy/Tax%20Policies%20for%204%25%20Growth%20-
Transcript.pdf). Accessed February 14, 2019. 
51 
 
need for big, bold policies, “Most of the political space is occupied by incremental time where 
you can only propose an incremental solution to something. The public is scared now. They’re 
scared for the future of their country. You could go across the state of Kansas, get a crowd of any 
100 people and ask, ‘How many of you are scared for the future of your country?’ You’ll get 90 
percent of the hands shoot up… [N]ow is the time the public is ready to engage tough discussion 
and real, major solutions. Now’s the time to be bold and aggressive with good, thoughtful plans.”  
 
“Legislative Poker:” How the Tax Plan Passed  
 While Brownback was focusing on the income tax, moderate Republicans and Democrats 
tried to suggest Kansas should focus instead on reducing property taxes. As the legislature 
reconvened on April 25, 2012, the moderate Republican leadership in the Senate declared, based 
on public hearings during the legislative break, there was not public desire for income tax cuts. 
Rather, as Senate Majority Leader Jay Emler said, constituents were “asking about property 
taxes being lowered," (Rothschild 2012i). Emler’s perspective was corroborated by a GOP-
commissioned poll of Kansas Republican voters taken in January which revealed 45 percent of 
respondents wanted property taxes lowered while only 27 percent wanted lower income taxes.27 
(Rothschild 2012i). The “Kansas Speaks” public opinion poll, conducted by the non-partisan 
Docking Institute at Fort Hays State University in Hays, also substantiated that Kansans wanted 
property tax reduction. According to the survey, 50 percent of respondents claimed they wanted 
the property tax somewhat or significantly decreased. In contrast, only 33 percent responded they 
wanted to income tax significantly or somewhat decreased. And of that 33 percent, the majority 
(68 percent) indicated their preference was to decrease income taxes only somewhat. Nearly half 
                                                                   
27 The poll also revealed 16 percent wanted lower sales taxes.  
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of respondents indicated they wanted the income tax to remain at the current rate. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in Table 3, the preference for changes in taxes did not vary dramatically by party. 
Thus, among the general public and Republican voters, there was not a strong preference for 
income tax cuts. 
 
Table 3 Tax Preference by Political Party, 2012 
 Income Tax Sales Tax Property Tax 
Republican Independent Democrat Republican Independent Democrat Republican Independent Democrat 
Significantly 
Increased 
1% 3% 6% 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 2% 
Somewhat 
Increased 
9% 11% 25% 20% 20% 22% 3% 4% 10% 
Remain the 
Same 
52% 45% 48% 48% 46% 46% 40% 39% 48% 
Somewhat 
Decreased 
27% 29% 14% 20% 22% 21% 34% 35% 25% 
Significantly 
Decreased 
12% 13% 7% 8% 10% 9% 23% 21% 15% 
Source: 2012 Kansas Speaks Survey 
 
 Brownback, for his part, indicated he understood the public’s preference for property tax 
reductions. However, he also said he did not believe cutting the property tax would spur 
economic growth (Rothschild 2012e). Instead, Brownback urged the legislature forward on 
income tax cuts in a Topeka Capital-Journal op-ed, “Now the Legislature has the opportunity to 
enact significant tax reform and prevent another lost decade of economic decline. Empowered by 
a tax policy that is built on liberty and rewards hard work, we can accelerate economic growth, 
create well-paying jobs, increase family and community stability, and reduce the number of 
children living in poverty” (Brownback 2012a).  
 By April 26, the conference committee had agreed to a plan. The first conference bill cut 
individual income tax rates, gradually eliminated income taxes on business over five-years, and 
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allowed the sales tax to revert back to 5.7 percent. Brownback urged lawmakers to vote for the 
conference version of the bill, “It’s got the key pro-growth features that I think are important,” 
Brownback said (Rothschild 2012j). Members of the committee, however, delayed introducing 
the legislation until Legislative Research determined the bill’s fiscal impact. When the KLRD 
released their analysis, it revealed the tax cuts would lead to a massive deficit in three years, 
eliminating the current surplus of $612 million and saddling the state with a $911 million deficit. 
Of course, those most wedded to the idea of tax cuts dismissed the threat of deficits. For 
Brownback’s supporters, the promise of supply-side growth negated the threat of deficits. Les 
Donovan, chair of the Senate tax committee, for instance, remarked, “What if the governor’s idea 
really does work? These numbers will be blown away” (Rothschild 2012k). However, the size of 
the projected deficit gave enough Republicans pause that the conference committee reentered 
negotiations.   
 Former governor Mark Parkinson had commented on the eve of Brownback’s 
inauguration, that the days of moderate political leadership in Kansas were over. Parkinson was 
not alone in holding this view and in a demonstration of how dramatically Kansas’ political 
culture was shifting under Brownback, a group of 50 former Republican state legislators calling 
themselves “Traditional Republicans for Common Sense,” began issuing strongly worded 
statements against the governor and the tax cuts. Criticizing the deficits that would occur under 
the plan, former representative Rochelle Chronister, a member of Traditional Republicans, said 
the group of former lawmakers had “a moral obligation to the citizens of this state. If we want to 
ensure our long-term success then we cannot mortgage our children’s future. Every farmer will 
tell you that you reap what you sow. Our children’s future and the stability of our state are too 
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important to gamble away with accounting tricks and the newest fad from a Washington, DC 
think tank” (The Gardner News 2012).  
 As the process advanced, lawmakers offered various suggestions and tweaks to the tax 
bill. Les Donovan and House tax chair Richard Carlson, for instance, suggested implementing a 
temporary top tax bracket or drawing out setting out a longer timeframe for the elimination of 
business income taxes. These tweaks were in the effort of trying to calm fears among moderates 
and gather enough support to pass the tax cuts. However, budgetary analyses still showed the bill 
producing large deficits. The KLRD produced another round of fiscal estimates, this time 
showing a $712 million deficit. Secretary of Revenue Nick Jordan and Budget Director Steve 
Anderson, however, strongly disputed these numbers. The tax cuts, they said, would boost the 
economy, invalidating KLRD’s projections. “We are not playing games with these numbers. We 
are confident in our methodology,” Jordan responded (Rothschild 2012l). However, budget 
projections which persistently demonstrated large deficits were still a barrier to many moderate 
senators, including Senate President Steve Morris who remarked "We can't do something that we 
can't afford,” (Rothschild 2012l).  
 On May 9, both the House and the Senate were scheduled to debate the most recent 
conference committee tax bill. By the point, the two chambers were essentially ready to call the 
other’s bluff. The Senate, however, was in a weaker position than the House because the Senate, 
the upper chamber, had passed a version of the tax bill. This gave Mike O’Neal leverage as the 
House could simply vote to concur with the Senate version of the bill to send it to the Governor. 
As the House was more inclined to pass tax reform at almost any cost, this was a move O’Neal 
had indicated he would be willing to make. Brownback, however, said he preferred the 
legislature pass the conference committee version of the bill. Addressing the House Republican 
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caucus (without Senate leadership’s knowledge) before the House convened, Brownback said, “I 
think it would be better if we did the conference report, but I am not the least bit confident that’s 
going to get to me, and then we’re left with nothing… I think it would help stimulate the 
legitimate discussions and negotiations taking place between the House and Senate on taxes if 
you were to concur with the Senate package that is in front of you today. I think that would be a 
better route to go” (Rothschild 2012m). The Governor, however, also said he would sign any 
version of the tax bill. His spokesperson, Sherriene Jones-Sontag released a statement saying that 
if the House voted to concur with the senate bill, that they “have looked at the numbers and 
could make it work” (Rothschild 2012n). 
In a situation the Lawrence Journal-World called “legislative poker” (Rothschild 2012n), 
the Senate took up the conference bill first. House leadership was closely following Senate 
proceedings to gauge their next move. Senate leadership was also trying to move quickly. As the 
House came to order, Representative Richard Carlson made a motion to concur with the Senate 
bill. Carlson moved quickly because, as he would later recount to The Wichita Eagle, “The 
Senate informally told us they were going to kill the conference committee report and not allow 
any tax reform or discussion to tax place” (Wistrom and Lefler 2012). After Carlson’s motion to 
concur, Representative Tom Moxley made an opposing motion which set a debate over the 
measure. This was important because, as Sheryl Spalding recalled, “We came into session, and I 
don’t remember who was the first one there, but Tom Moxley was holding the floor, just talking. 
I remember going out to take a break just in the hallways, because he was just talking and 
talking, not saying anything really, just holding the floor. I went out and John Vratil, Senator 
Vratil happened to be out there at the same time, and he said, ‘Just hold the floor. Make sure you 
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guys hold the floor.’ And I said, ‘Okay,’ and I still didn’t have a clue really what was going on, 
but I knew they were talking about taxes.”28  
However, only about ten minutes later, Representative Kinzer made a priority motion to 
force a vote on the motion to concur. At that point, Moxley tried to make a motion to adjourn the 
House, fearing what was about to happen. But Mike O’Neal loudly declared Moxley out of 
order, which forced a vote. The House voted and the bill passed 67-51. Almost immediately the 
House moved towards final action on the bill. To delay the final vote, Democrats demanded a 
“call of the house,” which pauses voting, locks the doors of the chamber and forces 
representatives to remain seated at their desks. Any wayward members who are absent are 
forcibly returned to cast their vote. Democrats had demanded the call because some Democratic 
members were absent. The call of the house was in place for less than an hour, however, when 
O’Neal invoked rule 2508, determining that reasonable effort had been made to secure the 
missing members, and raised the call. Democrats objected but were unsuccessful and the motion 
to concur was passed.  
 Across the capitol building, the Senate was engaged in a tax debate of their own. 
Conservative senators had decided to stall, and gave long speeches and explanations over their 
vote, essentially filibustering to give the House enough time to vote. Sensing time was running 
out, Senate Vice President John Vratil interrupted Senator King’s explanation of vote and 
attempted to force a vote. Senate President Morris agreed with Vratil, ruling the conservative 
senators out of order. This angered the conservatives, who appealed the ruling and postponed the 
vote even more. The delay tactics worked, however, and before the Senate could force a vote on 
                                                                   
28 Interview conducted July 26, 2016 
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the conference committee bill, Morris announced that the House had voted to concur with the 
Senate version and declared the Senate’s vote moot.  
 Back in the House, moderate Republicans and Democrats expressed disbelief at O’Neal’s 
maneuver to concur with the Senate. Lawmakers described it as “completely undemocratic,” and 
a “dark, sad day” (Marso 2012). Representative Moxley, who had tried to stall the vote, also 
commented that "people who have been in that House observing this process for 37 years have 
never seen what we heard here today” (Marso 2012). O’Neal defended his decision, issuing a 
statement after the vote, “Today the House took necessary action to ensure Kansas is moving in 
the right direction when it comes to reforming our state’s income tax policy. The Senate has 
made it clear they do not want to reform taxes this session, and we hope this will encourage them 
to reconsider giving the tax conference committee report further consideration” (Marso 2012). 
The boldness of O’Neal’s move, though, earned him praise from members of the Brownback 
administration. As O’Neal was leaving the Chamber that evening, Budget Director Steve 
Anderson stopped him in the hallway: “We really appreciate that. We’ll always remember it,” 
Anderson said (Marso 2012). 
 In Kansas, once a bill has been passed by the legislature, governors have up to ten days to 
sign it. During this period, after the dramatic passage of the tax cuts, Brownback issued a 
statement recommending that legislators “continue their work on reforming our state’s tax policy 
and to consider some of the alternatives I proposed in my original pro-growth tax reform to 
offset the cost” (Wichita Eagle 2012). And the conference committee did continue to meet, even 
offering an alternative tax bill on May 16. Brownback urged lawmakers to pass this new tax 
policy quickly, however this angered many conservatives in Brownback’s own caucus. 
“[Brownback] asked us to do something and we did it. What’s the problem? Why doesn’t he sign 
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it?” conservative state representative Owen Donahoe asked (Rothschild 2012o). At this point, 
Brownback, who had indicated he could make the tax plan work, was still aware of the size of 
the revenue shortfalls that were about to occur. The May 16 conference tax bill would have been 
a smaller tax cut. However, on May 18 the Senate voted 21-18 to not take up discussion of the 
new conference committee report, which effectively ended the tax debate for the session and 
essentially guaranteed Brownback would sign the more aggressive tax cut bill.29 Brownback, 
staying true to his word, announced plans to hold a signing ceremony for the tax cuts (Rothschild 
2012p). Democrats and moderate Republicans urged the governor to veto the bill. John Vratil, 
the Senate Vice President, remarked, “The governor has told numerous senators that the state 
cannot afford House Bill 2117. The bill on his desk could well bankrupt the state and lead to 
massive cuts in our classrooms, roads and public safety. It is the governor’s responsibility to the 
state of Kansas to veto House Bill 2117” (Rothschild 2012p). Republicans for Common Sense 
spokesperson Rochelle Chronister also urged Brownback to veto, “We support tax cuts and have 
voted for a number of them over the years, but you have to pay for them and roll them out 
responsibly… The governor’s tax plan does neither. Instead, it smacks of Washington-style 
irresponsible spending that places us on a dangerous path, which will have future generations 
paying for this mistake” (Rothschild 2012q). Brownback refused. “It is unfortunate that the 
                                                                   
29 During the period of time between when the House passed the tax cuts and when Brownback signed them, there were different 
incentives offered to try to entice moderate senators to support the tax cuts. Brownback indicated he offered moderates a “global” 
agreement which increased funding for schools in exchange for support of the May 16 conference tax bill (Hanna 2012b). Mike 
O’Neal seemed to corroborate this version in my interview with him. As O’Neal described, “We literally spent the next 10 days 
making all sorts of offers to the Senate that they turned down. And I’ll tell you how bizarre it got. So the House in 2012 was far 
more conservative than the Senate. And we have a senator on the Conference Committee who is a Johnson County moderate 
Republican who is all about the schools… They’ve got to think they’re in the Twilight Zone, because here is a conservative 
House throwing money literally at the Senate, giving the Senate, particularly the one senator, exactly what he’s always wanted, 
and they’re over there going there’s fifty friggin’ million dollars on the table, take it. And the Senate turns it down, because they 
were bound and determined that they were not going to give this governor a tax relief bill, I guess. They’d have to explain to you 
why they stonewalled us for 10 days. And I think they thought at the end of the day that this bill is just too rich for even this 
governor to sign—he won’t sign it. Well, Sam did what he said he was going to do. He said, ‘This bill is on my desk. I want tax 
relief this year. If you don’t like this version, send me another version, but if you don’t I’m going to sign the bill on the tenth 
day.’ And he signed it on the tenth day” (Interview conducted October 21, 2016). 
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Kansas Senate has refused even to debate a tax compromise bill that would have provided 
Kansans tax relief. However, strengthening the Kansas economy cannot wait,” he said 
(Rothschild 2012p). While noting that the tax policy he was about to sign was not exactly what 
he had originally advocated, he still viewed it as positive “pro-growth” tax reform “that will 
create tens of thousands of jobs and will make our state the best place in America to start and 
grow a small business” (Rothschild 2012r). “We’re going to be able to do this.” (Wistrom 
2012a). On May 22, 2012 Brownback signed the tax bill into law.  
 The bill included several different provisions. First, it collapsed Kansas’s three income 
tax brackets into two. The lowest tax bracket for taxable income above $15,000 for single filers 
was lowered from 3.5 percent to 3 percent. The middle tax bracket for incomes between $15,000 
and $30,000 was lowered from 6.25 percent to 4.9 percent. And the top bracket for incomes 
above $30,000 was eliminated altogether. The bill also eliminated 20 tax credits and deductions, 
though not as many as originally intended. However, the credit for adoption expenses, child care 
expenditures, and the homestead program (which gave renters a property tax refund) were 
eliminated. The plan also increased the standard deduction for a single filer from $4,500 to 
$9,000. But the crown jewel of the tax cut was the total and immediate elimination of income tax 
on non-wage business income. Filers that reported income from pass-through businesses, such as 
LLCs, subchapter S corporations, or sole proprietorships were now exempt from state income 
tax. And during the press conference prior to signing the tax bill, Brownback remarked, 
 
We will soon will have a new, bold course in our state tax policy based on the people’s 
ability to work, invent, and create – not the government’s ability to tax and redistribute… 
Now all major policy changes, just like changes in life, are met with understandable 
criticisms and skepticisms. But let me say clearly: we will meet the needs of our schools, 
and our most vulnerable, and our roads will get built. Now when Ronald Reagan cut 
taxes in the early ‘80s, many people called the tax cuts too big, too bold, too expensive. 
But those cuts ignited an era of prosperity in America. By enacting them, Reagan showed 
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his faith – but not in the government. It was in the American people. Reagan proved that 
given a bit of economic freedom and opportunity, the American people would 
accomplish things no government program could ever imagine. And they did. My faith is 
in the people of Kansas, not its government. I believe the people will do incredible things. 
Today’s legislation will create tens of thousands of new jobs and help to make Kansas the 
best place in America to start and grow a small business… After one of the sessions – 
and it was difficult – I was driving out of the parking lot here in my Kansas-made car and 
a guy was walking in front of me and he saw that it was me and he looked back and he 
yelled at me and he said “We need jobs!” And I thought: that’s what this is all about. This 
is about jobs. This is about private sector creating of jobs; it’s about the fundamental 
private sector job creating machine which is small business and taking the tax off of that 
and unleashing it to grow and create the jobs that this man was yelling for and that we 
need for our citizens. So with that, I’m going to sign this bill. I’m excited about the 
prospects for it and I’m very thankful how God has blessed our state and I pray that he 
continues to do so.30  
 
Brownback was joined at the signing ceremony by members of the legislature and his cabinet, as 
well as lobbyists from Americans For Prosperity (AFP) and the Kansas Policy Institute (KPI), 
who handed out a white paper detailing the economic benefits that would stem from the tax cuts. 
(Rothschild 2012s). Brownback’s office, for their part, released their projections for the 
dynamically scored effects of the tax cuts: 22,900 new jobs, 35,740 new residents to the state, 
and $2 billion in additional disposable income for state residents (Rothschild 2012s). According 
to Nick Jordan, these were the numbers upon which the success of the tax cuts would be judged 
(Wistrom 2012a).   
After the signing, Brownback began making the media rounds to tout the state’s bold, 
new policy. And it was during his June 19 appearance on MSNBC’s Morning Joe, where 
Brownback would utter the phrase that would come to define the policy. During the interview, 
Brownback explained, “On taxes, you need to get your overall rates down and you need to get 
your social manipulation out of it, in my estimation to create growth. And we’ll see how it 
works. We’ll have a real-live experiment… You’ll get a chance to see how this impacts a 
                                                                   
30 “Governor Brownback delivers statement prior to signing pro-growth tax legislation,” YouTube video, 5m 43s, “Gov. Sam 
Brownback,” May 22, 2012 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IcjomHACsk). 
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particular experimental area and I think Kansas is going to do well.”31 Describing the tax policy 
as an “experiment” would come to haunt Brownback over the rest of his tenure as governor. 
Indeed, during a 2014 interview with the NewsHour on PBS during his re-election campaign, 
Brownback would confess, “Yeah, I shouldn't have used that word [experiment]. But the good 
news is, it's working well.”32  
 
Just Getting Started 
As part of his media onslaught, Brownback penned an op-ed in the Wichita Eagle, 
writing, in part, “Our new pro-growth tax policy will be like a shot of adrenaline into the heart of 
the Kansas economy. It will pave the way to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs, bring 
tens of thousands of people to Kansas, and help make our state the best place in America to start 
and grow a small business. It will leave more than a billion dollars in the hands of Kansans. An 
expanding economy and growing population will directly benefit our schools and local 
governments. We will continue to work to provide a business environment that will keep our 
state regionally and globally competitive. We will continue to reform state government so that it 
is more efficient, effective and responsive to our citizens’ needs. We will continue to meet the 
needs of our state’s most vulnerable. We will continue to provide for high-quality schools. But 
most of all, we will continue to strive to make our state even better. Kansas’ lost decade is over. 
No longer will we be satisfied with our children moving to another state for better opportunities. 
No longer will we accept having the highest tax burden in the region. Now is the time to grow 
                                                                   
31 “Kansas Gov. Sam Brownback on MSNBC’s Morning Joe,” YouTube video, 8m 39s, “Republican Governor’s Association,” 
June 19, 2012 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juDv41jovEA).  
32 “Kansas political races leave Republican candidates in peril,” YouTube video, 9m, 2s, “PBS NewsHour,” September 27, 2014 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y73sefUafm4).   
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our economy, not state government, and that’s what our policies will do. We are just getting 
started in Kansas, but we are off the sidelines and in the game” (Brownback 2012b). 
Indeed, Brownback was just getting started. Because of the difficulties moderate 
Republicans posed in the Senate for Brownback’s agenda, Brownback and his allies set their 
sights on purging moderate Republicans from the legislature during the Republican primaries. 
Brownback, aided by the Kansas GOP as well as the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, launched a 
campaign to unseat moderates in the party and replace them with more conservative 
Republicans. It is highly unusual, even more so for Kansas, for a sitting governor to target 
members of his own party for defeat.33 Yet that is exactly what happened. "Because of the 
alliance in the state Senate between Democrats and some Republicans that join together to 
promote a Democrat agenda, the primary election has effectively become the general. Therefore, 
I am going to be involved in a limited number of primaries,” Brownback justified (Rothschild 
2012t). The primary campaign unfolded “with the sound and fury of a military mopping up 
operation” (Smith 2013:124). Advertisements, primarily in the form of mailed flyers, framed 
moderate Republicans as allied with liberal Democrats. For instance, one moderate Republican 
former state senator relayed to me that “one of the things Americans for Prosperity sent out was 
a postcard this big [gestures] and it had Obama’s picture, Pelosi’s picture and me in the middle. 
And we were supposed to be there together, and they said that this guy supports Obama. I never 
had and I don’t now, but that was the postcard they sent out to tell people that I was doing that, 
and people in this area and a lot of the Republicans just hated Obama, but it was not true, but 
they sent it out. And they’ll do it again. They’re going to continue to do that sort of politics. They 
                                                                   
33 In response to this aggressive type of politics, many moderate Republicans mention that Brownback “brought Washington-
style politics to Kansas,” meaning he brought hard-ball politics to a state traditionally not know for that. Indeed, this helps 
understand how Brownback bested Morris, who admitted he “certainly underestimated what the governor was willing to do” 
(Rothschild 2012r).  
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can send it out. It doesn’t have to be true. If you get it out there and people see it and they believe 
it—I’ve got relatives down in central Kansas down along 160. They think, oh well, this happened 
and this happened, and it didn’t. So I have to tell them, ‘No, it didn’t. It’s not true.’ ‘Well, why is 
it out here like this?’ I said, ‘Because they’re trying to win the election.’ It’s all about winning 
and it’s all about money. It’s pretty ugly, but it’s reality.”34  
To try to salvage a moderate politics in Kansas, former moderate Republican Governor 
Bill Graves returned to Kansas to try to help the more moderate candidates after Brownback 
began endorsing very conservative challengers (Associated Press 2012b). Yet, it was too little, 
too late. Moderate Republicans targeted by conservative forces, such as Steve Morris, Tim 
Owens, Roger Reitz, Bob Marshall, Dwayne Umbarger, Pete Brungardt, Dick Kelsy, Jean 
Schodorf, and Ruth Teichman, were all defeated. "I think that is what you had, is the market 
functioned on Tuesday,” said Brownback after the primary (Rothschild 2012u). 
In the November general election, Republicans saw predictable victories and entering the 
2013 legislative session, conservatives held 75 of 84 House seats as well as 27 of 40 Senate 
seats. Brownback now faced essentially zero resistance to his conservative agenda in the 
legislature. However, he still had the realities of budgetary and fiscal constraints to deal with. An 
ever so slight adjustment of expectations among administration officials began to reflect the 
reality of the size and scope of the tax cuts. Budget Director Steve Anderson, for instance, made 
it clear that they would “make the tax cuts work,” but also wanted it known that the tax plan the 
governor signed was not the one he originally advocated for (Rothschild 2012z). Moreover, on 
December 5, at a forum in Overland Park, Brownback said he hoped the legislature would look 
for ways to pay for the tax cut and acknowledged, now, a “hard dip” in revenues (Associated 
                                                                   
34 Interview conducted June 1, 2016 
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Press 2012c). Again, explaining that moderate Republicans had sabotaged his original tax plan, 
Brownback urged the legislature to “do some of the pay fors that I proposed last year” 
(Associated Press 2012c). The realities of the gathering fiscal storm on the horizon found 
Brownback attempting to shift blame before the tax cuts had even gone into effect. However, he 
was resolute on one point in particular: “What I am not going to do — and what I won’t sign — 
is putting taxes back on small businesses and raising the income tax rate back up… Certainty is a 
key issue on tax policy” (Associated Press 2012c). Brownback’s obstinacy on this point would 
eventually sour Brownback’s relationship with the legislature.  
Brownback had succeeded in passing his tax cuts and, in the process, radically remaking 
the state politically and fiscally. National-level conservative Republicans praised Brownback for 
these changes, particularly on taxes. Speaking on the Kansas tax cuts, Senate Republican leader 
Mitch McConnell said, “This is exactly the sort of thing we want to do here, in Washington” 
(King, Jr. and Peters 2013). Similarly, Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform, 
pointed to Kansas saying, “Kansas is the future. Kansas is the model” (ReasonTV 2015). 
Brownback himself was enthusiastic about the policy. During his 2013 State of the State 
Address, Brownback declared, “In important ways, our state is going against the tide... When I 
started as governor, we had the highest state income tax in the region, now we have the 2nd 
lowest and I want us to take it to zero. Look out Texas, here comes Kansas!”  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided a history of the development and passage of the Brownback tax 
cuts. The 1981 Reagan tax cuts were developed largely in response to perceived public opinion 
(Prasad 2012). However, in the absence of strong popular support for tax cuts in Kansas, 
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Republicans leveraged various institutional mechanism to pass an unpopular and fiscally 
unsustainable policy. Not only did Brownback’s reforms dramatically alter the formal institution 
of the tax structure, he also altered the informal, or symbolic, institution of the three-legged 
stool. Both of these institutions, the formal and the informal, importantly constrained the ability 
of the tax cuts to stick. And in the coming chapters, I explore in-depth how these various 




Chapter Three:  
Small Businesses Reject the Tax Cut 
 
 
“I just want to emphasize that I actually benefitted greatly from this tax law. In fact, the 
amount of state income tax I paid last year was less than five percent of what it would have been 
had there not been this LLC exclusion. And I didn’t employ anyone else because I’m not in the 
kind of business I can.” It was already three hours into the House Taxation Committee hearing 
when Doug Albin, a small business owner from WaKeeney, Kansas, stood up to deliver his 
testimony. Doug had come to Topeka to provide input on a tax bill which would repeal much of 
the Brownback tax cuts, including eliminating the pass-through provision, which had come to be 
known as the “LLC loophole.” 
 “I guess that’s really mainly what I have to say,” Doug concluded as he reached into his 
pocket and pulled out a folded piece of paper. “And I also wanted to let you know that I’m so 
hopeful that you will overturn this in an effort to partially rebalance our budget that I brought my 
first quarter of Kansas income tax that I will approve if you reinstate the taxes on these types of 
businesses. So I’ll lay this up here because I don’t know who to give it to.” Doug walked up to 
committee chair Steven Johnson and laid down the envelope with the check inside as several 
onlookers laughed and applauded his gesture. “Do we have anyone from the Department of 
Revenue still here?” joked Steven Johnson. 
 Doug was one of several people who had come to testify in support of repealing the tax 
cuts. However, his testimony was particularly compelling because he represented many small 
business owners who had been directly targeted as the primary beneficiaries of this tax policy. 
When Doug, and others like him, vocalized their opposition to the policy, lawmakers and media 
took notice. In this chapter, I examine how small businesses responded to the tax cuts. As this 
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chapter’s opening anecdote illustrates, many small business owners were pro-repeal.  This 
chapter argues that that tax cuts fragmented business interests in Kansas because of the 
discrepancy in rhetoric and material benefit. The Brownback administration rhetorically targeted 
small businesses as the main beneficiaries of the tax cut, yet in practice it was primarily large 
businesses who benefited most. Moreover, the ensuing budget cuts hit services that actual small 
businesses heavily rely on. The tension created between rhetorical and material conditions 
fractured business interests and this unevenness created the institutional conditions that enabled 
small businesses to take a pro-repeal position.  
 
The Small Business Accelerator and the “LLC Loophole” 
 “Is that evil?” asked Nick Jordan while explaining the pass-through carveout (Rothschild 
2012l). He continued, “The goal is to grow small businesses.” Governor Brownback and the 
supporters of the tax cut framed their policy first and foremost as a tax cut for small businesses. 
The tax cuts, according to Brownback, would “help to make Kansas the best place in America to 
start and grow a small business.”35 There were a number of reasons why the Brownback 
administration focused on small businesses. First, Brownback justified the policy’s emphasis on 
small businesses through a type of populist rhetoric. Brownback, for instance, reasoned, “We do 
a lot for big companies to come into the state. The problem of it is, that’s not where most people 
work. What have we done for the small ones? The answer is basically, we’re taxing the brains 
out of them” (Carpenter 2012b). For Brownback, the small business aspect of his tax policy was 
a great leveler.36 Big businesses have lobbyists and can secure large tax breaks where small 
                                                                   
35 Gov. Sam Brownback, "Governor Brownback Delivers Statement Prior to Signing Pro-Growth Tax Legislation," YouTube 
Video, 5m 43s, May 22, 2012 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IcjomHACsk). 
36 Nick Jordan also emphasized the populist aspect of the tax cuts by highlighting differences in access to capital between small 
and big businesses. As Jordan explained to me, “I know the governor and I and others are out doing speeches all the time, and it 
is consistent that every time we do a speech or meet with a group anywhere in the state, several people come up afterwards and 
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businesses do not. By zeroing out income taxes for small businesses, Brownback was essentially 
fighting for “the little guy.”  
Brownback’s populism, at least at the level of discourse, contends that big businesses 
have a corrupting influence on the state by eroding the tax base with special interest tax 
incentives. During an appearance at the George W. Bush Presidential Center where he touted the 
new income tax cuts in Kansas, Brownback recalled, “When we first went after it, we said, 
‘Okay, we’re going to abolish the income tax, and we’re going to go to a flat tax, just a whole 
system.’ Well, then everybody that had something stuck in the income tax code came out of the 
woodwork and said, ‘Okay, except for this deduction for this group,’ for General Motors, for the 
farmers, for oil and gas. You just got eaten alive by everybody that had the code, for their little 
area, just the way they wanted it.”37 Historically, tax incentives state governments use to lure big 
businesses to a state carve out holes in the tax structure. Moreover, these are often specific 
incentives for that business which are the result of lobbying and political influence, something 
small businesses generally lack. Conservatives generally believe in a neoclassical “broad base, 
low rates” approach to tax policy. A “broad base is one that includes all or most income (or 
spending), whereas a narrow tax base means that significant parts of income are excluded from 
the base through deductions or exemptions” (Christensen 2017:31). Thus, business incentives 
unnecessarily reduce the base. Brownback saw this policy as leveling the playing field by 
                                                                   
say, ‘Thank you. I’m a small business. I was able to hire a couple of people thanks to the savings or buy some equipment I’ve 
been looking for, for years.’ Small businesses had an extremely hard time getting loans and banks to help them with capital they 
need to grow their businesses. So now we’ve come along and a lot of these small businesses are really appreciative, because now 
they’ve got some capital flow that helps them grow their business” (Interview conducted March 29, 2016). Jordan also penned an 
op-ed in the Wichita Eagle with the magnanimous title, “Tax Policy is Helping Small Business Grow.” This op-ed is a sustained 
argument in favor of the small business benefits of the tax policy. In Jordan’s op-ed are echoes of everything the Brownback 
administration had been saying about the tax policy, namely that Kansas small businesses “have had a difficult time finding 
capital to grow. Many are entrepreneurs who don’t qualify for many of the incentives available to large corporations” (Jordan 
2016). 
37 George W. Bush Presidential Center. 2012. "Tax Policies for 4% Growth: Evidence From the States, American History, 
Markets, and Nations." April 10 (http://bushcenter.imgix.net/legacy/Tax%20Policies%20for%204%25%20Growth%20-
Transcript.pdf). Accessed February 14, 2019. 
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providing a massive tax incentive for small business. However, the irony of exempting pass-
throughs from income taxes is that Brownback was shrinking the base, just for a different group 
of businesses. 
The second major justification for targeting small businesses was economic growth. 
Small businesses were framed as the main actor in “the myth of the business friendly economy” 
(Lotesta 2018). For Brownback and his advisors, “small businesses are the engine of job creation 
and capital investment.”38 Outside advisors, namely Art Hall, also contributed to this narrative by 
providing evidence suggesting that small businesses generate faster job growth.39 By liberating 
small businesses from taxes, Brownback hoped to kickstart the state’s economy.40 Brownback, 
for instance, referred to the post-2012 tax structure as “A flat tax with a small business 
accelerator, where you take the tax totally off of your Sub S’s or LLCs so you really get your 
acceleration. This is like shooting adrenaline into the heart of growing the economy by taking 
that tax off of small business where most of your job creation is.”41 Framing a tax cut as 
benefiting small businesses is not itself new or revolutionary. Indeed, this is often a group that 
politicians will hold up as among the most deserving. However, crafting a tax policy specifically 
to target small business is new and makes the small business rejection of the policy even more 
interesting.  
                                                                   
38 Testimony given to the Senate Assessment and Taxation Committee, January 12, 2012 
39 The handout that accompanies Hall’s testimony has a picture of the garage in Palo Alta, CA where Hewlett-Packard was 
founded. This image represents the entrepreneurial worldview held by those in Brownback’s orbit. In this sense, the Brownback 
tax cuts were trying to fundamentally change society towards greater entrepreneurialism. The significance of the HP garage is 
that Silicon Valley represents an ideal-typical model for a society founded on entrepreneurial principles. In this scenario, 
everyone is involved in trying to start and grow a business and take risks and they wear their failures as badges on their sleeves.  
40 Elsewhere Brownback remarked that “For small business, which is your primary job-creating machine, [the tax policy] will 
have a very dynamic growth effect” (Hanna 2012b). 
41 George W. Bush Presidential Center. 2012. "Tax Policies for 4% Growth: Evidence From the States, American History, 
Markets, and Nations." April 10 (http://bushcenter.imgix.net/legacy/Tax%20Policies%20for%204%25%20Growth%20-
Transcript.pdf). Accessed February 14, 2019. 
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To target small businesses, the Brownback administration focused on pass-through, 
sometimes called flow-through, businesses. Pass-throughs refer to a type of business structure in 
which business income passes to the business owners, who then pay personal income tax on 
those earnings. Only the owner of a pass-through entity, unlike a c-corporations which is subject 
to corporate income tax, is taxed on business revenue. There are a number of different types of 
business entities which fall under the umbrella of pass-through businesses, such as sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, and S-corporations. However, perhaps the most well-known pass-
through is a limited liability corporation, or LLC. Indeed, in Kansas the term “LLC loophole” 
became a framing devise many critics of the policy used to describe the whole tax policy, a 
phrase supporters of the tax policy strongly disputed.42 
The LLC as a business formation was first created in Wyoming in 1977. LLCs were not 
widely used, however, until federal tax changes incentivized their growth. For instance, in 1980 
only 20.7 percent of business income was earned through a pass through, but this increased to 
54.2 percent by 2011 (Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar, and 
Zwick 2016:92). There are several reasons why a business would organize itself this way, but 
perhaps the most prescient tax reason is that individual income tax rates are often lower than 
corporate tax rates.43 Various tax reforms passed in the 1980s lowered individual rates relative to 
corporate income tax rates strongly incentivized this type of business structure (Hertel-Fernandez 
and Skocpol 2015:8). Today, the LLC is the most popular business organization and outpace the 
creation of C-corporations nearly two to one (Chrisman 2009:460; see also Travis 2019). Pass 
                                                                   
42 For instance, conservative senator Ty Masterson explained, “People who are against it call it ‘the LLC loophole.’ The truth is 
it’s a small business exemption. It’s an exemption that’s purposed for behavior just like you would create a mortgage deduction 
to incent people to buy housing or you would exempt sales tax for nonprofits… Our tax code has all types of exemptions within 
it, all aimed towards behavior. So, the goal was to exempt small business, because that’s the main employer… By calling it an 
“LLC loophole,” is you create the connotation that it's some kind of getting by with something, there’s a loophole, there’s a way 
to get around” (Interview conducted February 14, 2017). 
43 LLCs specifically have been used to great extent by landlords and property owners largely as a means to personal legal 
protections (Travis 2019).  
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through income is paid both to the federal government and the state government, however after 
2012 this group was exempted from Kansas income tax. Post-2012, only wage earners were 
required to pay income tax. This “revolutionary” (Dickinson, Mazza, and Keenan 2012) type of 
tax structure is unique and no other state has ever offered this provision (Johnson and Mazerov 
2012). 
Both the populist and economic growth justifications Brownback offered, however, faced 
challenges even from fellow conservatives. For instance, while Brownback saw his tax reform as 
helping small business compete, by creating a new tax exemption Brownback infracted the 
conservative “low rates, broad base” tax principle. This principle formed the basis of the “tax 
reform movement” and is primarily about creating efficient tax systems. Reflecting the larger 
shift from Keynesian to neoclassical economics, a low rate, broad base approach to taxation 
argues that taxes create “wedges” between the before and after-tax prices of economic activity. 
Wedges create distortions by altering the economic choices of individuals and thus give rise to 
inefficient allocation of resources (Christensen 2017:36). Efficiency, in this case, also implies 
that market-mechanisms, rather than governments, can allocate resources better, thus policies 
should aim to emulate markets or cede decisions to markets. Tax systems should try to 
“conform” to markets (Christensen 2017:6). An efficient tax system, according to this view, 
would reduce (or eliminate) the distorting effects of taxes by subjecting everyone (base) to the 
same level (rate) of tax. In terms of policy, this means marginal rates should be lowered and the 
base should be broader by eliminating deductions and exemptions (Christensen 2017:6). In many 
ways, the Kansas tax reform (as it was initially proposed) seemed to comport with this approach. 
However, in carving out an exemption for small businesses it transgressed the broad base 
principle. Several national conservative tax figures pointed this out, primarily from the Tax 
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Foundation, who warned the pass-through carve out will “encourage economically inefficient” 
activities (Robyn 2012). However, in transgressing this principle, Brownback was tipping his 
hand towards supply-side, rather than just efficiency, tax reform.44 This is consistent with 
Christensen’s point that supply-side tax reforms are different than market-conforming policies; 
supply-side being a much more extreme version of neoclassical economic ideas (2017:39-40).  
 The second major hurdle to the policy’s justification was the rhetorical slippage between 
“small business” and pass-through business. The Kansas tax cuts did not address corporate taxes, 
and instead eliminated taxes on owners of pass-through businesses which were regularly 
conflated with small businesses.45 Rhetoric aside, however, not only “small” businesses are 
organized as pass throughs.46 Defining “small business” is challenging and there have been a 
variety of suggestions offered for how best to classify businesses by size (Bean 1996:11).47 
However, according to the U.S. Small Business Administration, a small business is defined as a 
business with fewer than 500 employees. For many, this definition does not resonate to how we 
culturally view small businesses, as primarily “mom and pop” stores rooted in local 
                                                                   
44 Brownback was very explicit about the supply-side nature of this tax cut. Dave Trabert of the Kansas Policy Institute 
interviewed Brownback for his book on the Kansas tax cuts (I attempted on numerous occasions to secure an interview with 
Brownback but was never granted one). Trabert quotes Brownback as saying, “I’m a friend of Art Laffer and I’ve worked with 
Art for a long period of time. I believed in the Reagan tax cuts. I saw them. I saw their impact on the economy. I had been 
working with [Art Laffer] after I made these kinds of proposals when I was in the Congress, going to a flat-tax system 
nationwide. Paul Ryan was on my staff, who’s committed to supply-side, I am too. That’s what we need” (2018:18).  
45 Again, according to Trabert’s book, Jordan indicated their goal was to eventually zero out corporate income taxes too: “We 
wanted to go to zero, no corporate income tax eventually, but those with large tax credits wanted to keep them” (2018:30-31).  
46 Supporters of the tax cuts conceded this point. For instance, Mike O’Neal told me, “I say small businesses. Some of them are 
not so small, but their structure is more of a small business model. You’re an LLC. You’re a Subchapter S. You’re a family-
owned corporation operating under Subchapter S or a sole proprietor. The lion’s share of those are truly small businesses, but I 
would acknowledge that there are some LLCs out there that most people would say, ‘Well, that’s not small. They’re actually 
pretty big.’ But it’s targeting small businesses. Kansas is really a small business state. Most of them are supplying the needs and 
wants of the local community or larger manufacturers and larger companies in the state. But primarily you’d describe us as a state 
of small business versus big business” (Interview conducted October 21, 2016). 
47 The complication of defining a small business is found in whether you take employees, revenue, industry, or business structure 
into account. The SBA definition of fewer than 500 employees obviously takes the first definition into account. Though for 
many, 500 still seems like a large business, but where do you draw the cutoff point? Others have advocated taking industry into 
account – for example an ice cream shop with 200 employees would obviously be a huge ice cream shop, but an airline 
manufacturer with 200 employees might be considered a small airline manufacturer by industry standards. But this difficulty has 
also found its way into overall assessments of the SBA itself. For instance, in 1977, a report titled “What is a Small Business?” 
concluded the SBA had no idea, writing “Little wonder that the SBA has had considerable difficulty in conveying to the 
Congress and to the public, just what is meant by ‘small business’” (Bean 2001:98). The political difficulty in defining a small 
business is expertly chronicled by historian Jonathan Bean (1996, 2001).  
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communities. A similar disconnect occurs between small businesses and pass-through 
businesses. A pass-through business refers to how a business is structured, not its size (by any 
definition). But by associating pass-throughs and small businesses, Brownback was framing his 
policy as helping the local mom and pop stores, instead of large businesses in the state which are 
structured as pass-throughs. Indeed, large businesses account for most of the economic activity 
associated with pass-through businesses. Pass-throughs with revenue over $10 million account 
for only 0.4 percent of all pass-through businesses, but they account for 60 percent of pass-
through revenues and 42 percent of pass-through incomes (Marron 2011:6).  
Kansas-based Koch Industries, one of the state’s largest businesses, is structured as a 
pass-through. For many in the state, including some lawmakers, this was not a coincidence.48 As 
senator Tom Holland explained, targeting pass-throughs “is why I derisively refer to this as the 
Koch tax plan, because you’re talking about uber-wealthy people. Forget about Charles. I’m sure 
he makes out like a bandit on this thing, because if you think about it, that whole Koch Industries 
deal they had down there, that’s a conglomerate. It’s probably a C-corporation, but all the 
individual items in there—their cattle holdings, they make spandex, they do a whole bunch of 
different things—all those are LLCs, they’re non c-corp entities. So, all those little companies, 
which are actually some that are incredibly big themselves, billions of size annual revenue 
                                                                   
48 To my knowledge, David or Charles Koch never made any public comments about the tax cuts. However, in January 2017, 
Steve Feilmeir, CFO of Koch Industries, expressed public support ending the pass-through exemption. “There needs to be more 
equality in how the tax gets applied. You can’t have half the state exempt and the other half not exempt,” he said (Roberts 2017). 
Feilmeir, however, also disputed claims that the Koch’s wrote or advocated for the tax cuts in Kansas. “People just assume that 
Koch is in Topeka pulling puppet strings. That is not accurate,” he claimed (Roberts 2017). The Koch’s, however, have 
historically been the top donors to Brownback’s various electoral campaigns (Sharlet 2008:267). Their support for Brownback 
has sometimes veered into scandalous territory, exemplified by the Triad Management scandal in his 1996 U.S. Senate campaign 
(Mayer 2016:144-145). Koch Industries, also, has been a large supporter of Americans For Prosperity and the Kansas Chamber 
of Commerce. Indeed, they are a “Cornerstone Member” of the chamber and donated over $120,000 to the Chamber’s PAC in 
July and October 2016 during the primary and general elections in Kansas to try to defeat moderate Republicans and Democrats 
(Lowry 2017a). While Feilmeir said that Koch was not “pulling puppet strings,” Democratic lawmakers believed otherwise. 
Indeed, during one school funding debate, Democrat Tom Burroughs wondered if “this isn’t the great state of Kansas. Maybe this 
is the great state of the Chamber of Commerce” (Hancock 2015a).  
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themselves, like Georgia-Pacific.”49 This fact was pointed out to Kansas Secretary of Revenue 
Nick Jordan, who responded, “I don’t know the structure of Koch Industries. We didn’t write this 
for them. We wrote this for small business” (Shields 2012a).  
 The administration was claiming the tax cut would be a boon for business in the state and 
many businesses were initially optimistic. Conservative anti-tax groups such as Americans for 
Prosperity or the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) gushed at the new tax 
law. Dan Murray, head of the Kansas chapter of the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses, was quoted as saying, “Small business, which accounts for most employers in this 
state, are overwhelmingly in favor of eliminating the income tax on the many business entities 
which are organized as LLCs, S corporations and sole proprietorships” (Rothschild 2012s).50 
And Derrick Sontag of Americans for Prosperity said, “The move to lower the individual income 
tax is an acknowledgement of the undeniable fact that low income tax states achieve much 
higher levels of economic growth as compared to high income tax taxes” (Wistrom 2012a). 
Some small business owners also thought the tax cuts would help. One business owner told a 
local reporter, “From a business perspective, it definitely helps small businesses” (Siebenmark 
2012).51 In my interviews as well, several chamber executives recalled feeling initially 
optimistic. “It was pretty widely accepted by the businesses that it would be helpful,” 
remembered the Dodge City chamber.52 The Garden City Chamber likewise recalled that “on 
paper it looked like a really nice idea. It really did. It helped some of those business owners 
                                                                   
49 Interview conducted February 2, 2017 
50 The National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), which often claims to speak for small business nationally, has 
become a powerful conservative advocacy organization. Indeed, “in 2005 Republican members of Congress identified it as the 
most powerful congressional lobby” (Kazee, Lipsky, Martin 2008). Yet the NFIB is not a trade or peak association. Instead, it is a 
lobbying firm devoted to ultraconservative policy positions, and often misrepresents not only the views of small business owners 
more generally, but even its own members (Domhoff 2015:30). 
51 In line with the local chamber’s views of guarded optimism, this small business owner also cautioned that “Tax policy doesn’t 
affect when we hire. We’re hiring when the business dictates we need to hire” (Siebenmark 2012). 
52 Interview conducted July 18, 2017 
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looking to take advantage of a new tax system. It looked nice.”53 The Pittsburg Chamber 
described the initial feeling as one of “guarded optimism.”54 And the Hays Area Chamber 
director, who took over in 2011, also remembered being open to the idea of the tax cuts, “What 
we have been doing hasn’t been working. Let’s give it a try.”55 However, this sense of optimism 
was guarded. Chambers also recalled wondering whether the tax cuts were too big. “I do think, at 
that time even, we heard concerns of we still have to operate the state, so is it too drastic of a cut 
to begin with,” said the Dodge City Chamber. The Hays Chamber also remembered, “There were 
some concerns, from an economic development side.” And the Pittsburg Chamber explained 
“There was also a natural skepticism because business owners and business leaders understand 
as well as anybody else that you’ve got to make the bottom line work and in order to be able to 
do that you’ve got to be able to cover your expenses.”56  
The cultural and symbolic significance of small businesses affords legitimacy to policies 
that are cast as addressing the needs of small businesses. This is particularly true when it comes 
to tax cuts. The cultural deference given to small business owners played an important role in 
their impressive reversal of fortunes that began in 1970s (Bögenhold and Stabler 1991; 
Steinmetz and Wright 1989). Due in part to the financial insecurity and the rise of the 
postindustrial service sector created through neoliberal restructuring of the economy (Blackford 
2003; Harvey 2005), politicians cast small firms as both more adaptable to changing economic 
conditions and as key indicators of a growing economy (Goss 2015[1991]). Thus, lawmakers 
claimed taxes and regulations on small businesses must be eliminated in order to generate 
economic growth (Dannreuther and Perren 2013). But in claiming to speak for small businesses, 
                                                                   
53 Interview conducted May 14, 2018 
54 Interview conducted June 5, 2018 
55 Interview conducted July 20, 2017 
56 Interview conducted June 5, 2018 
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politicians created a “small business” constituency and their interests. The amorphous definition 
of small business allows political rhetoric to stick. As Danreuther and Perren explain, 
“Politicians that use the small firm construct are not really representing a tangible political 
constituency” (2013:172). Rather, they are discursively constructing an interest group that serves 
as a legitimating mechanism for neoliberal, market-based economic policies. This allows small 
businesses to become “a repository of ideas and sentiments supportive of capitalism” 
(Bechhoffer and Elliott 1985:181). 
However, small businesses are also politically significant. Both political parties in the 
United States claim to speak for small businesses, however in popular imagery and academic 
research this constituency is viewed as overwhelmingly conservative (Aldrich, Zimmer, and 
Jones 1986; Bechhofer and Elliott 1978; Kidder and Martin 2012; Sears and Citrin 1985; Hertel-
Fernandez and Skocpol 2015; Johnston 2003). Small business owners, historically, have been 
cast as “pathological” right-wing reactionaries who oppose the state at all costs (Weiss 1988:31-
54). For instance, Richard Hofstadter summarized the “typical” small business owner as “a 
parochial and archaic opponent of liberal ideas, a supporter of vigilante groups and of right-wing 
cranks” (quoted in Bean 1996:10). Antonio Gramsci derided small businesses as the “latest 
incarnation of ‘fascism’” (1977:374). More recently, Pierre Bourdieu scoffed that “it is no 
accident that the adjective petit (small) or one of its synonyms can be applied to everything the 
petit bourgeois says, thinks, does, has or is, even to his morality” (1984:338, emphasis original). 
Sociological research does suggest members of the petite bourgeois tend to be more conservative 
than economic elites (Barton 1985; Brint 1985; Mizruchi 1989). Yet, in Kansas, this group 
mobilized to secure the repeal of the tax cuts.  
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This chapter challenges the view of a radically conservative small business class. Small 
business is often “spoken for” by various political interests. However, in the case of the repeal of 
the Kansas tax cuts, the gap between how pro-tax cut politicians framed small business, and how 
small businesses themselves reacted to the cuts, became apparent. However, in the case of the 
repeal of the Kansas tax cuts, a fracturing occurred between the construction of small business 
interests and small business interests themselves. In the following sections, I elaborate how the 
political construction of small business differed from how small business owners viewed the 
effects of the tax cuts. 
 
Public Opinion, Small Business, and Taxes 
Conservative political figures and various interest organizations were making claims 
about what small business owners in Kansas thought about the tax cuts. While many business 
owners expressed a sense of “guarded optimism” about the policy, in this section I argue small 
business owners were not overwhelmingly in favor of the elimination of the income tax. At best, 
owners were split on the issue. Further, any support business owners offered towards the tax cuts 
came with caveats that services would not suffer. Support for the tax cuts, in other words, was 
contingent on the consequences of the policy.  
Americans overwhelmingly view small business positively. Opinion polls reveal 96 
percent of Americans hold a positive view of small businesses compared to only 53 percent who 
hold a positive view of big business (Newport 2016). Crucially, support for small business is 
essentially bipartisan as Republicans and Democrats, who differ on their support for big 
business, both rate small businesses very favorably.57 This positive view of small business is 
                                                                   
57 According to this poll, 57 percent of Republicans and 48 percent of Democrats hold a positive view of big business. 
Comparatively, 97 percent of Republicans and 96 percent of Democrats hold positive views of small businesses (Newport 2016).  
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repeated in Kansas. In 2009, prior to Brownback’s election, statewide opinion polling found 55 
percent of respondents favored reducing taxes on small businesses while 52 percent favored 
increasing taxes on large businesses. The following year, the same opinion polling found a 
similar split with 52.8 percent of respondents indicating taxes on small businesses should be 
decreased. This begins to change in 2011 when 44.6 percent of respondents believed small 
business taxes should be reduced and 62.5 percent believed taxes on large corporations should be 
increased. However, by 2016 there was a spike in the percentage of Kansans indicating they 
favored an increase taxes on small businesses. In 2016, 21 percent indicated a preference for 
taxes on small business to be increased and by spring 2017 that had grown to 25 percent. In the 
Fall 2017 wave, this percent begins to drop, which corresponds with the repeal of the tax cuts in 
June 2017. This indicates the tax policy had high salience for many Kansans. Moreover, when 
asked directly about support for repealing the “LLC loophole,” a large majority of Kansans (both 
Republican and Democrat) supported eliminating that provision of the tax policy (Table 4).58 
Likewise, the change in public opinion corresponds with certain anecdotal evidence from 
lawmakers. Representative Stephanie Clayton, for example, said her constituents “were kind of 
cagey about [the tax policy] in 2012, hated it in 2014, and have a virulent hatred for it now. And 
                                                                   
58 Looking at the cross-tab of support for increasing taxes on small businesses and support for closing the LLC loophole shows a 
somewhat puzzling pattern. For example, 134 respondents indicated support for closing the exemption and also decreasing taxes 
on small businesses. Possibly these are very astute political observers who know that LLCs do not equate to small businesses. 
More likely, however, is that this strange demonstrates the success of critic’s political messaging associated with the “LLC 
loophole,” which was the wording used specifically in the survey questions.  
 
 Increase Remain Same Decrease DK/Ref TOTAL 
Support 113 98 134 10 355 
Neutral 4 16 20 1 41 
Oppose 14 31 59 4 108 
DK/Ref 4 7 23 5 39 




my constituents are some of the most wealthy and educated people in the state of Kansas, so they 
benefit the most from this tax plan, and they think it’s garbage.”59 
 
 
Figure 1 Public Opinion on Taxes on Small Business, Percentage 




Table 4 Support for Closing the LLC Pass-through exemption by Political Party 
 Republican Independent Democrat DK/Ref TOTAL 
Support 139 68 134 10 351 
Neutral 23 8 9 1 41 
Oppose 53 23 24 5 105 
DK/REF 19 6 4 9 38 
TOTAL 234 105 171 25 535 
Source: Kansas Speaks Survey, Spring 2017, Docking Institute, Fort Hays State University 
 
Public opinion on taxes tends to be messy and inconsistent, which explains why the study 
of public opinion and taxes has tended to lag research on elites and taxes (Campbell 2009:48). 
And if one believes that Brownback was responding public opinion in cutting taxes, there is 
certainly some supportive evidence. But Brownback made no indication the business tax cuts 
                                                                   














Increased Stay the Same Decreased
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were made to appease public opinion. Rather, taxes on small businesses were eliminated to 
jumpstart the Kansas economy. 
In early 2012, prior to the tax cuts passage, the Overland Park Chamber of Commerce 
commissioned a survey of business owners in Johnson County, Kansas.60 Business owners were 
asked their opinion on whether property, sales, and income tax rates should change. A majority 
of Johnson County business owners expressed a preference for all taxes to remain at their current 
rates. However, a third of Johnson County business owners did indicate a preference for income 
tax cuts. Additionally, in follow up questions, business owners were asked which taxes they 
liked paying the least. Of the three taxes, most said the income tax was the least liked, with 43 
percent. The property tax followed with 33 percent and the sales tax with 14 percent. This would 
seem to indicate a base of support among business owners, at least in the richest part of the state, 
for the Brownback administration’s plan.  
However, instructively, the community scan also asked about support for the reduction or 
elimination of the income tax, which was what Brownback was proposing. Half of respondents 
were asked if they would support the total elimination of corporate or personal income tax if it 
meant a reduction in state services and the other half were asked if they would support simply 
reducing the same taxes if it also resulted in service reductions. The responses to both sets of 
questions, however, mirror each other. For those asked about cutting income tax rates, only 24 
percent supported the measure while 65 percent opposed. For those asked about eliminating the 
income tax, again only 23 percent indicated support while 65 percent opposed. This is largely 
because business owners in Johnson County believed the taxes they paid were appropriate for the 
services they valued. A majority (64 percent) of business owners indicated that for the services 
                                                                   
60 In total, 693 business owners were surveyed between January 23 and February 3, 2012. 
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they received, the amount they paid in tax was about right while only 26 percent believed their 
taxes were too high.  
 
Table 5 Johnson County Business Owners Tax Preferences 
 Increased Decreased Stay the Same 
Sales 22% 19% 54% 
Income 8% 33% 54% 
Property 10% 27% 57% 
Source: Johnson County, Kansas Online Business Survey61 
 
 In addition to polling business owners, the Chamber asked the same questions to 
registered voters in Johnson County, allowing a comparison between the views of business 
owners and the general public on taxes.62 Results indicate that business owners do not 
necessarily hold more extreme or conservative views compared to the general public. When 
asked which taxes should be increased, decreased, or remain the same, general voters follow a 
similar pattern as business owners. The majority of respondents indicate a preference of tax 
levels to remain the same, though there is also some appetite for lower income and property 
taxes. The tax that voters least liked to pay was the property tax (41 percent) followed closely by 
the income tax (37 percent) and then the sales tax (18 percent). Moreover, Johnson County 
voters indicated that they would also be unwilling to support the reduction or elimination of the 
income tax if it meant loss of services. The half that were asked about income tax reduction 
opposed it 66 to 28 percent while those asked about elimination opposed it 65 to 29 percent. 
Thus, on many tax-related items, the general public and business owners were complimentary.  
 
                                                                   
61 Overland Park Chamber of Commerce. N.D. “Johnson County, Kansas Online Business Survey” p. 17 
(http://opchamber.org/clientuploads/community_scan/OP%20Chamber%20Foundation-JoCo%20Interview%20Results-
Business.pdf).  






Table 6 Johnson County Voters Tax Preferences 
 Increased Decreased Stay the Same 
Sales 12% 24% 64% 
Income 10% 27% 62% 
Property 8% 30% 61% 
Source: Johnson County, Kansas Registered Voters Survey63 
 
Table 7 General Kansan Tax Preferences, 2012 
 Increased Decreased Stay the Same 
Sales 21% 30% 47% 
Income 16% 34% 48% 
Property 6% 51% 41% 
Source: Kansas Speaks Survey, 2012, Docking Institute, Fort Hays State University 
 
 The Johnson County community scan survey, while not representative of the entire state, 
still provides valuable insight into how Kansans came to evaluate the Brownback tax cuts in one 
of the most economically and politically influential parts of the state. However, statewide 
opinion polling shows Johnson County residents were not outliers. Across Kansas, there was a 
strong preference for tax rates to remain at their current rate as they are with only a third of 
respondents indicating a preference for sales or income taxes to be decreased (see Table 7). By 
far the main difference between the statewide survey and the Johnson County survey is in 
property taxes. While 30 percent of Johnson County residents wanted property taxes cut, 
statewide over half of respondents felt property taxes should be lowered.  
                                                                   





Public opinion polling on taxes often asks whether respondents would like to see taxes 
increased or decreased. When asked this question without regard to the specific fiscal context of 
the responders, most people will indicate preference for lower taxes. As such, these types of 
survey results are more indicative of the degree of tolerance for the existing tax system rather 
than an accurate reading of how the public want rates to be altered (Citrin 1979:114). Thus, we 
can infer from these survey results that business owners and the public had a high degree of 
tolerance for the existing tax system. Furthermore, both business owners and the general public 
were unwilling to support tax cuts if it meant valued services would be reduced. 
 But what services did those in Johnson County indicate were their top priorities? Here 
again there are similarities between business owners and the general public. Education and local 
schools topped the priority list for both groups. Registered voters were asked to rank a variety of 
priorities for elected officials to consider. The top ranked priority, with 43 percent, was K-12 
education followed by economic development and job growth with 37 percent. These were also 
the top two concerns for businesses. The top priority for owners was economic development with 
57 percent followed by K-12 education with 51 percent. But not only was education a top 
priority, respondents indicated a willingness to pay higher taxes to support these services. 
Among those surveyed, 80 percent of voters and 81 percent of owners indicated strong support 
for tax increases for K-12 education. In addition to education, however, infrastructure was also a 
high priority. Among business owners, the quality of the roads and highways was a top priority 
for 22 percent and a high priority for another 74 percent. Similarly, among general voters, 
infrastructure was a top priority for 15 percent and a high priority for 77 percent. Both groups 
also indicated a willingness to increase their taxes to pay for improved infrastructure. A total of 
75 percent of business owners and 67 percent of voters supported tax increase for roads. 
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 The picture that emerges from this community scan is one of support for public goods 
and an expressed willingness to pay for those goods. Put another way, Kansans did not support a 
tax cut if it meant services would be cut and they would be willing to pay more to support those 
services. These findings support recent research in sociology and political science which 
demonstrates that, contrary to political rhetoric, most Americans are generally pro-tax 
(Williamson 2017; Pearson 2014). The community scan survey demonstrates that pro-tax 
persuasion is also found among business owners. Moreover, the pro-tax opinions expressed in 
the survey were eventually backed up by political action on the part of voters and many business 
owners. 
 
What Did the Tax Cut Actually Do for Small Business? 
 Rhetorically, Brownback’s tax policy was devised to benefit small businesses. Moreover, 
benefit for small businesses was also the primary metric the administration used to claim the tax 
cuts were “working.” In particular, the governor’s administration drew on business filings from 
the Secretary of State’s office to claim the tax cuts were responsible for record new small 
business growth. For example, in a February 2017 press release, the Secretary of State’s office 
boasted, “Since taking office in 2010, Secretary Kobach presided over a 29 percent increase of 
business entities throughout the state. Secretary Kobach said: ‘The pace of small business 
formation in Kansas continues to be strong’.”64 And it is true that business filings increased. 
Below, Table 8 recreates the latest business formation chart from the Brownback-era Secretary 
of State’s office.  
 
                                                                   
64 Kansas Secretary of state news release (NR_2017_2_8), February 8, 2017 
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Table 8 Kansas Secretary of State Business Formation Report Summary 
Filings 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Domestic 13,354 12,811 12,387 13,024 13,646 15,008 15,469 15,780 17,298 18,147 
Foreign 3,427 3,368 3,034 2,960 3,136 3,461 3,381 3,523 3,622 3,422 
Reinstatement 4,001 4,107 3,881 3,762 3,978 3,675 4,513 3,849 3,472 3,589 
Dissolution 1,647 1,814 1,829 1,839 2,035 2,168 2,303 2,676 3,038 3,054 
Withdrawals 805 869 873 883 958 975 984 1,159 1,210 1,313 
Forfeitures 9,320 11,670 12,043 12,917 13,037 11,824 14,120 11,321 11,402 12,539 
Annual 
Reports 
115,616 122,473 127,119  128,614 135,817 134,439 141,886 150,636 157,909 164,176 
Entities in 
Existence 
132,397 138,652 142,540 144,598 152,599 152,908 160,736 170,489 179,066 187,305 
Net 
Domestic* 
5,583 2,565 1,523 1,147 1,594 3,716 2,575 4,473 5,120 4,830 
* Net domestic number arrived at by taking the sum of domestic and reinstatement and subtracting dissolution, withdrawals, and forfeitures. 
 
The administration focused exclusively on the top line of this chart – the number of domestic 
filings.65 This chart, however, obscures more than it reveals. While domestic filings increased, so 
too did dissolutions, withdrawals, and forfeitures. Net domestic filings increased over the course 
of the tax cuts but were still lower than pre-recession net domestic filings. Moreover, the number 
of domestic filings in this report is not broken down into types of businesses. But pass-through 
businesses also did not receive the “shot of adrenaline” that Brownback had promised.  
According to the Governor’s Consensus Revenue Estimating Group’s Final 
Recommendations report, the tax cuts did not stimulate growth in either the number or rate of 
pass through business. As Table 9 demonstrates, while the number of pass through entities did 
increase, the rate of new pass through entities was not sustained and did not surpass the rate of 
growth prior to the recession. The rate of new pass through entities peaked in 2012, the year the 
tax cuts were passed (but before they took effect), but then declined. The rate of new pass 
                                                                   
65 As Nick Jordan said in response to the number of business filers, “This is a policy that's going to grow the very backbone of 
your economy, and by growing these numbers, we're saying, ‘Hey, guess what? We did it’” (Associated Press 2015a). 
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through creation in 2014, for instance, was less than in 2011, before the tax plan was in effect. 
Moreover, this rate of pass through business formation did not outpace neighboring states or the 
country. In Kansas between 2012 and 2015, the percentage of growth in sole proprietorships was 
2.8 percent and the percentage of growth in S corporations and partnerships was 4.1 percent 
(Mazerov 2018). The rate of growth among S corporations and partnerships in Kansas surpassed 
only Missouri (2.6 percent) among the neighboring states. The growth in new sole 
proprietorships fared only slightly better against neighboring states, but was still below Colorado 
and Oklahoma and well below the U.S. average of 6.2 percent (Mazerov 2018). 
 
Table 9 Pass-Through Businesses by Year, 2007-2014 
Tax Year Number of Entities Rate of New Pass 
Through Growth over 
Previous Year 
Number of W-2’s 
2007 74,648 N/A 449,047 
2008 77,053 3.2% 465,665 
2009 78,348 1.7% 420,814 
2010 80,278 2.5% 469,386 
2011 82,616 2.9% 508,449 
2012 85,400 3.4% 536,946 
2013 87,943 3.0% 579,002 
2014 90,084 2.4% 605,943 
Source: Governor’s Consensus Revenue Estimating Working Group Final Recommendations  
 
 Additionally, the number of new pass through entities was likely the result of tax 
avoidance. This was illustrated by high-profile and highly paid university athletic coaches in the 
state received large percentages of their compensation paid to their pass throughs. The University 
of Kansas men’s basketball coach, Bill Self, for instance, earned $230,000 in salary from the 
university in 2012. Because this was salary, he would pay income tax on it. However, he also 
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received $2.75 million paid to “BCLT II,” the name of his LLC (Margolies and Zeff 2016). This 
income was totally tax free. Many economists, particularly conservative economists from the 
Tax Foundation, highlighted the tax avoidance incentive created by the Kansas tax cuts. Tax 
avoidance, as opposed to tax evasion, refers to taking action to lessen tax liability. Tax evasion, 
on the other hand, refers to the failure to pay required tax. Tax evasion is illegal while tax 
avoidance is legal and, in many cases, encouraged.66 However, from the point of view of a state 
government, the results look the same: less tax money. At the time, the Tax Foundation wrote 
that the 2012 Kansas tax cuts “creates an incentive for businesses to structure as pass-throughs 
for tax reasons, even if it might be unwise to do so for non-tax reasons” (Robyn 2012). And after 
the tax bill passed, Gary Allerheiligen, who was head of the Kansas Society of CPAs for several 
years and helped advise the creation of the tax policy, argued that legislators needed to go back 
and fix the tax avoidance “hiccup” (Shields 2012b).  
The tax avoidance “hiccup” has to do with how pass-through businesses, specifically 
LLCs, are structured. The owner of an LLC could pay themselves a salary from their business. In 
that case, the business owner would pay income tax on the salary just like any other paid 
employee. However, the owner of the LLC could also pay out their business income as profits 
and avoid taxes entirely. And initial research has largely supported the claim that the tax cuts 
incentivized tax avoidance. Turner and Blagg, for instance, conclude that the Kansas tax law did 
not create job growth nor did it incentivize new business formation. Indeed, they observe “a 
small net loss” in jobs which they speculate is associated with tax avoidance. “Some workers 
could be leaving establishment employment in order to become self-employed. A switching from 
                                                                   
66 As a result of the fiscal crisis, Kansas also had to raise sales taxes. This was done on groceries as well. Economists have also 
found that high sales taxes lead to tax avoidance, especially in border counties as people would go across state lines to buy 
groceries and cigarettes. Thus, the Kansas tax cuts created multiple avenues for people to engage in tax avoidance.  
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employer-based work to self-employment without new hires underscores an excess burden 
aspect of the policy: it may reallocate economic activity but not increase it” (Turner and Blagg 
2018:1040, emphasis mine). Other economic research has attempted to estimate the size of tax 
avoidance. Economists have demonstrated that pass through businesses in Kansas show a $400 
dollar decrease in wages compared to control states (DeBacker, Heim, Ramnath, and Ross 
2017:17). This result suggests “that although we see an increase in the share of sole proprietors 
in Kansas, this increase appears more consistent with income shifting rather than with new 
business activity” (DeBacker et al. 2017:19). 
Some local chambers of commerce, namely the Kansas City, Kansas (KCK) Chamber, 
tried unsuccessfully to advocate for eliminating this provision for LLCs specifically. As the KCK 
Chamber saw it, the “LLC loophole” referred specifically to the ability of LLC business owners 
to avoid paying income taxes by paying profits instead of salaries. In a policy letter to state 
legislators, the KCK Chamber explained, “The law was not intended to have a person (e.g. LLC 
member) classify all of their income as profits, thereby avoiding Kansas taxes completely. After 
all, profits of LLC’s and partnerships are subject to federal income taxes. Therefore, we support 
fixing the ‘LLC loophole’ to create equity across all small business pass through corporate 
structures. However, we do not support taxing the ‘true’ profits of small business, including the 
profits of S Corporations.”67 The KCK Chamber’s position was unusually nuanced. For the KCK 
Chamber, the “LLC loophole” (as they interpreted that phrase) was unfair and they supported its 
repeal. However, they still supported the tax exemption for what they referred to as “true pass 
through income,” understood as profit above salary. However, that degree of nuance often gets 
lost in political debates and the KCK chamber’s policy position largely fell on deaf ears. 
                                                                   
67 Memo dated May 21, 2015 
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But reclassifying salaries as profits to avoid taxes was only one way the Kansas tax cuts 
incentivized tax avoidance. Because the 2012 tax reform created a split in how business income 
was taxed (eliminating pass-through income but not corporate income from taxes), the tax policy 
incentivized corporations to restructure as pass-through businesses. The incentive to switch 
business structure was demonstrated by the actions of some policymakers, even those critical of 
it. Senator Tom Holland, for instance, who ran unsuccessfully against Brownback in 2010, 
explained he reclassified his business as a result of the tax change. “Full disclosure, my 
company… we are a Minnesota-registered C-corporation. I voted against this legislation. I’ve 
always spoken against it. I will vote to repeal it in a heartbeat. But I am also a rational actor. So 
when this thing passed I ran out and, like the other thousand businesspeople, I set up my own 
LLC. So I am able to shield a significant amount… In essence, I use basically the LLC to charge 
my C-corp basically a management consulting fee… Then because it’s pass-through I flow it 
down to me through my individual income return as non-taxable income.”68 
Although the process Holland describes is not exactly switching between business 
structures, it provides evidence of the tax avoidance incentive created by the policy. 
Furthermore, several C-corporations switched (see Table 10). True, the policy did not incentivize 
sustained switching. The number of entities that switch to a pass-through in 2014 is roughly 
equivalent to the number that switched in 2010 and 2011 before the policy was implemented. 
However, in the policy’s first year, there is a noticeable bump where 575 entities switch, an 
increase of approximately 68 percent over the previous year. While these data provide a glimpse 
of how many corporations switched, it does not reveal which specific corporations switched. In 
other words, we cannot tell how much revenue was lost to the state from corporate tax 
                                                                   
68 Personal interview, February 2, 2017 
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avoidance. However, as a social process, the percent increase in 2013 is significant because 
research tends to suggest C-corporations very infrequently switch from more to less complex 
organization (Cole and Sokolyk 2015). Thus, the increase in switchers suggests the potential tax 
savings was worth the effort required to restructure. 
 
Table 10 Number of C-Corp to Pass-Through "Switchers" 
Tax Year Number of C-Corp Entities Number of Entities that 
Switched to a Pass-through 
TY2010 28,532 346 
TY2011 28,240 353 
TY2012 28,187 343 
TY2013 28,532 575 
TY2014 26,949 369 
Source: Governor’s Consensus Revenue Estimating Working Group Final Recommendations  
 
 The tax policy incentivized tax avoidance, however the actual tax savings to business 
owners varied dramatically. Table 3.8 shows the breakdown of estimated tax savings per filer by 
net business income. The total number of filers in tax year 2013 was 333,771. Of those filers, the 
176,920 (53.01 percent) with business income under $25,000 saved an estimated $158 in taxes. 
Conversely, the 2,274 filers (0.68 percent) with net business income over $500,000 saved 
$38,310 in taxes. Tax savings for business owners translated into revenue lost to the state. For 
the group of filers with business income under $25,000, the tax cuts translated into $24,98,944 of 
lost revenue. For the group of filers with business income over $500,000, the state forfeited 
$87,116,265. Put another way, less than one percent of filers who benefited from the pass-








However, the data also reveal another important aspect of the 2012 tax reform. While 
most filers saw only minor tax savings, others actually saw their taxes increase as a result of the 
tax cuts. Approximately 94,000 filers, or 28.17 percent, saw their taxes increase by an average of 
$559. The tax increase for this group is largely the result of eliminating certain deductions, 
namely the loss carryforward provision, which prevented owners from claiming business losses 
as a deduction on their taxes.69 All told, in the first year of the tax cuts, 81 percent of filers saw 
their taxes either increase or the savings were negligible. 
 The inequality in tax savings across businesses became part of the political debate over 
the repeal of the tax cuts and is exemplified in an exchange during a House tax committee 
testimony. Mike Bosworth, president and owner of NorthWind Technical Services in Sabetha, 
Kansas, testified in opposition to repealing the tax cuts, stating if the policy was eliminated he 
would have to “find a way” to make up the $50,000 in extra expenses. In response, ranking 
Democrat on the Committee, Tom Sawyer, asked Bosworth, “If I’m reading your testimony 
right, your taxes are about $50,000. Is that right?”  
 “It’s about – not exactly – but in that neighborhood.” 
 “Okay, so that means you made over a million dollar last year to pay that.” 
 “That would be correct,” Bosworth replied. 
 “So… out of that million dollars, you can’t find $50,000?” 
 “That is an interesting observation. Because of the money that we took in, at first I told 
you that the federal government is going to take about $450,000 of that. Did you know that?” 
 “I’m asking you the question. That’s not really what we do,” Sawyer responded calmly as 
other committee members chuckled softly.  
                                                                   
69 Investigative reporting from the New York Times revealed Donald Trump used the loss carry forward deduction to essentially 
avoid paying federal income taxes for over 18 years (Confessore and Appelbaum 2016). 
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 “In your statement, you said we had a million dollars, but we don’t actually really have a 
million dollars….” 
 “Well, obviously,” Sawyer interjected, “you are making over a million dollars if, if, it’s 
going to cost you $50,000. You have to have over a million dollars in taxable income to pay 
that.” 
 “Yes,” Mike conceded. “And when that $50,000 comes through it’s going to get passed, 
like I said we have profit-sharing for our employees, the profits will go down and they’ll get 
less.” 
 This somewhat tense exchange highlights the politicization of the business tax cuts. 
Many local chambers and small business owners advocated for the repeal of the cuts, but not all 
did. Mike Bosworth opposed the repeal and urged lawmakers to find other ways of balancing the 
budget. While his testimony claims repeal would hurt his business and his employees, the 
disclosure of his million-dollar income reveals his personal financial stake in the policy 
continuation. Those who advocated for sustaining the cuts, if not done for ideological reasons, 
primarily stood to benefit the most financially.  
The key point is that the tax cuts produced an uneven material benefit for businesses. 
Most business owners did not substantively benefit from the 2012 tax reform, with some even 
having to pay more in taxes. Those who did benefit the most were more inclined to oppose repeal 
efforts. While this may seem like a basic point, it is important because often “business interests” 
are painted with an overly broad brush. The uneven distribution of tax savings highlights the 
variation within this key constituency. Moreover, it is this variation in material benefit, coupled 




What Was Behind the Anti-Tax Cut Advocacy? 
 I now examine the main themes that emerged from interviews with local chambers of 
commerce and observations of small business owners in their testimonies to taxation committees. 
Not all small business actors took the pro-repeal stance. However, several did and, crucially, they 
were the most highly visible. For instance, the Kansas City Star ran a story in 2016, “They Get 
Kansas Tax Breaks, and They ‘Feel Like Freeloaders’” profiling several pro-repeal business 
owners in the state. (Montgomery 2016). Likewise, The Guardian also wrote in 2017 that “the 
business owners Brownback targeted [with the tax cuts] are… unimpressed” (Rushe 2017). Thus, 
it is instructive to understand the ways in which those in the business community in Kansas 
understood their pro-repeal stance. The Brownback administration viewed the causes of 
economic activity differently than “on the ground” economic actors. This schism between the 
Brownback administration and local economic actors expanded over time as the policy not only 
failed to provide meaningful tax savings to most businesses, but actively worked at cross-
purposes to discourage the initial goals of the policy.  
 
The Coalition of Local Chambers and the Kansas Chamber of Commerce 
Chambers of commerce are said to be the “voice” of businesses. As sociologist C. Wright 
Mills noted, “Such power as the local business community has is organized in the Chamber of 
Commerce, to which most small businessmen belong” (2002[1951]:49). However, over the 
course of the Brownback tax cuts, the business community spoke with two, often opposing 
voices. Instead of uniting in support of the tax policy, business interests fractured. The state 
chamber of commerce was steadfast in its support of the policy while local chambers primarily 
advocated for repeal. This fracturing, I argue, is best explained by the embeddedness of local 
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chambers in their communities (Pacewicz 2016). Local chambers described the state chamber as 
abandoning local business communities in favor of large corporations. Moreover, they saw the 
state chamber as an antagonistic political force promoting radical and immoderate politics. As a 
result, several chambers withdrew their membership from the state chamber and organized into 
different coalitions or regional networks, such as the Southwest Chamber Alliance and the 
Chamber of Commerce Executives of Kansas, often simply referred to as “the coalition” of local 
chambers.  
The coalition is made up of local chambers of various sizes from across the state. Some 
of these chambers are large and politically active, such as the Overland Park or Lawrence 
chambers. Others, however, are smaller and usually avoid taking strong political positions. 
Smaller chambers, for instance, usually (but not always) avoid publishing policy positions or 
other legislative agenda statements. As the Ellis chamber explained, “The general consensus… is 
that we stay out of politics.”70 The reason small chambers avoid politics is to avoid antagonizing 
local relationships. As another chamber told me, “In the smaller communities, we will start 
losing membership if we get too politically active.”71 Likewise, the Atchison chamber explained, 
“In a small community like this, you can make enemies really fast.”72  
The coalition grew in importance as the political activity of the Kansas Chamber strained 
relations with local chambers. While the coalition came together and was active during the repeal 
battle, it was not the original cause of the coalition’s formation. The coalition already existed and 
had previously voiced support for tax increases. For instance, in 2010, the “gang of 14,” as the 
                                                                   
70 Interview conducted April 5, 2018 
71 Interview with the Hays Area Chamber of Commerce conducted July 20, 2017 
72 Interview conducted December 22, 2017 
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coalition73 was called, sent a letter to state legislators stating they supported tax increases to 
protect core services, such as schools and roads, at risk of being cut due to recessionary budget 
shortfalls. “If revenue must be enhanced for basic government services, our chambers can 
support rational state revenue enhancements,” the letter read (Rothschild 2010e). In response to 
this open letter, the Kansas Chamber of Commerce rebuked the local chambers, stating they were 
“disappointed to see a small minority of its members – 14 of 80 local chambers of commerce – 
send a letter to legislative leadership saying they believe their business members don’t pay 
enough in taxes” (Gardener News 2010). The Kansas Chamber’s response prompted several 
local chambers to abandon the state chamber, an exodus which continued over the course of the 
tax cut battle. For most local chambers, withdraw from the state chamber has not resulted in any 
negative impacts. In fact, for some it has even been beneficial. As one local chamber told me, 
“We actually have had our own members stay members with us when they find out we have 
dropped our membership with the state chamber.”74 Likewise, another local chamber 
representative said, “I also have people who are members because we are not a member of the 
state chamber. I have both sides.”75 Some local chambers stayed for strategic purposes. The 
Overland Park Chamber explained while several local chambers “have dropped their 
membership, because they saw the Kansas Chamber going off in a direction that didn’t coincide 
with their positions on issues,” they decided not to withdraw “just so that we can at least have a 
seat at the table, whether it’s a good one or not, mostly not.”76 The Overland Park Chamber’s 
                                                                   
73 The Chambers in the 2010 Coalition were: Arkansas City, Dodge City, Emporia Area, Grant County, Greater Kansas City, 
Greater Topeka, Hutchinson-Reno County, Hays Area, Kansas City, Kan., Manhattan Area, Northeast Johnson County, Olathe, 
Overland Park and Salina Area.  
74 Interview with the Hays Area Chamber of Commerce conducted July 20, 2017 
75 Interview with the Atchison Chamber of Commerce conducted December 22, 2017 
76 Interview conducted May 12, 2016.  
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involvement with the Kansas Chamber, however, did not preclude their involvement in the 
coalition.  
In both 2010 and after 2012, local chambers pragmatically voiced support for tax 
increases, primarily to maintain funding for schools and roads. The weakening of public 
institutions and infrastructure was the impetus for the formation of the Coalition in the first 
place. As the Topeka Chamber explained, “it boils down to the fact that, really back in 2010, this 
narrative to the effect of all businesses cared about are lower taxes took root and was being 
propagated by a number of groups. But those of us who are business organizations on the 
ground, as opposed to ideological organizations, we know that the facts out here are a different. 
That businesses really do care about workforce, good roads, they care if your community has a 
hospital that isn’t about to close, and they care that they’re reading in the papers that your 
schools are tragically underfunded. Those are the sorts of things that do matter to businesses. 
And so, on that basis, this coalition came together to try to stand up an alternate narrative that we 
felt was more true to what real business people are thinking.”77 
The emphasis on infrastructure and school funding as public investments was an 
organizing principle for the coalition’s repeal efforts. For instance, in 2015, the coalition 
addressed a letter to Brownback, stating, “Some contend Kansas businesses will only be satisfied 
once they are no longer asked to pay income taxes. The business community in Kansas is not a 
monolithic block, though. We want to remind you that there is another very real voice of 
business in Kansas that supports a multi-faceted approach… Responsible business people 
understand, though, that tax dollars fairly assessed and properly expended are an investment in 
the kind of State we want for ourselves, our customers, our employees and our children.”78 These 
                                                                   
77 Interview conducted July 21, 2017 
78 Letter dated April 29, 2015. 
98 
 
themes were repeated again in a 2016 when the coalition wrote, “Our Kansas local chambers, 
governed by local businesses, believe it is critical to emphasize how statewide decisions impact 
efforts to attract and retain jobs in cities across our state.” The Coalition “encourages and 
supports a balanced and stable tax policy that is fiscally responsible, creates a competitive and 
pro-growth business environment, and allows for local maintenance of essential services and key 
quality of life factors.”79 Moreover, the coalition’s increasing political activity was not driving 
chambers away. Instead, the number of coalition chambers increased from 14 in 2010 to 22 by 
2016.80  
Fracturing between state and local chambers also resulted from the view that the Kansas 
Chamber gave preference to large industries at the expense of local communities. As the 
Junction City Chamber explained, “economic development directors have the responsibility of 
understanding how their constituents need to operate and what is important to them… So, when 
the Kansas Chamber decides to endorse a tax policy that only benefits very large industries… 
that is not supporting the bulk of your membership across the state as chambers because the bulk 
of the chambers across the state are not metro chambers. So, it just stands to reason that that tax 
policy is not a fit for most of their members.”81 Moreover, because the state chamber was 
preferencing large industries, some local chambers felt the Kansas Chamber treated them 
condescendingly. For instance, the Liberal, Kansas Chamber recalled a meeting with Kansas 
Chamber representatives where they were told “they didn’t even know why the local chambers 
                                                                   
79 Letter dated March 3, 2016. 
80 The political activity of local chambers was garnering attention, not only from lawmakers, but also from other moderate 
political organizations in the state. Of particular note is the recognition the coalition of chambers received from the MainStream 
Coalition who recognized the Coalition of local chambers at a fundraising dinner, stating the local chambers “sent a signed letter 
to the Kansas political leadership, arguing for balanced revenue streams (including income taxes), strong local community 
control, an end to budget shell games stealing from highway funds to cover revenue losses, and strong funding for public 
education… For the bravery to stand up, and the conscience to speak out, we are proud to honor them at our event (MainStream 
Coalition 2015a). 
81 Interview conducted April 17, 2018 
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needed or wanted to be a member of the Kansas Chamber. That was their answer to us. So we all 
said ‘okay I guess we won’t be then.’ It’s not doing us any good and they don’t care about us at 
all obviously from what you’ve said. So most of us quit. I think everybody out here, I don’t think 
anybody is a Kansas Chamber member.”82  
The Liberal Chamber’s decision to leave was reinforced by the state chamber’s political 
activity. “After a couple of political campaigns that they [the Kansas Chamber] absolutely 
trashed our candidates, I had my chamber members calling me saying ‘are you a Kansas 
Chamber member? Because if you are I’m dropping my membership.’ So everybody out here 
was pretty upset with that. I am not a Chamber member for those reasons.”83 This encounter 
between the Liberal Chamber and the Kansas Chamber demonstrates that the split was intensely 
political, not just a disagreement over how to achieve economic growth. Indeed, many local 
chambers viewed the state chamber as exclusively a political force. According to the Ottawa 
Chamber, they “have consciously divested and separated ourselves from the state chamber which 
tends to be more of a political institution than an advocacy for commerce.”84 Instead, the Ottawa 
Chamber was a member of the coalition because they felt has “a more moderate approach and 
speaks with a stronger voice in terms of small businesses, business development, and commerce 
in our state.”85  
The state chamber engaged in aggressive and ideological political campaigns across the 
state. It was the Kansas Chamber, for instance, which led the campaign to defeat moderate 
Republicans in 2012. This type of political campaigning further antagonized local and state 
chamber relations. For instance, the Pittsburg, Kansas chamber explained that in a local House 
                                                                   
82 Interview conducted May 5, 2018 
83 Interview conducted May 5, 2018 
84 Interview conducted March 28, 2018 
85 Interview conducted March 28, 2018 
100 
 
election, “the state chamber was very active in unseating a popular incumbent. And very 
aggressive billboards against her. And in very small print at the bottom it said ‘paid for by the 
Kansas chamber.’ Well, people who don’t understand the difference between the Pittsburg 
Chamber, or the Lawrence Chamber and the state chamber thought it was us, so it was causing a 
lot of confusion on just who was funding that… So our board at the time just felt that to be able 
to assure our members that their membership dollars were not going to support that, that we 
would need to not be a member of the state chamber.”86 
Local chambers saw the state chamber as simultaneously preferencing large industry and 
belittling small businesses. But from the state chamber’s perspective, however, the fracturing 
process looked different. The state chamber saw the state-local split through a more ideological 
lens. From the state chamber’s point of view, local chambers are “more community organization 
driven, because they will have both a private sector and public sector component to them… The 
state chamber is 99.9 percent private sector businesses. There are many things and issues that we 
have in common. There are some that we don’t have in common because of the different makeup 
with the local chambers having maybe more a public influence. There are some local chambers 
who actually their leadership is dominated on the public sector side, whether it’s school districts 
or whether it’s hospitals, whatever, and that’s fine. But it just shows the difference between how 
they operate and how we operate as essentially private sector.”87 Thus, for the state chamber, 
preferencing large industry equated to advocating and advancing private sector policy positions. 
Local chambers, by contrast, are seen as “tainted” by the involvement of public sector actors, 
such as school district officials, who distort the pro-business effectiveness of local chambers.88  
                                                                   
86 Interview conducted June 5, 2018 
87 Interview conducted October 21, 2016 
88 Despite the “99.9 percent” private sector composition of the state chamber, even their membership began to sour on the tax 
cuts. According to the Kansas Chamber’s 2017 annual survey of business owners in the state, “the business community split 
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 While the most significant split was between the state and local chambers, not all local 
chambers were united in repeal efforts. The most significant outlier among local chambers was 
the Wichita Chamber of Commerce who consistently supported the tax cuts. Even after the 
repeal of the tax cuts in 2017, the Wichita Chamber’s policy agenda still supports “long-term 
state tax structure reform including reduction/elimination of personal income tax” (Wichita 
Regional Chamber of Commerce 2019). Moreover, unlike other chambers, the Wichita Chamber 
provided unwavering support for the tax cuts in committee testimonies in 2012. Other local 
chambers, such as Overland Park or the Greater Kansas City chamber, also provided committee 
testimony, though they appeared either as neutral or opposed to the reform. The Overland Park 
chamber’s testimony urged caution, stating “Before embarking on a measure as large as what is 
proposed in HB 2560, we respectfully urge you as policymakers to take the time to fully 
understand the bill’s future impact on our State.”89 The Wichita Chamber, however, claimed the 
tax cuts were necessary for the future of the state. The Wichita Chamber was “confident [the tax 
cuts] would lead to job creation and a more vibrant economy in Kansas. We also believe that this 
legislation would create a more efficient and productive system of taxation that incentivizes 
production from both firms and individual citizens.” 90 As proof, the Wichita Chamber noted that 
“One has to look no further than to our neighbor, Oklahoma, to see how an aggressive and 
innovative approach to tax policy and economic growth impacts jobs, state GDP and overall 
prosperity.”91  
 Other local chambers understood the Wichita Chamber’s pro-tax cut policy agenda as 
primarily driven by the influence of Koch Industries, also located in Wichita. However, the 
                                                                   
almost evenly” on the question of repeal of the 2012 income tax cuts, with 39 percent saying the pass-through portion should be 
repealed and 42 percent saying it should not be repealed (the survey having a margin of error of 3 points) (Hancock 2017a). 
89 Testimony, February 8, 2012 
90 Testimony February 8, 2012 
91 Testimony February 8, 2012 
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Wichita Chamber claimed this was a misrepresentation. The Wichita Chamber rejected this view 
because “what that suggests is that we don’t run our own government relations shop here, that 
Koch does. That is incorrect because Koch is one member and I’ve got 1,799 other ones. And 
Koch also does not strong arm. They put a lot of money behind the political things they want 
done but they do it directly. They don’t do it through us. They support the chamber of commerce 
because the chamber of comer takes pro-business positions which are usually reasonable, low tax 
rates.”92 The Wichita Chamber claimed to represent the broad view of all its members. As the 
chamber representative continued, “I think generally our member’s view is that too much wealth 
is being tied up in taxes and government… [W]e’re not de facto anti-tax. We are – and when I 
say ‘we,’ this is what I hear from the majority of our members – we are anti-high tax when we 
feel like we’re not getting much out of it. And when we see opportunity where that money could 
be directed into actually growing an economy and driving job growth and attracting people to the 
state. If you can’t do it, Topeka, let us keep our money and let us do it ourselves, is the attitude I 
hear.”93 
 
Community Embeddedness and Quality of Life 
The tax policy split business interests in the state along various fault lines, primarily 
between state and local chambers, but also between local chambers. However, the Wichita 
Chamber was unique not only for their general pro-tax cut stance, but also for the reasons why 
they took this stance. Pro-repeal chambers justified their positions by appealing to the overall 
business climate of the state, including community amenities. The Wichita Chamber, however, 
justified their tax cut position exclusively in terms of shareholder value. All chambers of 
                                                                   
92 Interview conducted May 31, 2018 
93 Interview conducted May 31, 2018 
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commerce invoke their membership to justify and legitimate their legislative agendas.  And, as 
mentioned in the coalition’s letter, emphasis on the importance of community and quality of life 
for local businesses was a primary theme for many chambers who took a pro-repeal stance. 
Quality of life in this sense is best understood as the public goods and services that a community 
attractive to businesses and workers. However, following Milton Friedman’s famous claim that a 
firm’s only social responsibility is to increase profits (1970), the Wichita Chamber claimed that 
“While firms have an obligation to their employees and the communities in which they operate,” 
the Wichita Chamber testified in 2012, “they also have an obligation to their shareholders and 
members.”94 
The firm-centric view, however, was not widespread and many chambers of commerce 
and business owners drew the link between support for services and raising taxes. For instance, 
during a House taxation committee hearing, Melinda Boeken stood up to deliver her testimony in 
favor of repealing the tax cuts. “I have farmed with my husband for 27 years in Ellsworth 
County,” Melinda testified. “And I am also a registered Republican, so I’m not a Democrat up 
here pushing a liberal agenda.” However, Melinda felt so strongly that the tax cuts should be 
repealed, she testified that she and her husband “have chosen to be paid a wage from the farm 
and pay W-2 taxes on those earnings. We feel that it is very important that we all contribute to 
ensure that we maintain good schools and infrastructure in our communities and state. Without 
everyone contributing to these programs, we will lose them and the high standard of living we 
have enjoyed in the state of Kansas.”95 Business owners also used the language of quality of life 
in situating their pro-repeal position. For instance, Trace Walker, a business owner from Salina, 
Kansas testified before the House taxation committee that “there are many things in which 
                                                                   
94 Testimony February 8, 2012 
95 Testimony March 15, 2016 
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government should not be involved, there are some things that only government can do and those 
are important to our quality of life… Although my company benefitted from the 2012 tax plan, if 
reinstating the tax on businesses is necessary for our state government to meet its obligations and 
invest for the future then I would urge you to do so.”96 These statements compliment the 
statewide public opinion polls found state residents and business owners were unwilling to 
sacrifice spending on schools and infrastructure for lower taxes. Further, these testimonies 
exemplify the link owners drew between taxes paid and services.  
The quality of life emphasis of the coalition and local chambers was repeated in several 
interviews and policy agenda statements. For instance, the 2016 coalition statement state they 
support a balanced and stable tax policy that is fiscally responsible, creates a competitive and 
pro-growth business environment, and allows for local maintenance of essential services and key 
quality of life factors.”97 Additionally, the Overland Park Chamber “believed that quality of life 
was really the driving factor in analyzing taxes, analyzing where people wanted to live, where 
they wanted to locate their businesses, and part of that was an obligation to pay for it… The 
services, the environment, not just education, but public safety, roads, all the government 
services that you typically think of that were important to us here in driving the quality of life in 
Johnson County and the state of Kansas was worth paying for, and they were happy to do it.”98 
This was echoed again by the Manhattan Chamber who said, “There was such a recognition that 
this needed to change. The decline in funding for education, the decline in funding for schools, 
both K-12 and higher education, the roads – those issues made it such that the businesses 
recognized that this needed to happen.”99 
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97 Letter dated March 3, 2016 
98 Interview conducted May 12, 2016 
99 Interview conducted July 5, 2017 
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Chambers, as business organization, had to strike a balance in advocating for repeal. 
These business groups were careful to add the caveat that nobody liked paying taxes. “I don’t 
care who you are, nobody wants high taxes,” one pro-repeal chamber executive told me.100 For 
these business organizations, however, basic public services, such as public education and 
infrastructure, were critical both in conducting commerce and attracting new businesses to the 
community. As the Salina Chamber explained, “Those types of quality of life pieces really go a 
long way in attracting companies and retaining talent and attracting talent.”101  
Education was arguably the most important public good for business owners. Schools and 
universities across Kansas suffered large budget cuts resulting from the recession and 
exacerbated by the tax cuts. Because of workforce needs, business groups are supportive of 
schools in normal times in most communities. Indeed, some local chambers had programs in 
local schools to help direct workforce development. For example, the Salina Chamber explained, 
“We worked with the high school to create several different curriculums and pathways that line 
up with, for example, cabinetry companies here in town. So that woodworking, that cabinetry, 
that basic manufacturing, those companies have gone in and talked to a school district and talked 
with the teachers and instructors and said this is what we need from a student who is interested in 
manufacturing or cabinet making when they graduate from high school and they want to go to 
the workforce, this is the skillset we need.” 102 
Beyond these direct connections between local businesses and schools, public education 
is important to chambers and businesses for two main reasons. Chambers of commerce viewed 
schools as providing workforce training and therefore make their communities attractive to 
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employers and employees. For chamber and economic development actors, workforce 
development has become the number one issue. As a member of the Kansas Economic 
Development Alliance (KEDA) mentioned, “workforce is of paramount importance and if you 
have an underfunded or poorly funded education system, all that does is kill you in the long 
term.”103 Many chambers believe a well-funded education program and a well-trained, intelligent 
workforce helps grow the state’s economy and attract business to Kansas. Good schools are a 
higher priority for small businesses than tax cuts. Even the Kansas Chamber of Commerce noted, 
“As the most significant consumers of the ultimate educational product of the state, Kansas 
businesses and industries have a huge stake in the quest to provide our Kansas students with the 
classroom resources they need to become college and career ready.”104  
The emphasis businesses and chambers place on education is reinforced by school 
districts themselves. Kansas City, Kansas schools superintendent Cynthia Lane, for instance, 
remarked in testimony that businesses across Kansas “expect and demand strong schools, both to 
support their employees and their families, and to provide a qualified workforce. Doing the right 
thing for public schools is also doing the right thing for the economy.”105 Likewise, Gary Menke 
of the Topeka School District stated that their “prudent and efficient” budgeting “is 
complimented by our public/private partnerships with businesses in our community and our role 
as contractor for goods and services necessary to support the district’s functions and school 
operations.”106  
More than providing human capital for local businesses, schools as institutions are 
important for local businesses because of their purchasing power. The Ottawa Chamber recalled 
                                                                   
103 Interview conducted May 11, 2018 
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a local business owner who makes school trophies and awards. According to the chamber, the 
owner explained “he loses way more business because the schools aren’t funded… than he ever 
made in the tax cuts that he received.”107 Likewise, in Pittsburg, Kansas, the chamber explained 
“so many of our businesses derive at least a portion of their business from Pittsburg State 
University.”108 Cuts to these institutions ripple across communities and negatively impact 
businesses. If schools (and school employees) have less financial capacity to pump into the local 
community, then businesses suffer and sales tax revenues fall. Business expressed this point in 
their pro-repeal arguments. 
At the signing ceremony for the tax cut bill, Brownback remarked that “all major policy 
changes, just like changes in life, are met with understandable criticisms and skepticisms. But let 
me say clearly, we will meet the needs of our schools, and our most vulnerable, and our roads 
will get built.”109 He was aware school funding was a major concern among state residents. 
However, he did not appreciate the extent to which the business community identified schools as 
fundamental to the well-being of their communities. Arthur Laffer and Steven Moore also 
dismissed these concerns, prioritizing tax cuts. “The quality of schools also matters as does the 
state’s highway system, but it takes years for those policies to pay dividends, while cutting taxes 
can have a near immediate and permanent impact, which is why we have advised Oklahoma, 
Kansas and other states to cut their income tax rates if they want the most effective immediate 
and lasting boost to their states’ economies” (Laffer and Moore 2012:18). While supply-siders 
were willing to sacrifice school funding for a hoped-for “near immediate and permanent” 
economic boost, business owners saw the Brownback tax cuts as an attack on the very 
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108 Interview conducted June 5, 2018 
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foundations of their communities. Business owner and Democratic Representative Adam Lusker 
charged that the tax cuts “are systematically dismantling communities in the state of Kansas.”110 
  
Decision-Making 
 In addition to maintaining quality of life, chambers believed the Brownback 
administration was operating ideologically rather than possessing a grounded understanding of 
how businesses actually operate. Brownback based the tax cuts on the supply-side view that 
businesses will increase economic investment or relocate solely because of lower taxes. As 
Brownback remarked, “People act economically rational. We’ve got to create a rationale for 
people to grow here and be here” (Rothschild 2011f). Supply-side suggests businesses would be 
motivated to relocate to Kansas purely because tax rates were low. But according to local 
chambers, this misunderstands the actual rationale of most businesses.  
According to chamber and economic development representatives, businesses do not 
make decisions about locating, moving, or expanding their operation exclusively, or even 
primarily, based on tax considerations. The Ottawa Chamber explained that the businesses they 
speak with are “first are most concerned about what a community has to offer to the families that 
are going to be their employees and what a community has to offer in way of education… And 
usually, and this is almost quantifiable, they never ask about taxes until about sixth of seventh on 
the list. It’s not a priority for them. At some point they’re going to figure out the taxes, but the 
first thing they want to know is workforce, housing, amenities, schools, those types of things.111 
Likewise, the Overland Park Chamber noted taxes “are not at the top of the list when businesses 
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are looking for a place to locate. They may be in the top five, six, seven or eight, but it was not 
the determining factor.”112  
Brownback was making bold economic predictions about the power of a zero tax rate to 
lure businesses to Kansas solely out of rational economic self-interest. However, chambers 
rejected this view. “The companies, first and foremost, are focused on the availability of a ready 
workforce… Then there are other factors that have to do with the quality of life.”113 In pressing 
only for lower taxes, Brownback distorted the decision-making process that business owners and 
those who work on recruiting business to the state actually go through. Furthermore, the effects 
of the tax cuts damaged the things that businesses owners actually identified as important for 
business decisions regarding relocation or expansion.  
Business owners themselves were more apt to emphasize demand-side considerations 
when making decisions. For instance, a Wichita-based sign-making business owner testified, 
“When I look back to 2012 when the current tax plan was adopted, we had 22 employees, and 
today we have 25. I attribute this increase to responding to the demand for our products and 
services, not to lower state income taxes. The statistician would say that our employment is up 
14 percent, and the economist would say we created three new jobs. But in my world, we added 
employees as we sold more signs, not because we set out to create jobs.”114 This perspective was 
shared by many lawmakers who also own businesses. Moderate Republican business owner 
Mark Hutton, for instance, stated during a 2015 taxation committee hearing that “employers will 
only hire when they have a job to perform and that is driven by demand for a product or 
service.”115 “I have been told I’m just a business man who doesn’t understand economics,” 
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114 Testimony given to the House taxation committee, January 19, 2017 
115 Andy Marso (@andymarso), “Hutton: ‘Employers will only hire when they have a job to perform and that is driven by 
demand for product or service’,” Twitter, June 5, 2015, 1:01 p.m., https://twitter.com/andymarso/status/606913879864524802.  
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Hutton continued. “That might be true. But I’d say we’re dealing with economists who don’t 
know anything about business.”116  
 By shifting the focus to demand-side, rather than supply-side, business owners and 
chamber executives undercut the very justification for the Brownback tax cuts. Lowering (or 
eliminating) taxes on business owners may provide extra money on hand, but those tax savings 
do not immediately translate into purchasing new equipment or hiring more people. The recent 
Trump tax cut, modeled on the Kansas experiment, has provided evidence of this point. Instead 
of investing in new equipment and hiring more people, most businesses bought back their stock 
to drive up its price. Growth requires demand rather than just a supply-side incentive. 
 In addition to emphasizing that the Brownback administration undertook tax reform 
purely out of ideological commitments, there was frustration among many economic 
development professionals that they were never consulted on the tax policy’s development. 
According to the Ottawa chamber, “at no time were chamber executive’s opinions sought on the 
best way to develop commerce. It was just a philosophy that the best way to do it was to cut 
taxes. But nobody ever asked the people that do this professionally everyday what is the best 
way to approach this.”117 Likewise, the Junction City chamber recalled the Kansas Economic 
Development Council (KEDA) asking to have a seat on Brownback’s council of economic 
advisors. “And we literally asked why is there not a person from KEDA on that council, on that 
advisory council as a boots on the ground? Let us have somebody there that is in trenches that is 
working with these bodies who knows what they’re saying. No, that was an absolute non-
                                                                   
116 Andy Marso (@andymarso), “Hutton: ‘I have been told I'm just a biz man who doesn't know anything about econ. That might 
be true....’ #ksleg,” Twitter, June 5, 2015, 1:03 p.m., https://twitter.com/andymarso/status/606914186304577536; Andy Marso 
(@andymarso), “Hutton: ‘... But I'd say we're dealing with economists who don't know anything about biz.’ #ksleg,” Twitter, 
June 5, 2015, 1:03 p.m., https://twitter.com/andymarso/status/606914260862537728. 
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starter.”118 In addition to not being consulted, the economic development community was shut 
out of the process.  
Businesses seek out communities with well-funded public infrastructure rather than 
communities (or states) with low tax rates. As sociologist Cristobal Young has argued, for many 
businesses, place becomes a form of capital (2018:67-95). Having communities where people 
want to live is a decided business advantage. And many of the qualities of a community that 
attract people and businesses are publicly-funded goods. In a fiscal environment where taxes 
were cut so severely, these very quality of life amenities were jeopardized or damaged which 
hurt the ability of economic development organizations to recruit new businesses and could 
motivate some business to exit. Thus, the tax cuts actually undermined the very stated goal of the 
tax cuts to grow jobs and bring in new businesses. 
 
Reputation and Stability 
 Another way chambers saw the administration’s tax policy as betraying business was the 
damage done to the state’s reputation. Contrary to the Brownback administration’s desire to 
create an attractive business climate in Kansas, many chambers and businesses viewed the tax 
policy as a deterrent. Specifically, chambers identified two ways the tax policy actually deterred 
businesses.  
 Negative media coverage of Kansas’s fiscal crisis, plus Brownback’s own claim that the 
policy was an “experiment,” did not instill confidence among businesses. After the tax plan was 
passed, Brownback travelled to other states to sell the tax plan. For instance, in an October 2012 
appearance in Colorado, Brownback “invite[d] anybody here to move to Kansas, so you hunt 
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pheasant, have a good time, and if you're an LLC, or sub-S, or sole proprietorship, zero state 
income tax. Zero state income tax in the state of Kansas” (Rothschild 2012v). However, despite 
Brownback’s salesmanship, the instability created by the tax policy undercut any of his rhetoric. 
Chambers suggested that the fiscal instability of the state sent a message to businesses that the 
policy would not last. This point was made clearly by the Manhattan Chamber of Commerce 
who observed that the tax cuts were “Everyone recognized that what Kansas was doing was 
unsustainable. And when you develop and environment that’s not predictable, not stable, that’s 
uncertain, then that decreases people’s willingness to invest… they don’t know what the future 
tax policy is really going to look like. And therefore, they were hesitant to invest.”119 
The damage to the state’s reputation was particularly evident for the Junction City 
Chamber. As she recalled, “One Saturday morning I’m at home and I get a phone call. And it’s 
this friend of mine and she says ‘You will never believe in a million years what I’m watching. 
I’m sitting here in my sister’s kitchen watching TV while we make breakfast. I’m watching ads 
on Maine TV saying do not let happen in Maine what happened in the State of Kansas.’ So we 
are – the state that I’ve worked 27 years of my career to try to build and grow – we’re being used 
in another state in this country as an example of what not to do. How does that make you 
feel?”120 
 The state’s reputation was tarnished by the tax cuts. Businesses, like most onlookers, saw 
how the tax cuts created a fiscal crisis in Kansas, sewing doubts to whether the policy would last. 
Businesses, in other words, because they value stability and predictability, were not willing to 
invest or move because of the tax cuts if they believed the policy would be repealed. In Kansas, 
the lack of stability created by the tax cuts deterred businesses from expanding or relocating to 
                                                                   
119 Interview conducted July 5, 2017 
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the state. As the Lawrence Chamber noted, “[T]he current tax policy, I think, is actually a 
detriment, because we are in a bit of a dysfunctional state, so businesses like predictability. 
They’d be fine with paying their fair share. They just need to know what that is so they can 
predict it, plan for it. When they look at other states they may have your more typical tax 
structure versus no taxes for your LLCs, but that’s not a deterrent for them to go to that state, 
when here you can see the writing’s on the wall for change, and that’s the worst thing you want 
from an economic standpoint is lack of predictability.”121 The same emphasis on stability and 
predictability was mentioned by the Olathe Chamber during a House Taxation Committee 
hearing where they testified, “we have consistently held the position that predictability and 
stability are vital to a strong business climate. To that end, we are hearing concerns from 
members that the pass-through exemption should be revisited on grounds of tax fairness as well 
as its contribution to budget instability.”122 
The Brownback administration attempted to recast how the tax cuts were framed in a bid 
to mitigate the appearance of instability and fiscal mismanagement. “Maybe we need to start a 
‘believe it’ campaign,” Brownback said of the tax policy (Rothschild 2012w).123 However, 
public relation campaigns did nothing to address the actual structural imbalance created by the 
tax cuts. Moreover, the tax cuts undermined the efforts of economic development professionals. 
The tax cuts tarnished the state’s reputation and created political and economic instability. Both 
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123 As part of the effort to publicize the tax cuts, the Brownback administration sent a mailer to 146,000 business owners across 
the state letting them know about the tax cuts. The brochure was described by the Lawrence Journal-World: “One side of the blue 
and gold brochure says the tax cuts make the state's income tax system "fairer, flatter and simpler." It goes on to say, "this bold 
action" will "provide a jolt of adrenaline to the heart of the Kansas economy," and it includes a quote from a Wall Street Journal 
editorial praising the changes and a quote from Brownback” (Rothschild 2012x). Democrats objected to the flyer because they 
saw it as a campaign flyer paid for with taxpayer funds. The flyer was sent out early November 2012, just prior to the election. 
The Department of Revenue spent $52,000 on the flyers. Brownback defended it, however, saying, “The tax mailer was sent to 
educate business owners affected by the change in tax policy prior to the next tax year… For income tax cuts to work businesses 
particularly have to reinvest the money in their companies and employees. How can they do this if they don’t know about the 
changes?” (Rothschild 2012x). 
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of these consequences made it more difficult for economic development actors to attract 
businesses to Kansas. Brownback had put his faith solely in tax cuts; that the policy alone would 
bring businesses to the state. This was not the case. Brownback’s approach to tax policy ignored 
the effort of actual people who build relationships with businesses and work to grow the state’s 
economy. In short, Brownback privileged tax policy above people. 
 
Budget Cuts 
 Brownback viewed the tax policy as sufficient for attracting businesses to Kansas. This 
contrasted with what business groups understood as necessary for growing local economies. This 
tension is exemplified by the resentment local chambers felt towards budget cuts for the Kansas 
Department of Commerce. The tax cuts did not promote economic growth in the state, nor did 
they incentivize businesses to relocate. What they did, however, was erode the state’s capacity to 
attract businesses by cutting budgets for development agencies, like Commerce. In other words, 
the tax cuts worked at cross-purposes to the stated goals of the policy. The Department of 
Commerce suffered significant budget cuts resulting in the loss of agency employees.124 
According to administrative data (Kansas Department of Administration 2017), Commerce had 
418 full-time (FTE) employees in 2009. By 2017, the number of FTE employees was down to a 
mere 137. This reduction was not the largest among public agencies during Brownback’s 
governorship. The Brownback administration reduced the number of employees at the 
Department of Transportation from 3,151 FTE employees in 2009 to 1,899 in 2017, and the 
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vacancy rates. According to a report by KDOC, for FY2020 there are 323, or 9.2 percent, of staff positions across the Kansas 




Department of Children and Families from 3,670 employees in 2009 to 2,024 in 2017. 
Nonetheless, staff reductions at Commerce were noticeable and severe. And for some chambers, 
their experience with fiscal crisis was through changes with this agency. For instance, the Dodge 
City Chamber remarked that “Probably the only thing that I have experienced, more as an 
economic development organization, is the lack of funding that the Kansas Department of 
Commerce has been receiving and the cutbacks that they’ve had to make on helping with 
assistance programs and doing the marketing.”125  
Local chambers across Kansas spoke in near-apocalyptic terms, using terms like “crypt” 
and “decimated,” to explain the extent of Commerce’s budget cuts. The Ottawa Chamber 
explained that the Department of Commerce is now “like a crypt compared to what it was prior 
to 2012 when it was robust and a lot of people. Now they’ve got rows of cubicles where nobody 
is working and they’re just open, vacant. I like to say that Commerce has just been gutted” 126 
The Junction City Chamber, likewise, recalled “There was a point in time when the Kansas 
Department of Commerce was just an incredible staffed, well-run, well-organized machine in 
this state. And it was just unbelievable to be able to partner with them and work on things. To 
this day, the people that they have on staff, that are left, are still very professional, their heart is 
in it and they’re doing their level best to do what they can for us.” However, because of budget 
cuts, “the Department of Commerce has been so entirely decimated by either not filing positions 
or attrition or left because of politics or whatever the reason for it may be, finance or whatever – 
that… [t]here’s just not enough of them to effectively do what we need to do.”127 
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Eliminating positions at the Department of Commerce was consequential because this 
agency is tasked primarily with attracting new businesses to Kansas and aligning them with local 
communities. Fewer staff meant fewer opportunities for local communities. Several chambers 
recalled that they have seen opportunities disappear as a result of the lower staffing at 
Commerce. As the Ottawa Chamber explained to me, “The Department of Commerce was a big 
source of where we would get leads for companies that were not in Kansas but looking to locate 
here… That work just isn’t happening now. They just don’t have the workforce in the 
Department of Commerce to provide this assistance back to communities.”128 Additionally, the 
Topeka Chamber of Commerce recalled, “[H]istorically we’ve collaborated with the Department 
of Commerce to land prospective businesses... It was a pretty good working relationship. But if 
you were to graph that out, the number of leads coming out of the Department of Commerce is 
like carbon-dating or something, it’s just been halved and halved and halved until we didn’t get 
any leads out of Commerce last year. It used to be many, maybe 10 or 15 a year or something. 
But it’s really fallen off… They have been crippled in their ability to collaborate with 
communities like ours to attract businesses. At this point they’re not even a meaningful partner in 
that.”129  
The Department of Commerce supported the local chamber’s views. “I’ve worked in [the 
Department of Commerce] for eighteen years,” one agency representative explained. “Only three 
of those eighteen years we’ve had status quo budget… The other fifteen we’ve had budget cuts. 
Eventually that does take its toll.”130 Similar to the local chambers, the Department of Commerce 
also expressed frustration at the emphasis Brownback placed on tax cuts instead of economic 
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development staff. “Governor Brownback comes in and we’re in the middle of the recession, 
we’ve been facing budget cuts as a state, and then to rejuvenate the economy, or kickstart it, we 
put in these tax credits that everybody thinks will be an incentive and business will grow and 
next year it will get better. And it didn’t. We’ve had budget cuts. We had recruitment staff get 
cut. People retired and because of budget cuts we weren’t allowed to backfill positions. We had, 
at one time, six recruitment staff. I now have two full time and two part-time, and the two part-
time are contract workers. If you go from six to three, it’s hard to be a high performer on 
recruitment.”131 The severe understaffing at the Department of Commerce also motivated the 
Kansas Economic Development Alliance (KEDA) to make re-staffing the Department a top 
legislative priority.132 
Referring to the diminished staff at the Department of Commerce, the Junction City 
chamber explained it was not the agency’s fault. “I would say it is the fault of leadership of the 
state not recognizing the importance of those people in that division.”133 The cuts to the 
Department of Commerce reveal perhaps the largest disconnect between business interests and 
Brownback. The administration’s view was that tax cut and consequent rational self-interest 
alone would be the primary means to draw businesses to Kansas. However, those most actively 
involved in local economic development stressed the relationships and people-power needed to 
attract new businesses.  
 
  
                                                                   
131 Interview conducted October 23, 2017 
132 Interview conducted February 15, 2018 
133 Interview conducted April 17, 2018 
118 
 
Interpreting Business Political Action 
 The pro-repeal views of business owners surprised both Republican and Democratic 
lawmakers initially. Former Republican state senator Jeff King, for instance, gave testimony to 
the House Tax committee in support of eliminating the pass-through exemption. During his 
testimony, King said the “guiding principle that I always heard when I started on the [Senate] tax 
committee was, as long as you serve on the tax committee, no one will ever ask you to raise their 
own taxes. What has amazed me about this bill that we have in front of us today, what’s amazed 
me about the LLC loophole, is some of the leading business men and women in my district, 
some of the most conservative people I know in my district, some of the most active Republicans 
I know in my district – and Democrats as well – have told me… ‘Jeff, you go back up to Topeka, 
I want you to tell them to tax me. Put the tax back on my business’.”134 Similarly, Tom Sawyer, 
the ranking Democrat on the House Tax committee explained that usually supporting tax 
increases was like going to the dentist to have a tooth pulled. However, he recalled that “some 
business owners actually drove six hours to come up here and say, ‘tax me.’ That’s a pretty big 
phenomenon. It’s just an amazing thing you don’t see. Tax increases are never really popular. So 
I thought it was pretty astonishing. And, still, even this year, I get emails, I get phone calls, 
people saying, ‘tax me,’ which is just pretty unusual.”135 Small business interests in the state took 
political action to secure the repeal of the tax cuts. But how lawmakers interpreted why small 
businesses were taking this position differed between supporters and critics of the tax policy.  
 Several lawmakers in the Kansas legislature directly benefited from the 2012 tax cuts. 
According to reporting by the Wichita Eagle, 70 percent of lawmakers, or their spouses, had 
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business holdings that were eligible for the pass-through exemption (Lowry 2016).136 This is not 
unusual since state level politicians tend to come from the business world. One nationwide 
survey found nearly one-third (30 percent) of state lawmakers were business owners, and another 
14 percent were attorneys (presumably also self-employed) (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2015). While many Kansas lawmakers benefited from the tax cuts, this direct 
personal gain did not seem to translate into opposing repeal. Indeed, several lawmakers, such as 
Tom Holland, took advantage of the pass-through provision while remaining critical of it. As 
Republican representative Daniel Hawkins, who sits on the House Taxation committee, 
explained, “My company is an S-corporation… we’re getting tax breaks. But quite frankly, I’m 
for repealing the pass-through tax exemption. So I find it interesting sometimes the media wants 
to portray the politicians here, the representatives and senators, as well they’ve all got some bias 
or special interest, whether they’re a business owner or something, they want to keep their tax 
breaks. Well, you know a lot of us who have been for the repeal of that have LLCs and S-
corps.”137  
While pass-through business holdings certainly could have incentivized some lawmakers 
to oppose repealing the tax cuts, I argue instead that the high percentage of lawmakers who held 
pass-through business income actually helped with the repeal effort. In this case, the number of 
business owners in the legislature meant lawmakers were personally familiar with the effects of 
policy in their own businesses. Thus, there was less need for the business owners and chambers 
to try to convince lawmakers that the tax cuts were not helping businesses because lawmakers 
themselves were not hiring more workers. For instance, Democratic representative Adam Lusker, 
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who owns Lusker Masonry, LLC, testified that “In 2013 when our accountant told us that we no 
longer had to pay state income tax, I viewed it as a nice bonus. Had I known then the devastating 
effects it would have on Kansas, I don’t think I would have been so happy.”138  
 Lawmakers who owned pass-through businesses generalized from their own experiences 
to inform their understanding of how the policy was working.139 Lawmakers drew on this 
experience when interpreting the pro-repeal perspectives on business owners in committees and 
elsewhere.140 But familiarity with how businesses operate was still refracted through an 
ideological lens. For some, business experience naturally led them to take business owner’s 
claims on face value. Democrat Jim Gartner recalled his days as a lobbyist prior to becoming an 
elected official, “When I was a lobbyist, I was a sole-proprietor. I took advantage… A sole-
proprietor under that exemption didn’t have to pay state income tax. So I took advantage of it. 
Did I hire anybody? No. Did I invest that money? No, I invested it in my pocket and went on a 
vacation.”141 For Gartner, his experience with the tax cut, particularly in not hiring any workers 
or reinvesting into his business, led him to be skeptical of the administration’s claims of how 
business owners were using the extra tax savings.  
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139 Holding a pass-through business helped lawmakers see the effects of the policy. However, it is also possible that the type of 
business mattered as well. Again, for Adam Lusker, his beliefs about the tax policy were formed not only by his experience with 
the policy, but with how the budget cuts were impacting his business. As he explained in the same testimony,  “we have primarily 
built schools. We have also built many projects at several colleges in Southeast Kansas. Large projects that were in full or in part 
funded through state dollars.” In this way, Lusker, as a business owner and lawmaker, was stating a view very similar to chamber 
executives from Ottawa and Pittsburg listed above. Lusker’s point was that businesses suffer as a result of budget cuts, 
particularly ones that hit schools. 
140 Committee testimonies were not the only way lawmakers heard from business owners about the tax policy. Indeed, several 
lawmakers heard directly from business owners in their own district regarding the tax cuts. As Representative Steven Johnson 
told me, “I think [business owners] see that erosion. Interestingly enough, the largest number that I’m getting it from are 
accountants who not only see their business but they see what everyone else is doing, and I think they’ve got a pretty good case 
and a pretty good perspective to say, ‘We’re not seeing this add jobs. We’re not seeing this add investment on the whole. We’re 
absolutely seeing cases, but on the whole we are seeing this as a way to not pay income tax, and unfortunately on balance it is 
more avoidance than growth that we are seeing’” (Interview conducted February 1, 2017). Likewise, Republican representative 
Tom Phillips, a Republican from Manhattan explained, “By and large, business owners back home who come and talk to me are 
saying this tax policy is not right and not fair. Whether they’re doctors, dentists, lawyers, they’re saying it’s not right that I’m 
paying zero taxes and all my W-2 employees are paying taxes” (Interview conducted February 20, 2017). 
141 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
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 However, for other, more conservative lawmakers, their business experience translated 
into a suspicion of the owner’s claims. In contrast to many moderate and Democratic lawmakers, 
who tended to see businesses advocating out of “enlightened” self-interest, many conservative 
lawmakers viewed businesses as advocating out of pure self-interest. Specifically, conservative 
lawmakers saw pro-repeal business owners as actually lobbying to restore lost tax privileges. In 
the 2012 tax reform, Kansas eliminated the loss carry forward provision.142 As a Kansas 
Department of Revenue memo outlined, the 2012 tax reform bill “includes provisions which 
prohibit individuals from deducting losses arising from these categories. Beginning in tax year 
2013, these deductions will only be available to corporations that are subject to the Kansas 
corporate income tax, i.e. C corporations. One of the deductions that will not be available to 
individuals is the net operating loss deduction.”143 The net operating loss deduction is important 
for many businesses, especially when they are still new.144 If a business loses money in a given 
year, they are generally allowed to claim that loss against current year’s taxable income, 
reducing their tax liability.145  
 For many conservative lawmakers, restoring tax code privileges, such as net operating 
loss, was key to understanding business efforts to secure repeal of the policy. This view was 
                                                                   
142 The net operating loss refers to the deduction a business can take when expenses are greater than revenues. In addition to 
small businesses not being able to deduct losses, this also occurred with farmers. Testimony provided by the Kansas Livestock 
Association (KLA) in 2014 points to this. While the KLA believed the tax reforms to be positive, they note, “As a result of the 
2012 changes to the Kansas income tax code, ordinary, pass-through business income was exempted from the Kansas income tax. 
This change also meant Schedule F (farm income) losses no longer could be used to reduce capital gains income from the sale of 
cull cows, bulls, sows, boars, ewes, rams, etc. Therefore, in a year where a farm or ranch has an operational loss, it will also incur 
a tax bill on capital gains that it would not have had prior to the 2012 income tax law changes. Unlike other capital gains that may 
be associated with a small business, sale of culled breeding livestock is a regular and often systematic occurrence that is factored 
into a producer’s cash flow and income statements” (Testimony provided to the House Taxation Committee, February 18, 2014). 
143 Kansas Department of Revenue, Memo, Notice 12-08 “Net Operating Losses,” 
(https://www.ksrevenue.org/taxnotices/notice12-08.pdf).  
144 The net operating loss provision of the tax code was established with the Revenue Act of 1918. Historically, losses could be 
carried forward up to 20 years and back up to 2 years, though recent tax reforms have altered this. The net operating loss is the 
provision of the tax code that allowed Trump to avoid paying taxes for up to two decades (Barstow, Craig, Buettner, and Twohey 
2016) 
145 The Kansas tax reforms eliminated the net operating loss provision for pass-through businesses. The Trump tax cuts of 2017 
also altered the net operating loss for pass-throughs, reducing the deduction to 80 percent of taxable income. Additionally, the 
TCJA eliminated the loss carryback provision, only allowing businesses to carry forward losses and not apply them retroactively.  
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exemplified most clearly by conservative Republican Ty Masterson, a business owner from 
Andover, Kansas. According to Masterson, “You’ve got to follow the money. You’re not just 
talking about adding the tax to the income. The big key of what they’re talking about is adding 
the losses back. If you’re a business that pulls back parallel losses, those that are small business 
people that are for [repeal], a good majority of them will actually pay less tax with the tax on but 
parallel losses applied… So you’ll find a lot of these guys that are small business people that are 
for reversing it are people that need to write losses off.”146 Making a similar point, freshman 
conservative representative Abraham Rafie stated, “There’s often things below the surface… 
With pass through income entities that the LLC exemption or loophole, effects, when the rate 
dropped to zero, when they were made completely exempt… at the same time, the ability to 
remove losses was also taken away because why do you need losses in order to be able to pay no 
income taxes anyway. That ability to have a loss is valuable.”147  
 For conservatives like Masterson and Rafie, business advocacy was primarily about 
restoring personal tax privileges, not about restoring funding for state services. While Masterson 
acknowledged some small business owners were altruistically lobbying for the repeal of the tax 
cuts, he believed “they’re the minority.”148 Substantially, the difference between how 
conservatives and moderates interpreted business action was a difference between self-interest 
and “enlightened” self-interest. Moderates believed businesses were acting out of enlightened 
self-interest; advocating for the repeal the tax cuts to stabilize the state’s economy, even if meant 
they personally would pay more in taxes. However, conservatives believed businesses were 
acting more selfishly and out of pure self-interest. The tax cuts had eliminated a valuable tax 
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deduction and businesses were lobbying to restore their own tax privileges. Loss of net operating 
loss did result in some businesses paying more in taxes than they otherwise would (Table 11). 
Thus, it is likely that at least some businesses were motivated by an interest to restore net 
operating losses, regardless of the broader fiscal crisis. However, my data tends to support the 
enlightened self-interest explanation for business action. 
 
Conclusion 
 Somewhat ironically, sociologists and conservative politicians have both tended to view 
small businesses similarly; that is, both have tended to regard small businesses as a constituency 
supportive of very conservative, anti-tax political positions. In this chapter I have argued this 
view of small business gets it wrong. Small businesses are not a priori anti-tax or anti-state. That 
is, their class location does not determine their views towards taxes. Instead, I suggest an 
institutionalist perspective best captures how small businesses relates towards the state through 
taxation. According to Prasad, the historical institutionalist literature has shown that “institutions 
structure the incentives of actors in ways that cannot be reduced to the social origins of the actor” 
(2006:23). Thus, according to an historical institutionalist perspective, taxes structure small 
business incentives in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. Dramatic and sudden changes 
in the institution of taxation reveal how this works. In Kansas, the sudden elimination of taxes on 
a certain business type (pass-throughs) dramatically changed the incentive structure for 
businesses. But instead of incentivizing businesses to maintain the policy, the effects of the 
policy (budget cuts and austerity), incentivized businesses to advocate for the reversal of the 
policy. Over the period of time when the tax cuts were in place, business owner’s social or class 
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locations did not change; the institution changed. Thus, the shift towards pro-tax political action 




Chapter Four:  
How School Funding Shaped Repeal Efforts 
 
 
This chapter examines the instrumental role of schools in shaping and reshaping the tax 
structure of the state. This chapter argues that schools contributed to the repeal of the tax cuts by 
constraining Brownback’s ability to remake the tax code in direct and indirect ways. Directly, 
school districts brought lawsuits against the state in response to school funding cuts which 
represented a formal limit to how far Brownback could continue to cut taxes. Schools 
constrained tax reform indirectly, as well due to their central position in many communities. 
Schools are essential to the identity and culture of Kansas towns. Thus, the effects of the tax cuts 
on schools were visible and drew people’s attention to the financial difficulties in the state.  
 Sociologists have noted the importance of school funding battles in state Republican 
politics (Kincaid 2016). And the school funding lawsuits in Kansas are part of a larger trend of 
public education employees protesting lack of adequate school funding in Republican-dominated 
states. School funding across many states has not returned to pre-Recession levels (Leachman, 
Masterson, and Figueroa 2017). For instance, Oklahoma cut its funding per pupil by 28.2 percent 
between fiscal years 2008 and 2018 (Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2017). Many of the 
other states that saw protests also saw their pupil funding cut dramatically during the same 
period; Arizona (13.6 percent), Kentucky (15.8 percent), West Virginia (11.4 percent). 
Moreover, many of these states also exacerbated these recession-mandated education funding 
cuts with tax cuts. In response, in the spring of 2018, five states - West Virginia, Arizona, 
Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kentucky - had teacher protests for higher public education funding 
126 
 
(Blanc 2019). Fully five percent of all K-12 public education workers participated in the strike, 
the largest number in a quarter century (Kerrissey 2018).  
 Despite a decline in per pupil funding of 9.9 percent between 2008 and 2018 (Leachman, 
Masterson, and Figueroa 2017), Kansas teachers did not strike. However, many of the same 
conditions in other states were found in Kansas. The last and only time teachers in Kansas went 
on strike was in 1973 (Bowers 1984). School districts in Kansas took a different approach and 
utilized legal system to bring about political pressure. This chapter examines the school funding 
battle in Kansas since the Recession. I argue that the school funding battle, and particularly the 
strategy of using the court, was a main driver of the decision to reverse the tax cuts.  
 
History of School Finance and Litigation in Kansas 
Education is the largest single expenditure in Kansas’ general fund, accounting for well 
over half of the state’s annual budget. Like most states, in the past Kansas relied heavily on local 
property taxes to fund public education. Prior to 1937, state funding for education accounted for 
approximately five percent of all education spending in the state (Berger 1998:4). However, state 
funding has increased to over 60 percent of the state general fund in FY17. Not all states fund 
their education primarily through the state general fund and several states still rely heavily on 
local taxes. However, in Kansas the goal of distributing funds via a state funding formula is 
designed to create a more equal funding across the state’s districts. This has not always 
manifested in practice and Kansas has seen several lawsuits over school funding in past decades. 
During the 1960s, Kansas implemented a variety of school reforms. For instance, the 
1963 School Unification Act radically reorganized schools across the state by consolidating 
districts. Kansas went from 8,624 in the 1940s to 349 by 1966. However, the most consequential 
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reform occurred in 1966 when Kansas amended the state’s constitution to adopt Article 6 which 
enshrines the state’s obligations to public education. Section 6 has been at the center of most 
legal disputes. Section 6 states that the Kansas legislature “shall make suitable provision for 
finance of the educational interests of the state.” Much of the fight over education in Kansas has 
revolved around interpretations of what a “suitable” level of funding means (Flentje and Aistrup 
2010:184). The first phase of school finance litigation began in the early 1970s with Caldwell v. 
State (Baker and Green 2005). For present purposes, however, it is useful to begin with the Mock 
v. Kansas decision in 1992.  
In 1973, in the wake of the Caldwell v. State lawsuit, Kansas passed the School District 
Equalization Act (SDEA) which increased the amount of funding the state provided to poorer 
districts while decreasing the amount of funding it provided to wealthier districts (Thompson, 
Honeyman, and Wood 1993:38). Every district receiving state aid was required to also raise local 
funds equal to 1.5 percent of the district’s wealth. If the amount raised locally was less than $936 
per pupil for districts with enrollment of less than 400 students and $728 per pupil for districts 
above 1,300 enrolled students, then state aid made up the difference (Berger 1998:11). 
Additionally, the SDEA placed a cap on the increase of spending for certain districts. Districts 
above the median in spending were allowed to increase their budget 5 percent per year while 
districts that were below the median could increase their spending to either 5 percent above the 
median or 15 percent from the previous year (Baker and Green 2005:3).  
Critics identified two major flaws in the SDEA, however. First, it allowed wealthy 
districts to essentially forego state aid and raise all funds locally. Wealthy districts could, for 
instance, levy a 3 percent local tax and spend more per pupil than poorer districts levying the 
same 3 percent and receiving state aid. Also, by allowing wealthy districts to increase budget 
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spending by 5 percent and prohibiting poorer districts from catching up, the SDEA perpetuated 
inequality among districts (Berger 1998:12).  
In 1974, a lawsuit brought by a group of taxpayers and 42 school districts challenged the 
constitutionality of the SDEA. A local district court found the SDEA unconstitutional and in 
response to the ruling, the Kansas Legislature changed the definition of district wealth, upping 
the amount required for local contribution from 1.5 percent to 1.7 percent, and changed the 
budget limitation from 5 percent to 10 or 15 (Berger 1998:14). Additionally, in 1978 the 
Legislature repealed the 15 percent alternative cap on budget increase and in 1979 repealed the 
cap altogether. This had a dramatic effect on district inequality. Kansas schools went from being 
among the most equitable in the country to among the most inequitable by 1987 (Berger 
1998:15). 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, several lawsuits had been brought against the SDEA 
by up to 42 different districts. The final straw for the SDEA was a dramatic tax cut by 
Democratic Governor Joan Finney who cut $19 million from state aid to schools in 1990 (Berger 
1998:17). These various lawsuits were consolidated into one case, Mock v. Kansas, that was 
presided over by Judge Terry Bullock. Instead of taking the case to trial, however, Judge Bullock 
convened an unorthodox conference with legislative leaders on October 14, 1991. During the 
conference Judge Bullock laid out his pre-trial opinion (presented in a rhetorical question-and-
answer format) that the legislature has the “sole and absolute duty to establish, maintain, and 
finance public schools” (Berger 1998:20). And further, the legislature has the duty to provide 
both equitable distribution of funding across districts as well as adequate funding.  
Judge Bullock agreed to delay a trial if the legislature agreed to take up school funding in 
the 1992 session. Legislative leaders agreed to these terms and Governor Finney immediately 
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convened a task force on school funding. The debate over school funding was arduous and 
quickly turned into a debate over taxes. Indeed, so heated was the debate that the tax discussions 
prompted a tax revolt secessionist movement in southwest Kansas (McCormick 1995). Though 
not an easy process,149 the recommendations from the task force were eventually passed as the 
1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act. This act was a “landmark event” 
(Tallman 1993:1) that dramatically changed both how schools were funded and the makeup of 
the state’s tax structure.  
 
The “Three-Legged Stool:” How the 1992 School Finance Law Changed the Tax Structure 
The 1992 school finance act is important because it dramatically changes the state’s tax 
structure. Prior to the 1992 school finance law, general fund property tax levies ranged from 9.12 
mills150 in Burlington to 97.69 mills in Parsons (Kansas Legislative Research Department 
2012a). The 1992 law equalized mill levies across the state establishing a uniform rate of 32 
mills. This rate was stepped up to 33 mills in 1993 and eventually 35 mills in 1995. Equalizing 
mill levies also raised other state revenue sources. By lowering property tax rates, the school 
funding act also raised $138 million in new income taxes and $305 million in new sales taxes 
(Berger 1998:25). Increasing income and sales taxes decreased the state’s reliance on property 
taxes. Prior to the 1992 law, property taxes comprised 38.7 percent of general fund revenue 
while sales taxes comprised 22.7 percent and income taxes comprised 21.1 percent. After the 
implementation of the 1992 law, the reliance on the property tax began to decline putting a more 
equal balance between the three main revenue sources. Thus, in FY98, property tax comprised 
                                                                   
149 For a detailed history of the legislative process leading up to the 1992 school finance act, see Tallman 1993. 
150 A mill is equal to one dollar per $1,000 in assessed valuation. This unequal situation meant that people in Burlington were 
only having to pay about $9 dollars per $1,000 in assessed value while people in Parsons were having to pay about $97 dollars 
per $1,000 in assessed value. 
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30.9 percent, sales tax was 28.1 percent, and income tax was 28 percent (Kansas Legislative 
Research Department 2010:5).  
The relative balance between the three main sources of income was a product of the 1992 
school funding law and came to be known as the “three-legged stool” approach. This approach to 
public finances in Kansas is not a formal rule, but rather is an informal institution which has 
guided state tax policy since the mid-1990s. In 1995, Governor Bill Graves established a 
Governor’s Tax Equity Task Force and instructed the group to study the “current mix of 
statewide property taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes” (Executive Order No. 95-178). The task 
force returned its report laying out the ideal of a “three-legged stool” for the state’s tax structure 
and urging the state to maintain its “enviable reputation as a fiscally responsible state” 
(Governor’s Tax Equity Task Force 1995:11). To do this, the report recommends a “balanced 
and diversified” tax structure because “a balanced tax system will reduce the magnitude of 
problems caused by over reliance on a single tax source (Governors Tax Equity Task Force 
1995:13). Likewise, this approach to taxes “should help stability in times of economic 
uncertainty and avoid the need for hasty, unexpected tax increases or service reductions” 
(Governors Tax Equity Task Force 1995:13). The report also lays out recommendations for 
future tax reform by noting “Kansans should be able to rely upon a stable tax policy” that 
“should not unduly erode the tax base” (Governors Tax Equity Task Force 1995:12-13). A 
“three-legged stool” approach to tax policy in Kansas would persist roughly unchanged until 
Brownback’s tax reform push in 2012. Moreover, the three-legged stool would become an 
important heuristic device for opponents of the tax cuts to draw upon.  
 The 1992 school finance reform is also important because it established the legal 
interpretation of the Constitution that increasingly antagonized Republicans in the legislature. 
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Article 6, Section 6 states the legislature must provide a “suitable” education. Prior to 1992, no 
lawsuit challenging the school funding system in Kansas had ever reached a conclusion, meaning 
the courts had never ruled what the Constitution requires (Tallman 1993:7). Thus, in finally 
offering an interpretation of the constitution, Bullock set a precedent for how future school 
funding cases would be judged. This is particularly true when it comes to interpreting equity and 
adequacy. Equity, according to the court’s opinion, means that “each child has a claim to receive 
that educational opportunity which is neither greater nor less than that of any other child” 
(Berger 1998:20). Importantly, however, this did not mean an even amount of funding per pupil. 
Bullock notes that the cost of educating a child will differ based on differing characteristics. For 
instance, the cost associated with transportation or English-language acquisition might mean that 
a suitable education requires more money for certain pupils. And by adequacy, the court found, 
would primarily be about suitability (Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes 2016:3). In other 
words, as Judge Bullock wrote, “should total legislative funding fall to a level which the Court, 
in enforcing the Constitution, finds to be inadequate for a 'suitable' . . . or minimally adequate 
education, a violation of the 'suitable' provision would occur” (Berger 1998:20).151 
 To briefly summarize: the 1992 school funding lawsuit helped to establish two important 
institutions which would come to constrain Brownback’s attempts to remake the tax structure. 
The new school funding approach created an informal institution – the three-legged stool – as 
well as formal institutions in the form of legal interpretations of the adequate and equitable 
approach to funding schools. Both of these institutions play a role, but the adequate and equitable 
                                                                   
151 Further, in his opinion, Bullock “asserts a strong role for the court” (Berger 1998:21). That is, Bullock’s opinion creates a role 
by which the Court is the arbiter for determining both equity and adequacy, and not the legislature. This is important because, as 




provisions play a noticeable role in the next major school funding lawsuit that becomes 
intertwined with Brownback’s tax cuts: the Gannon lawsuit. 
 
The Gannon Lawsuit 
 The school funding formula established in 1992 persisted into Brownback’s tenure as 
governor. However, that does not mean school funding litigation ceased. Lawsuits152 in the 
intervening years were primarily about fine-tuning different weighting categories. After a series 
of these lawsuits, by 2008, the base state aid per pupil funding amount had increased to $4,400 
(Kansas Legislative Research Department 2016:8). In 2008, the legislature also approved (but 
never funded), future increases to the base state aid which set the amount at $4,492. These moves 
by the legislature satisfied the court and Montoy was dismissed in 2009 (Daniel 2016:1605). 
However, 2008 was also the height of the Great Recession which meant Kansas was unable to 
fund the increases to the base state aid amount and would instead have to cut education spending.  
Nearly all states cut education spending as a result of the Recession. The amount cut, 
however, differed and Kansas was among the 12153 states that cut public education the sharpest. 
Kansas’ state-funding formula per student declined 9.9 percent between 2008 and 2018 
(Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2017). During the 2010 legislative session, after delaying 
cuts to education, the structural balance to the budget became too large. Governor Mark 
                                                                   
152 The school funding formula established an equation for distributing per pupil funds and included weights for certain types of 
students. For instance, students who needed extra transportation or students who needed extra English language learning were 
weighted to provide extra money for these services. In 1999, another lawsuit, Montoy, was filed over under-funding in some of 
the weighted categories. The Montoy case lasted several years and in 2003, Judge Bullock in the Shawnee District Court found 
the state’s funding scheme to be unconstitutional. The state appealed and in 2005 the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court 
opinion and found the state to be unconstitutionally underfunding the schools. In response the legislature passed HB 2247 which 
added $140 million in new funding. This amount did not satisfy the court and during a special summer session the legislature 
approved SB 43 and authorized another $147 million. The following year, in 2006, the legislature again passed another school 
funding increase. This law, SB 549, made several changes to parts of the formula as well as increased funding by $466 million 
over the next three years (Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes 2016:9). 
153 The other states included in this list are Oklahoma (-28.2%), Texas (-16.2%), Kentucky (15.8%), Alabama (-15.3%), Arizona 
(13.6%), West Virginia (-11.4%), Mississippi (-11.1%), Utah (-10.1%), Michigan (-9.2%), North Carolina (-7.9%), and Idaho (-
7.0%) (Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2017). 
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Parkinson, who had just taken over for Kathleen Sebelius, ordered $38 million in cuts to K-12 in 
May 2009, another $40 million in cuts in July 2009, and again another $36 million in November 
2009. By the 2010-2011 school year, base state aid had fallen to $3,937. After Brownback was 
elected, he further cut funding to schools. In May 2011, Brownback signed what was known as 
the “largest cut to schools,” cutting K-12 funding by another $104 million. These deep cuts, 
coupled with the reduced revenue from the tax cuts, meant Kansas was unable to restore 
education funding to pre-recession levels.154 
 In response to this series of budget cuts, schools155 filed another lawsuit, Gannon v. 
Kansas, to force the state restore funding. The first ruling was handed down in January 2013, just 
as the Brownback tax cuts went into effect. In the ruling, a District Court Panel determined that 
Kansas was violating the constitution by underfunding schools. The court ordered the legislature 
to increase funding back to the base level demanded by statute - $4,492. The Court was not 
ordering the legislature to increase school funding at this point – rather, they were ordering the 
legislature to fund education at the level demanded by the 2008 statute.  
 The state, however, argued the budget cuts were necessary because of declining tax 
revenue and, as such, increasing school funding would burden the state’s economy and budget. 
The court, however, rejected this argument. Only a few months earlier Kansas had passed the 
Brownback tax cuts and this was not lost on the court. In their decision, the court wrote, 
                                                                   
154 In Kansas, the tax cuts are nearly solely responsible for the inability to restore education spending. However, it should be 
noted that several states (29 in fact) fund public education at less than pre-recession levels (Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 
2017). 
155 Four districts – Wichita, Dodge City, Hutchinson, and Kansas City, Kansas, are plaintiffs in the case. There are 286 school 
districts in Kansas and approximately 50 of those districts are co-sponsers in the case as members of Schools for Fair Funding, 
the organization that formed behind the Gannon lawsuit. Later, there was another group, the Kansas Coalition for Fair Funding, 
which also formed. The group, intentionally branding itself similarly to the Schools for Fair Funding, formed to advocate for a 
constitutional amendment that would limit the amount of funding for K-12 in the state. This is not the only group that formed that 
had a similar name to an anti-Brownback group. Similar to the moderate MainStream Coalition, the Kansas Chamber of 
Commerce formed a PAC called the MAIN Street Kansas PAC. And under this PAC, the Kansas Chamber sent out mailers 
attacking moderate lawmakers. This was meant to create confusion and, at least partially, succeeded. In a post, the MainStream 
Coalition had to explain the difference and noted, “One [MainStream Coalition] supporter even went so far as to tell us they 




It seems completely illogical that the State can argue that a reduction in education 
funding was necessitated by the downturn in the economy and the state’s diminishing 
resources and at the same time cut taxes further, thereby further reducing the sources of 
revenue on the basis of a hope that doing so will create a boost to the state’s economy at 
some point in the future. It appears to us that the only certain result from the tax cut will 
be a further reduction of existing resources available and from a cause, unlike the 
“Great Recession” which had a cause external to Kansas, this is homespun, hence, self-
inflicted. While the Legislature has said that educational funding is a priority, the passage 
of the tax cut bill suggests otherwise...156 
  
In making this argument, the court further antagonized itself towards Brownback and 
conservatives in the legislature. In response to this ruling, the state appealed to the Kansas 
Supreme Court. Brownback dismissed as myth that his tax cuts were responsible for impacting 
the school funding stream: “One of the great myths,” Brownback remarked, “is that you can’t cut 
taxes and invest in education” (Kansas City Star 2014). 
 The District Court decision was released just prior to the 2013 legislative session and 
Brownback took aim at the Court during his State of the State address. Brownback called for a 
change in how Supreme Court justices were appointed, recommending Justices be selected either 
by a general election or by governor appointments.157 However, changing the selection of 
justices was only one in a number of options conservatives floated in an attempt to remove the 
constraints (both political and budgetary) imposed by schools. Indeed, one of the first options 
floated was to try to change the Kansas constitution and get voter approval by April to stop the 
funding increase by changing the definitions of equitable and adequate (Rothschild 2013a).  
 The appeals process took over a year, but in March 2014 the Kansas Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower court and ruled that Kansas was underfunding its public schools. The 
Court also reaffirmed the earlier ruling that Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution contained both 
                                                                   
156 Gannon v. Kansas, 2013 Shawnee County District Court, Case No. 10C1569, p. 226-227 
(http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/457), emphasis added.  
157 Currently, the way in which Kansas choses its Supreme Court justices is a nominating committee provides a list of three 
people to the Governor to choose from. 
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an adequacy and equity component. Further, the Court essentially sought to operationalize these 
more abstract concepts for the legislature, determining that adequacy would be satisfied when 
Kansas schools meet or exceeded the “Rose Standards158” (Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes 
2017:2) and equity would be satisfied when all school districts “have reasonably equal access to 
substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax effort” (Kansas Office of 
Revisor of Statutes 2016:11).   
 A few weeks after the Court’s decision, Brownback signed a law addressing the Supreme 
Court’s ruling on equity.159 In June, the district court panel ruled that the additional funding was 
sufficient to meet the equity portion of the case, however, the ruling on the adequacy portion of 
the law came in December after Brownback won re-election. A panel of judges at the District 
Court in Topeka affirmed the previous ruling that the State had “substantially complied” with the 
equity portion of the ruling (Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes 2016:12). However, it also 
ruled that the overall level of funding for schools was inadequate and thus unconstitutional. 
While it did not provide a direct amount of money the legislature should allocate, they did 
suggest a base state aid amount of $4,654 could be adequate. Again, the Court pointed to the tax 
cuts in their ruling. “[W]e understand the self-imposed fiscal dilemma now facing the State of 
Kansas, both with or without this Opinion… Since the obligations here declared emanate from 
                                                                   
158 The Rose Standards come out of a 1989 Kentucky Supreme Court case, Rose v. Council for Better Education. These standards 
consist of seven158 skills that children should attain from a public education. These Standards had been mentioned by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in previous cases, namely in Mock and Montoy. And the Supreme Court noted that the state already included 
similar language. However, this was a clearly defined guideline offered by the Court for the legislature to follow. 
159 The bill did two main things. First, it codified the Rose standards as the metric for evaluating educational capacities for 
Kansas schools. Second, it appropriated an additional $109.3 million to general state aid as well as transferring $25.2 million 
from the state’s general fund to school capital outlay funds (Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes 2016:12). These two things are 
the funding-related aspects of the bill. The bill did more. It also made other, non-funding decisions to education policy. During 
the Senate debate on the bill, various amendments were added and approved that made their way into the final bill. One such 
amendment was offered by Susan Wagle that repealed teacher tenure, a law that had been on the books since 1957. Kansas’ 
tenure law provides due-process hearings for teachers who have been with a district for three or more years before they can be 
fired or have their contract non-renewed. Additionally, the bill also included a 70 percent tax credit for corporations that 
contribute to scholarship funds. 
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our Kansas Constitution, avoidance is not an option,” the Justices wrote. Again, the state 
appealed the decision to the state Supreme Court. 
 While the Gannon lawsuit was filed before the Brownback tax cuts, these two events 
become inexorably linked. This is partially due to the dual nature of public finance; Brownback 
had radically remade the state’s tax structure at the same time being hindered in his ability to 
remake expenditures. But another way the tax cuts and school funding became linked is through 
the Brownback administration’s response to Gannon. Instead of increasing funding or trying to 
change the funding formula, conservatives opted simply to repeal the funding formula. 
 
A “Timeout in the School Finance Wars:” Block Grants and the Repeal of the 1992 School 
Finance Formula 
 Governor Brownback, in his 2015 State of the State address, gave legislators two 
instructions for how to deal with school finance: “My suggestion is simple, and I believe 
necessary---a timeout in the school finance wars. In this two-year budget, the Legislature should 
appropriate money directly to school districts, so it can be spent where it is needed most, and 
that’s in the classroom. At the same time, the Legislature should repeal the existing school 
finance formula and allow itself sufficient time to write a new modern formula that meets our 
needs for great 21st Century schools.” 
Despite the call for a “timeout,” Brownback immediately re-escalated “the school finance 
wars” by blaming the school funding formula for the state’s current budget woes saying. “The 
dramatic increase in state education funding that has occurred over the last four years is 
unsustainable,” Brownback said (Office of the Governor 2015). In February 2015, Brownback 
announced another round of budget allotments, this time cutting $44.5 million from K-12 and 
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higher education. Not only did Brownback make mid-year budget cuts to K-12, but he also 
supported repealing the funding formula and implementing block grants. In a memo titled “The 
Beauty of the Block Grant” (July 8, 2015), Brownback extolled the benefits of block grants: 
“The beauty of the block grant lies in the flexibility it provides to those closest to the classroom: 
parents and teachers. Local schools now have the flexibility to invest state funding where it will 
most benefit the individual needs of their students.”160 
The Brownback administration was trying to frame the state’s current school funding 
formula as a deterrent to “accountability and efficiency.” Brownback highlighted as 
“symptomatic of the inherent flaws in the current formula,” (Office of the Governor 2015) a 
$48,000 piano purchased by Sumner Academy. “That money could and should have been used to 
hire another teacher to reduce class sizes and help improve academic achievement,” he declared 
(Office of the Governor 2015). The formula, Brownback bemoaned, locked in “automatic, 
massive increases in spending unrelated to actual student populations or improved student 
achievement.”161 However, many of these “flaws” in the school funding formula that Brownback 
and fellow conservatives noted misrepresented the actual accounting and budgetary processes of 
school districts. Nevertheless, claims that the funding formula was “broken” continued to gain 
momentum. Senate President, conservative Susan Wagle asserted, “The formula is broken in that 
we are no longer talking about student outcomes and student achievement. We’re fighting for 
money” (Shorman 2015a). And in committee testimony, the Kansas Policy Institute asserted 
“The K-12 funding formula is irreparably broken.”162  
                                                                   
160 Memo dated July 8, 2015  
161 January 15, 2015 State of the State 
162 Testimony given March 9, 2016 to the House Appropriations Committee 
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Public school advocates, however, pushed back against conservative’s characterization of 
the formula. The problem was not the formula, they insisted, rather the lack of funding. Mark 
Desetti of the Kansas National Education Association testified, “The formula is not broken; it is 
underfunded and we would urge the legislature to get about the business of restoring the state’s 
revenue stream and then restoring the cuts made to education in the aftermath of the recession 
and the tax cuts.”163 A focus on Brownback’s tax cuts dominated the testimonies of school 
advocates during the debate on the block grants. In a 2015 testimony from the Topeka Public 
Schools, they drew on the three-legged stool approach to fiscal policy, saying, “A sound tax 
system is one where sales tax, property tax and income tax are balanced. Cutting state income 
taxes without providing offsetting revenues is shifting the burden for funding schools to local 
taxpayers and thereby further dis-equalizing Kansas’ education system.”164 The Hutchinson 
school district also testified that Kansas needed “a tax policy that will sustain and provide 
financial support to school districts in Kansas.”165 And the Lawrence Public School district stated 
that “State tax policy should be balanced and sustainable... State revenues should come from a 
balanced and equitable mix of sources: sales, income, and property taxes” (Lawrence Public 
Schools n.d.). Devin Wilson, of the Shawnee Mission School District’s PTA, testified, “We 
encourage committee members to focus on policies that will address the root cause of our K12 
school finance dilemma. Consider ‘going back to work full time and picking up some hours at 
IncomeTax LLC’.”166 And Mark Tallman noted, “If we’re going to rethink what we’re doing for 
education many of our members believe we’re also going to have to rethink tax policy as well” 
(Cooper 2015a). 
                                                                   
163 Testimony given March 9, 2015 to the House Appropriations Committee 
164 Testimony given March 9, 2015 to the House Appropriations Committee  
165 Testimony given March 9, 2015 to the house Appropriations Committee 
166 Testimony given March 10, 2015 to the Senate Ways and Means Committee 
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The Brownback administration respond to claims they were underfunding public 
education by simply denying it. When Brownback signed the tax cuts into law, he promised they 
would not lead to a reduction in school funding or other states services. Instead, the Brownback 
administration claimed they had actually increased overall school funding. However, a second 
claim, which seemed to undercut the first, was that school districts were being inefficient in 
using those dollars. Instead of spending money on school administration or building costs, 
funding should be directed “in the classroom” (Trabert and O’Neal 2015). Schools were 
receiving more money than they ever had, they reasoned, yet schools were still demanding more 
money. 
These arguments, however, ignored two crucial things. First, while the amount of money 
being classified as school spending did increase, this was largely due to an accounting maneuver 
that reclassified KPERS payments as school funding.167 In a clear example of how policy design 
can contribute to deceiving the public in ways that “discourage active citizenship” (Schneider 
and Ingram 1997:5), KPERS payments were reclassified and distributed to districts in their 
general fund. As Dale Dennis, the Deputy Commissioner of Fiscal and Administrative Services 
at the Kansas Department of Education explained, “It used to be on KPERS, we write a check 
and walk down the street and give it to KPERS. We did it electronically, but the same thing. 
Now, we have to send it to school districts based on the amount they would be entitled to get that 
the state’s paying on their behalf. Then they send it straight back to KPERS.”168 And the KPERs 
money is only in district accounts for a very short amount of time. “The employer portion, the 
state-funded portion of KPERS, is in our bank account about one second,” explained the Topeka 
school district. “I’ll get an email that says your KPERS payment hit. In less than two minutes 
                                                                   
167 The change also moved bonded interest payments through the districts as well. 
168 Personal Interview conducted August 29, 2017 
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another email or notice will come that says its withdrawn.”169 Of course, conservatives in the 
legislature had been making the argument that spending needed to be for the “classroom.” To 
stay consistent, they began to argue that KPERS payments were classroom spending. As Ty 
Masteron noted, “The money that we spend for the retirement of the teacher is a classroom 
expense” (Associated Press 2015b).  
The second crucial element this argument ignored was the actual process Kansas schools 
use for allocating funding within districts. Kansas schools use a system of fund accounting, 
meaning expenditures are tied to a specific fund, such as the general fund, special revenue funds, 
capital outlay funds, and debt funds (Kansas State Department of Education 2015). These funds 
are governed by strict rules concerning the expenditures that came come out of each fund and 
what kinds of transfers, if any, are allowed between funds. Thus, money allocated by the funding 
formula to capital outlay, for example, must be used on expenditures classified as capital outlay. 
Often, this does not include salaries for staff or resources for instruction. 
Proponents of the block grant were framing it as an issue of local control, allowing school 
districts to do what they want this their funding.170 However, fund accounting is a system 
designed primarily for accountability. In a fund accounting system, allocated dollars have to be 
spent on their intended purpose. Mark Desetti of the Kansas National Education Association 
testified in regards to fund accounting, saying that “the use of these so-called ‘silos’ was 
intended to create accountability. When it was found that bilingual students needed additional 
resources, bilingual weighting was created and later adjusted. That money has a purpose. And 
you should expect to see that it is used for that purpose.”171  
                                                                   
169 Interview conducted December 22, 2017 
170 Interview with Mike O’Neal, October 21, 2016 
171 Testimony given March 9, 2015 to the House Appropriations Committee 
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A common justification from Brownback and other conservatives regarding school 
funding cuts was the amount of cash school districts have on hand. “School districts are 
estimated to have approximately $381 million in reserve fund balances to help them offset the 
smaller than expected increase in state funding,” Brownback said after the February 2015 round 
of budget cuts (Lowry 2015a). However, often the amount of cash on hand is what districts are 
legally required to maintain. According to the Olathe district, “The law says I have to have on 
hand an extra bond payment. If I think, I make two bond payments a year. I have to have a third 
one just in reserves. That one bond payment for me, one six-month payment is $30 million. 
When I'm at the end of my fiscal year on June 30th, and I've got money in the bank from my 
September payment, and I got to keep that one extra one on hand. I have $60 million sitting in 
the bank and they're like, ‘Well see, they don't need more taxes. They're not spending what they 
have.’ I can't use that to pay teachers' salaries. I can't buy a pencil out of that. I've got to keep it 
sitting there for that bond payment. It's called fund accounting. I have 31 different little funds, 
and they all have a different reason for the money to be there, and what I'm allowed to spend it 
on.”172 
Conservatives recognized these rules and had been trying to change them. For instance, 
Mike O’Neal noted that when he was in the legislature he “championed a bill that broke down all 
those silos. You can move money around. You’ve got a little extra at-risk money? Move it over 
here if you need it. And then they did away with the formula and went with block grants, which 
is the ultimate in local control. There we’re just going to send you a check. Knock yourself out, 
spend it any way you want, because we’re tired of this argument that there’s not enough money 
for this.”173 Kansas did loosen restrictions slightly over the course of the school funding battle, 
                                                                   
172 Interview conducted November 23, 2017 
173 Interview conducted October 21, 2016 
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for instance allowing districts to pay certain salaries out of capital outlay. However, they still had 
to be spent on staff involved in the maintenance of district property and equipment, such as bus 
drivers and custodians. While districts were allowed to do this, not all districts did. As I was told 
by the Fredonia school district, “just because they say you can do things does not mean it's a 
good decision.”174 And it was not a good decision for many school districts not only because of 
the lack of transparency involved in allocating funds outside of traditional accounts, but because 
districts saw it as fiscally irresponsible. According to the Herington district, “In a capital outlay 
thinking, I think anyone would tell you it’s much better to put money away and save it for 
projects down the road instead of having to pay interest on a loan, like a bonded interest project. 
Sometimes the accounts do get up high but that’s based upon our needs and our fiscally 
responsibly ways of doing things.”175  
 An underlying impetus behind breaking down the fund accounting system has to do with 
district cash balances. Some funds allow districts to rollover money from one year to the next. 
General fund expenditures need to be spent to zero, but money for capital outlay, for instance, 
can be rolled over. For school districts, like Herington, this rollover capacity is used to build up 
reserves for large purchases in the future. This is also the case with the Coffeyville District who 
explained, “One of the things that we get hit with down here and have gotten questioned about is, 
well, how come your capital outlay is a million dollars? And all I have to do is say, well, on my 
high school I’ve got four rooftop units and it’s a building that’s almost a hundred years old. And 
I’ve only got four big rooftop units. And if I were to replace just one of those units that were all 
put in at the same time, about 18 years ago, I can’t just replace the unit I have to replace the duct 
work and everything that goes with the unit because they are undersized. And that one unit alone 
                                                                   
174 Interview conducted February 9, 2018 
175 Interview conducted September 21, 2018 
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would cost about $450,000. So when I tell somebody that the one air conditioning unit that I 
have is almost half a million dollars and you’re wondering how come I have a million dollars in 
my capital outlay, you really ought to be wondering how come I don’t have two or three million 
dollars in the capital outlay.”176 Districts also build up their reserves to guard against “unknown 
unknown” future expenditures: “Something’s going to break. I don’t know what it’s going to be. 
I don’t know if it’s going to be a $20,000 Suburban or a $30,000 Suburban that I’m going to 
have to replace. Or if it’s going to be a $120,000 boiler system someplace.”177 Building up cash 
reserves provides a cushion not only for known future expenses coming up, such as new bus 
purchases or re-roofing a building, but also for unknown expenses which may occur during the 
year. 
However, for conservatives, the amount of cash on hand proved school districts were 
disingenuous about their needs. Mike O’Neal, for instance, told me, “On any given day there’s a 
billion dollars sitting out there in funds that the school districts could write a check for right now 
over the lunch hour, and it’s sitting there in reserves. Okay, well, good, you’re saving money. I 
like that. That’s probably prudent. Just don’t let me hear that you don’t have enough money to 
pay a teacher reimbursement... I don’t want to hear that story anymore… That is a narrative 
where they ramp up these false crises in order to get more money.”178 The Kansas Policy 
Institute echoed this sentiment in a House Appropriations committee meeting, stating “Hundreds 
of millions more might make the institutions happy (until they want more).”179 And Dave Trabert 
of the KPI testified that “The current practice of allowing unlimited accumulation of carryover 
cash reserves demonstrates that school funding has been higher than needed to fund current 
                                                                   
176 Interview conducted October 5, 2018 
177 Interview with the Ellsworth school district conducted September 28, 2018 
178 Interview conducted October 21, 2016 
179 Testimony given March 9, 2015 to the House Appropriations Committee 
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operations, which in turn causes taxes to be higher than necessary or causes funding to be 
diverted from other services.”180 Brownback even circulated a document among conservative 
lawmakers claiming to show school districts had $381 million in “flexible” funds that they could 
tap into to lessen the brunt of the budget cuts (Lowry 2015b). In other words, conservatives were 
charging school districts with being greedy and inefficient181 by maintaining high cash reserves.  
In total dollars, school district cash reserves have grown in recent years. For instance, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2, in the 2010-11 school year, school districts carried over collectively 
$1.5 billion from the previous school year’s budget. In the 2016-2017 school year, this increased 
to $1.7 billion. However, as Figure 2 also demonstrates, the percent carried over from the 
previous year’s budget actually declined slightly, from 31 percent in 2011-2012 to 29 percent in 
2015-2016. This is indicative of districts using more of their reserve funds in response to budget 
cuts.  
The carry over balance also belies the variation that exists among districts. An efficiency 
study commissioned by the legislature and conducted by the consulting group Alvarez & Marsel 
(A&M), provided recommendations regarding district carry over funds and suggested the amount 
of cash should correspond to the degree of assessed risk. Minimal risk translated into 10 percent 
carryover; low to moderate risk translated into 11-15 percent; and moderate to high ranged 15-25 
percent; and high risk was 25 percent and over (2016:173). In 2014, A&M found 68 districts 
with cash balances currently less than 10 percent of operating budget; 77 with 10-15 percent; 92 
with 15-25 percent; and 49 with over 25 percent (2016:173-174). Thus, half of school districts 
were already meeting the A&M recommendation of 15 percent and lower cash reserve. All 
                                                                   
180 Testimony given March 11, 2016 to the Senate Ways & Means Committee  
181 Another report commissioned by the Legislature and released in 2018 was charged with determining how efficiently Kansas 
school districts operated. The report, conducted through WestEd by Dr. Lori Taylor of Texas A&M, found that Kansas schools 
produced “nearly 96% of their potential output” (2018:63). In other words, Kansas schools were maximizing their resources 
nearly 100 percent.  
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others, as Mark Tallman noted, “appear to believe the Kansas fiscal situation is at least 
“moderately” risky, given years of revenue shortfalls, credit downgrades, budget reductions and 
disappearing ending balances” (2016).182 As the North Ottawa district explained to me, “It’s hard 




Figure 2 Total USD Cash Balances and Percent Carried Over from Previous Year 
Source: Kansas Department of Education School Finance Reports 
 
However, despite the school district’s attempts at explaining the budgeting process to 
lawmakers, claims of inefficiency and waste formed an implicit, or even explicit, foundation for 
implementing block grants. In March 2015, Republicans revealed the block grant funding 
scheme, which repealed the 1992 school funding formula. The block grants froze the amount of 
funding each district received at the current funding level regardless of changes in enrollment.184 
                                                                   
182 After the tax cuts were repealed and the new funding formula was implemented, Mark Tallman also recommended to school 
districts to begin “prudently” reducing their cash reserves (Tallman 2017). 
183 Interview conducted October 3, 2018 
184 Additionally, districts that were experiencing an increasing student population would also not be able to plan for increased 
per-pupil funding and would instead have to apply to the State Finance Council for extra funding to cover the costs associated 
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The block grants would come with “no strings attached,” allowing districts to distribute money 
as they saw fit, untethered to fund requirements. The block grants were proposed for two years as 
a way to give lawmakers time to craft a new funding formula. Lawmakers moved quickly on the 
block grants, taking only 12 days from the introduction of the bill to signing.185  
After the block grant formula was passed, the bill again went to the courts for review.186 
In June of 2015, another three-judge panel ruled that the block grants were unconstitutional and 
ordered the state to immediately pay $49.6 million to districts. Brownback again went after the 
courts, claiming the court had “taken upon itself the powers specifically and clearly assigned to 
the legislative and executive branches of government. In doing so, it has replaced the judgment 
of Kansas voters with the judgment of unelected activist judges” (Hancock 2015b). The primary 
basis for finding the block grants unconstitutional turned on the “laundered” KPERS payments. 
The Court acknowledged this in their decision, writing, “KPERS contribution funds have either 
                                                                   
185 To speed the bill along, lawmakers turned to a controversial legislative maneuver known as the “gut and go.” The House took 
up the education bill first and Speaker Merrick ran the bill through the House Appropriations committee. Reactions to the change 
in school finance were swift and predictably split among school groups and conservative groups. In the House appropriations 
committee testimony over the change, the only three groups that testified in favor were the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, 
Kansas Policy Institute, and Kansans for Liberty. The day after testimony in the committee, Ron Ryckman, appropriations 
committee chair, then moved the discussion onto Senate Bill 7 – a bill that had previously been passed by the Senate on February 
25 and addressed information technology audits. This motion to consider SB7 was opened and closed then there was a motion to 
replace the contents of SB7 with the school funding bill. The gut and go maneuver in this case would allow the committee to strip 
out (gut) the contents of SB7 and replace it with the school finance funding bill. Because SB7 had already been approved by the 
senate, if SB7 was passed by the House, the senate could vote to concur with the house-passed SB7 and send it to the governor 
(go). After the gut and go passed out of the House appropriations committee, and the full House took it up the next day and 
passed it 64-57 followed by the senate (25-14). 
186 Kansas filed another appeal in the funding lawsuit asking the Supreme Court to again review the lower court’s opinion. The 
state had appealed immediately after the December ruling to the lower court, but they refused the appeal. The Supreme Court 
heard the appeal, but they also had to decide whether the dramatic changes to the funding formula brought on by the block grants 
would actually halt the Gannon lawsuit. The schools involved in the Gannon lawsuit also tried to block the implementation of the 
new block grant system by appealing to the lower court. And, indeed, a three-judge panel indicated during the legislative debate 
on the school funding formula that they might intervene to block the implementation of the new formula while the Gannon case 
was pending. This did not sit well with conservative lawmakers. Ty Masterson, for instance, said “It is shocking to have a court 
say they are going to interfere with the legislative process” (Cooper 2015b). This further escalated the tensions that had been 
growing between the legislature and the courts. And in response, conservatives began to actively threaten the court. The 
legislature passed a series of bills aimed at punishing the courts. For instance, one law, which the Governor signed, threatened the 
funding of the judiciary if the Supreme Court overturned a 2014 Kansas law that changed the way judges were selected. The 
2014 law took away the authority from the Supreme Court to appoint chief judges of the district courts and allowed district courts 
to appoint chief judges themselves (Eligon 2015). Another bill lowered the mandatory age of retirement for judges and yet other 
listed “attempting to usurp the power of the legislature or executive branch of government” as grounds to impeach a Supreme 
Court justice (Hancock 2015f).  
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never been considered by experts or other competent professionals in evaluating the adequacy of 
K-12 school funding or, if so considered ... such KPERs contributions were reflected as an add-
on increase to the per pupil costs, not as an in-lieu of, or in substitute for, other needed funds” 
(Hancock 2015b). In other words, KPERS payments cannot be counted towards adequate or 
equal education. However, the state appeals for relief from having to repay districts, which the 
Supreme Court granted, relieving the state from the requirement to repay $49.6 million.  
 
Addressing Equity within the Block Grants 
The lower courts had found the block grants unconstitutional and in February 2016, the 
State Supreme Court issued their ruling upholding the lower court and struck down the block 
grants. The Court then gave the legislature until June 30 to fix the inequities in the block grant 
system or else schools would be shutdown starting July 1. This further antagonized the 
legislature’s relationship with the courts. For conservatives, they continued to claim that the 
“power of the purse” lay with the state legislature and the court’s rulings forcing the legislature 
to increase funding usurped that power.187 As Dale Dennis explained to me, “Some policymakers 
thought appropriation money was the legislature’s business and not the court… There’s still 
quite a few people around who believe that but the court has spoken and that decision has 
already been made.”188  
The legislature introduced a new bill aimed at satisfying the courts in March. This bill 
added very little new money to school funding, but instead focused on the equalization aspect by 
changing the state’s equalization formula. At the urging of the Education Commissioner Randy 
                                                                   
187 Indeed, legislators began to consider very dramatic actions. While also debating the new school funding legislation, the Senate 
also passed a bill that would have made “usurping the power of the legislature” grounds for impeaching a Supreme Court judge 
(Hanna 2016). 
188 Interview conducted August 29, 2017 
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Watson, they inserted a “hold harmless” provision which meant no district would receive less 
money than they were getting with the block grant formula, and 23 districts would see increases. 
The new plan utilized median property valuation per pupil rather than average property valuation 
per pupil and, according to legislative analysis, the plan did indeed narrow the disparity between 
districts. However, the biggest question mark hanging over the plan was whether or not it would 
be enough to satisfy the courts and stop the schools from closing. Brownback signed the law on 
April 7 and the Supreme Court announced it would hold the next round of hearings on May 10.  
 During the hearing, the state’s main argument was that the court should not find the 
whole formula unconstitutional and if it had further issues with parts of the law, just those should 
be addressed. “No one,” the state argued, “except apparently the plaintiffs now, wants to close 
the schools. There’s no reason for the court to strike the entire funding system” (Hancock 
2016a). The court, however, was unconvinced and on May 27 ruled that the recent school 
funding changes that the legislature passed still did not meet the standard for equitability. 
Further, the court also struck down the severability clause, the clause that the legislature had 
inserted that said that if the court found one part of the law unconstitutional, it would not apply 
to the whole law.189  
To respond to the latest ruling, Brownback called a special session of the legislature. 
Some lawmakers, however, were not waiting for the special session to begin to address the 
possibility of the court closing the schools. Senator Jeff King, for instance, announced that he 
would be drafting an amendment to the state’s constitution that would block the court from being 
                                                                   
189 Reaction from the Governor and other conservatives was swift. “The court is engaging in political brinkmanship with this 
ruling, and the cost will be borne by our children,” said Brownback (Hancock 2016a). House Speaker Ray Merrick was more 
bombastic, “The court has yet again demonstrated it is the most political body in the state of Kansas. Dumping the ruling at 5 
p.m. the day before a long weekend and holding children hostage. This despite the fact that the legislature acted in good faith to 
equalize the record amounts of money going to schools. This court is planning to shut down schools over less than 1 percent of 
the total education budget. Frankly, I find their actions disgraceful and hope Kansas voters will remember this in November when 
deciding whether these Justices should be retained” (Hancock 2016a). 
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able to shutter the state’s public schools. Similarly, the state’s Attorney General, Derek Schmidt, 
filed a motion to get the court to back off its threat to close the schools, writing “To prevent harm 
to Kansas schoolchildren, their families, and the many Kansans who otherwise rely on having 
schools open and operating—who are not part of this dispute among the three branches of their 
government— the State respectfully requests this Court withdraw its twice-repeated warning that 
it may enter an order that would result in the closing of Kansas public schools.”190  
The Democrats, for their part, announced their own plan which involved returning to the 
old funding formula as well as funding the increase needed for equalizing district’s local option 
budgets by cutting various other programs, namely a $13 million job creation program at the 
Department of Commerce, $3 million from TANF, and $15.2 million from an extraordinary need 
fund. In response, the House Republicans responded by issuing a statement, “While it’s nice that 
the Democrats finally came up with an idea other than voting no, their plan would force the state 
of Kansas to break binding commitments already made with job creators” (Hancock 2016b). 
 The special session lasted only two days. The plan, put forward and approved by the 
House (116-6) and then the Senate just an hour later (38-1) reinstated the supplemental general 
state aid formula as it existed prior to SB 7 and added $38 million to the formula to fund it. After 
it was passed, Brownback signed the bill saying, “This is something I agree with. When I called 
the special session, my effort was focused on making sure that we could get something to pass 
that would satisfy the court and keep them from closing the schools. That will happen” (Hancock 
2016c). The Kansas Supreme Court accepted the legislature’s school funding change from the 
special session which essentially satisfied the “equity” portion of the case. Next, the court would 
                                                                   
190 Gannon v. Kansas, Case No. 15-113,267-S (https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/gannon-motion-for-rehearing-or-
modification.pdf?sfvrsn=4), p. 1. 
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turn its attention to the adequacy portion. The court announced the date for the next stage of the 
school funding case for September 21. 
 
Still Unconstitutional 
 After the September 21 round of arguments in the school funding case were heard, the 
Supreme Court announced its decision in March 2017. In a unanimous decision, the Kansas 
Supreme Court again ruled that school funding was unconstitutionally low. It gave the legislature 
until June 30 to address it and again issued the threat to close the schools on July 1 if the 
legislature did not act. The Court gave no exact amount of money that it suggested would be 
enough to meet the constitutional requirements, however the Kansas Department of Education 
suggested the amount should be about $841 million.  
 The latest school funding decision was made after the November 2016 election which 
saw a return to more moderate lawmakers into the legislature. After the ruling, many pro-
education groups made the connection between the moderates and the eventual repeal of the tax 
cuts with the hope of addressing the school funding issue. For instance, the attorney for the 
school districts, Alan Rupe, said after the ruling, “Many Kansans associate Governor 
Brownback’s tax cuts with the state’s inability to fund basic state programs and agencies, as well 
as education. The new, more moderate Legislature has already suggested that it will repeal some 
of the tax cuts put into place by Governor Brownback. This would go a long way in not only 
allowing Kansas to address the inadequacies in education funding, but also in addressing the 
overwhelming budget deficit that Kansas is currently facing” (Hancock 2017b). Additionally, 
Kansas Families for Education, another education group, issued a statement saying, “It has now 
become abundantly clear that Kansas must turn away from the road to ruin that the Brownback 
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tax policy has been leading us on for too long and return to responsible budgeting that allows us 
to fund our priorities” (Hancock 2017c). 
 School funding and the income tax cuts had become closely linked, not only in the 
public’s imagination, but also in lawmaker’s responses. For instance, during the 2017 legislative 
session, lawmakers attempted a “mega” bill that addressed both issues simultaneously.191 
Democrats and Republicans, however, both objected to the “mega” bill for different reasons. 
Democrats, such as Ed Trimmer, objected that the two issues should be handled separately: “I 
don’t think we should be talking about tax policy in education policy. They should be two 
separate issues” (Moore 2017). Conservatives, on the other hand, objected that linking income 
taxes directly to school funding would make voting for future income tax cuts impossible. 
Instead of dealing with these issues together, the legislature opted to separate them and passed a 
school funding bill on June 5. The bill, which ended the block grants and reestablished a school 
funding formula essentially returned Kansas to the formula as it existed prior to the block grants. 
However, it did increase funding by approximately $317 million over two years. Brownback 
reluctantly signed the law, saying that “The Legislature missed an opportunity to substantially 
improve the K-12 funding system,” (Hancock 2017d).  
The school funding formula obliges a certain level of public spending. In seeking to 
eliminate, or at least dramatically alter, the formula, Brownback hoped to eliminate or change the 
institutional constraints imposed by the funding formula. In political science, scholars have noted 
that politicians in any given legislative session operate under the rules of “yesterday’s 
legislators” (Steuerle 2010:876). This is particularly true when it comes to spending 
                                                                   
191 The increase in taxes in the bill would be used to pay for school funding. The bill, requested by Ron Ryckman, would have 
increased funding to schools by $280 million over two years and increased taxes approximately $1 billion over two years. 
However, it would have also established a new policy of sending all state income taxes to school funding.  
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commitments. Expenditure-side commitments constrain the fiscal discretion of future lawmakers 
by committing greater shares of the budget to mandatory spending, including payments on debt 
interest (Pierson 1998, 2002; Streeck and Mertens 2013; Genschel and Schwarz 2013). In many 
cases, the growing share of mandated expenses constrains the state’s ability to address the 
possible changing interests and priorities of the citizenry (Streeck and Mertens 2013:27). The 
declining share of fiscal discretion is often seen as pre-empting “fiscal democracy,” or the ability 
for citizens to exercise choice through the budget and public finances (Steuerle 2010:876; 
Genschel and Schwarz 2013:59). If a greater and greater share of the budget is tied up in 
mandatory expenses, the capacity for citizens to exercise their choice through future public 
finances recedes. However, mandated expenses also place a constraint on tax cutting politicians. 
Fiscal democracy can be pre-empted by increasing shares of mandated expenses, but those 
mandated expenses are still an expression of the general public. In this case, the spending 
commitments of “yesterday’s legislators” are more of a protection against austerity rather than a 
cause of it.  
 
Public Opinion and School Funding 
 To this point, the school funding narrative has primarily been about elites – lawmakers 
and judges battling over the interpretation of adequate and equitable funding. But the battle over 
school funding in Kansas also manifested visibly in communities. In the following two sections, 
I draw on public opinion and interview data to better understand the state’s inability to address 
school funding in the context of the tax cuts. I argue that the effects of school budget cuts were a 
primary way most Kansans experienced the state’s fiscal crisis. Diminished funding for schools 
linked the revenue and expenditure side of public finances for many Kansans, a central 
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component for developing fiscal consciousness according to Zelnak (2013). Moreover, school 
funding is among the public investments that are the most salient and most highly rated among 
most Americans (Williamson 2017:86). According to public opinion data, the same is true in 
Kansas.  
 Conveniently, the Kansas Speaks survey asked the same version of a school funding 
question between 2009 and 2013, allowing for a comparison over a period of time. In 2009, half 
of the respondents indicated that state funding for K-12 education in Kansas should be increased 
while 40 percent responded it should be decreased. In 2010, the responses were again very 
similar (52 percent increase, 39 percent decrease). Thus, while the schools took initial legal 
action against the state as a result of funding cuts during the recession, the general public seems 
to not have reacted to the Parkinson-era budget cuts. In other words, the school funding cuts as a 
result of the recession were less salient to the general public than the inability of the state to 
remedy those cuts under Brownback. We can see further evidence of this in the 2012 and 2013 
waves of the Kansas Speaks survey (Figure 3). In 2012, the percent favoring an increase in state 
school funding rose to 56 percent and in 2013 it increased again to 65 percent. Correspondingly, 





Figure 3 Preference for State Funding for K-12 Education 
Source: Kansas Speaks Survey, 2009-2013 
  
 
The emphasis on asking about state funding in these questions is important. After all, as 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, Kansas schools were historically funded by local property taxes 
before the equalization of mill levies. However, on the whole, Kansans support the formula-
based approach to funding schools in the state. For instance, when asked in 2016 if schools 
should rely more on property taxes or more on state funding, 60 percent of those surveyed 
responded that schools should rely more on money from the state and only 27 percent said they 
should rely more on local property taxes.  
Beyond asking about general support for funding for schools in Kansas, what did the 
public think about school districts taking legal action against the state? Of those surveyed in the 
2013 wave of the Kansas Speaks survey, a majority supported the districts’ legal action, 54 to 35 
percent. Furthermore, even a large percent of Republican voters supported the districts. Table 12 
illustrates support for the school districts’ lawsuit by political affiliation. While 60 percent of 
Republicans opposed legal action by the districts, nearly 40 percent supported them. 
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2015 wave, a plurality (45 percent) indicated they still preferred the legislature rather than the 
courts (30 percent) to determine the suitable amount of funding for schools.   
 
Table 12 Support for School District Legal Action by Party 














































Source: 2013 Kansas Speaks Survey 
 
While a majority of those in the state supported school districts, what did they think of how 
lawmakers were responding? The most consequential change to school funding under 
Brownback was the block grant program, a move most Kansans opposed. When asked whether 
they approved or disapproved of the block grants, 49 percent opposed it and 30 percent favored 
and 22 percent were not sure.  
Taken together, Kansans largely favored the current formula approach to funding schools 
rather than a block grant but increasingly saw the need for the state to increase the amount of 
money to schools. Further, they favored districts taking legal action to achieve that end. In the 
following section, I examine the experience of school districts in Kansas to argue that school 
funding cuts highlighted the degree of the fiscal crisis for folks. In other words, school funding 
cuts were a highly visible effect of the state’s fiscal crisis.   
 
How Did School Funding Decline Impact School Districts? 
 In the media, stories of school funding cuts forcing Kansas schools, such as Carney 
Valley (Tobias 2016), to switch from five to four-day weeks made state and national headlines. 
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However, this was not the norm as fewer than ten districts reduced the number of school days per 
week. Among the districts I interviewed, none went to four-day weeks although all had discussed 
it at some point. Slightly more common was shortening the overall school year, particularly 
during the 2014-15 school year when Brownback cut $28 million in February 2015 (in the 
middle of the school year) forcing districts such as Concordia and Twin Valley to end their year 
early (Associated Press 2015c). The February 2015 round of cuts effected Johnson County 
school districts particularly hard with the Olathe, Shawnee Mission and Blue Valley school 
districts hit with $5 million of the $28 million in cuts. (Cooper 2015a). Johnson County districts, 
because of their wealth, often had enough reserves to fund the rest of the school year. However, 
not all districts were so lucky and six districts across the state ended their school year early due 
to budget cuts.  
Brownback’s school funding allotments exacerbated the long-term trend of districts 
scheduling fewer school days per year. When controlling for stable differences between districts 
in length of the school year, the average school year in Kansas is 6 days shorter for teachers and 
12 days shorter for students compared to 1996. The trend has been towards shorter school years, 
but there are two noticeable inflection points which exacerbate the trend. As noted in Figure 4, in 
2008 and 2014 the number of days dips more dramatically indicating district responses 





Figure 4 Averange Length of Kansas School Year, 1997-2017 (Days) 
Source: Kansas Association of School Boards (KASB) 
+ Thanks to Emily Rauscher for creating this graph 
 
 
Community and District Staffing 
 Budget cuts put school districts under enormous financial strain. Shorter days and shorter 
school years were some ways districts attempted to adjust. But cutting back on school days can 
only go so far before districts have to address staffing. School districts see their staff as their 
main resource. As I was told by the Topeka school district, “We’re a people-driven business.”192 
The people-centered nature of schools comes not only from the main function of schools 
(educating children), but also in terms of budgeting. The majority (around 70 percent) of a 
district’s budget goes toward staff salaries which means budget cuts also affect staffing levels.193 
Reducing staff is sometimes done for practical accounting reasons. As the Neodesha district 
explained, “The staff cut is the cleanest, easiest way to guarantee that you know how much your 
budget's going to be decreased. You now, because you've got those figures right there.”194 
                                                                   
192 Interview conducted December 22, 2017 
193 Interview with the Ellsworth School district conducted September 28, 2018 where I was told, “About 70 percent of our budget 
goes towards people.” 
































However, among the school districts I spoke with, nearly all avoided directly laying off or firing 
teachers and other staff members. As the Topeka district explained, “Nobody likes reduction in 
force and, knock on wood and thank God we didn’t have to do that. We didn’t have to fire 
anybody. But we didn’t replace people.”195 Instead, districts reduced staff primarily through 
attrition. Teachers and staff that retired or relocated were simply not replaced during lean budget 
years.  
School districts make an effort to keep the effects of budget cuts away from the 
classroom. Conservative lawmakers and school district officials both spoke abount money being 
spent “in the classroom.” However, school districts had a broader view of what counts as “in the 
classroom.” According to the Herington school district, “I think every dollar we spend really 
impacts our overall operations and anytime our operations are better it impacts students in a 
positive way.”196 However, when resources are drastically reduced, districts have to triage the 
budget which meant prioritizing cuts away from direct classroom spending. As the Olathe school 
district explained to me, “We laid off some custodians. We did reduce those ranks. That's the one 
layoff we did. Teacher wise, we didn't. You circle the wagon. You try to protect the classroom as 
much as you can. First you try to do everything else, before you affect the classroom.”197 The 
Baldwin City district echoed this view, saying, “We have cut some teaching positions in the 
district… our number one priority was to try not to directly affect classrooms by the cuts. Now 
that's always up for your own definition of whether it’s effecting the classroom or not, but our 
idea was, we were trying to find ways to make cuts that would be least effective to the classroom 
as we could.”198 
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Prioritizing “direct” classroom expenses, such as teacher salaries, meant support staff and 
administration positions are particularly vulnerable. For instance, the McPherson school district 
characterized this tension very well, stating, “Our board, when they made cuts and reductions, 
lowering things that would sooner support learning than would be actual direct instruction. 
Counseling staffs may not be as robust as we'd like them to be. Staffing in media centers now, 
we staff a classified employee and have one librarian or media specialist covers all of our 
elementary schools. Those are things that kids and parents don't see directly. Can't say they don't 
impact what goes on with kids, but as far as what was delivered in classrooms, we really haven't 
reduced much of that.”199 In other words, for the McPherson district, while they recognized that 
positions like librarians did impact kids, and thus could be considered “in the classroom,” there 
was a marked delineation between more primary classroom positions and more periphery 
positions.  
Likewise, the McPherson district’s experience also highlights that the positions most at 
risk of elimination were often counselors and librarians. This was common for the districts I 
interviewed and statewide data indicates this was also common across all school districts. 
Counselors, for instance, dropped as 6.7 percent between 2007-08 and 2016-17. The number of 
counselors did recover in the 2016-17 school year, though the total number of these positions is 
still below pre-recession levels. Likewise, librarian positions declined nearly 35 percent across 
the same time period. Unlike counselors, library positions have not seen any recovery in recent 
years. Instead, librarian positions have tended to become district-wide positions where one 
librarian will split their time across all the schools in a district. “We used to have a high school 
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School districts tried to conceal the effects of budget cuts, but for some public education 
advocates this was a point of frustration. According to Judith Deedy, who formed the public 
education advocacy organization Game On for Kansas Schools, “[Superintendents] work so hard 
to hide the impacts [of budget cuts]. They keep the cuts as far away from the classroom as 
possible. And it’s like against their DNA to admit what they’re not able to do. They don’t want 
to publicly say, ‘Yeah we know we’re letting our kids down. We know our class sizes need to be 
smaller. I know I need para’s in more of my classrooms or I know we need more tech support, I 
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know we need more counselors.’ But they don’t want to come out and say that.”201 And for 
Deedy and others202 like her, keeping cuts away from the classroom obscures the true extent of 
the damage being done to public schools. “That’s a thing that an average parent doesn’t 
recognize. There’s still someone in their library, you know? So it has been a real challenge for 
our side is to help people understand what’s happening because it’s hard to see. So your class 
size went up a few. Whatever. And if your kid is in kindergarten, you don’t even know what 
your classroom looked like six years ago. You don’t even know you’re getting screwed.”203 For 
many public education advocates, concealing the effects of budget cuts by prioritizing certain 
positions actually makes it harder for parents and the general public to see the effects. While 
school librarian positions have been reduced statewide by nearly 35 percent, at some point 
during the day there is still someone in the library. The presence of someone in the library 
obscures that the position has dramatically changed.  
Even though non-teaching positons, such as librarians, were most likely to be eliminated, 
this does not mean that teacher positions remained filled.204 Teaching positions were particularly 
vulnerable to attrition (retirements and resignations). Indeed, teachers are leaving Kansas en 
masse. In recent years, the number of teachers leaving Kansas has nearly doubled (Kansas 
Department of Education 2016). In the 2012-13 school year, 413 teachers left Kansas. But by the 
2015-16 school year, the number of exiting teachers had grown to 831. The number of teachers 
                                                                   
201 Interview conducted March 12, 2018 
202 This perspective was echoed by many at the Rally to Restore Revenue held in Lawrence on March 25, 2017. One woman in 
attendance at the rally told me she was there because “I have three daughters in public school. So it started with looking at 
education and just how everything was falling apart and class sizes were ridiculous. The stories my daughters were coming home 
with were ridiculous…. When there’s such tremendous class size, so nearly 30 growing, energetic, highly-spirited kids in 
classroom and one adult, there’s bound to be behavior issues… So, just the stories of fights breaking out. And one adult cannot 
manage a classroom of kids. We need to fund it so that there’s an assistant and there’s student teachers, just manageable 
classrooms.”  
203 Interview conducted March 12, 2018 
204 Kansas also had a high number of turnover in superintendents. Over 60 districts had new leadership for the 2016-2017 school 
year, the highest turnover of superintendents in the state’s history (Tobias 2016). 
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who left the profession also grew from 669 in 2012-13 to 1,075 in 2015-16. Finally, data show 
that retirements increased from 2,084 to 2,693 in the same years. Thus, during lean budget years, 
school districts can take advantage of a larger trend in the state which makes budget savings 
easier to anticipate. 
 However, this data does not reveal the reasons teachers are leaving. As the teacher 
vacancy report notes, teachers may leave the profession or the state for a variety of personal 
reasons which may not be directly tied to budget cuts. However, a likely reason for teacher 
vacancies is wage stagnation and low entry pay, which are directly tied to school funding cuts.205 
Indeed, the National Education Association’s 2015-2016 ranking of teacher salaries places 
Kansas 45th with an average salary in 2016 of $47,755, well below the national average of 
$58,353 (National Education Association 2017). Of course, Kansas’ pay ranks higher than some 
neighboring states, such as Oklahoma, but is still below other neighboring states, namely 
Missouri (which the NEA ranked 22nd). The difference in teacher salaries across states increases 
competition for teachers. According to the Olathe district, “We're losing teachers across the 
border, because of the changes in state pension here, the lack of funding, our salary schedules 
have not kept pace with inflation. It's more attractive for some to work over in Lee’s Summit, 
[Missouri] right across the border than it would be here right now. It never used to be that way, 
so that's created a new recruitment issue.”206 And indeed, Missouri school districts appear to 
have benefits from Kansas’ budget problems.207 In 2011, for instance, only 85 applications for 
                                                                   
205 According to the KASB’s survey of districts, with the increase in school funding that came in 2017, most of this increase (80 
percent) was spent on teacher salaries (Tallman 2018). 
206 Interview conducted November 23, 2017 
207 Indeed, Missouri school districts, such as the Independence, Missouri school district took out billboard advertisements in 
Kansas encouraging Kansas teachers to apply. This was also widely covered in local media (Zeff 2015; Glas 2015). For many, 
Missouri districts advertising in Kansas was a sign of how bad the fiscal and budgetary situation in Kansas had become.  
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Missouri teaching licenses were filed from a Kansas address, but over the following three years 
those numbers nearly doubled (Zeff 2015).  
The increase in teacher vacancies has occurred even as student enrollments have grown. 
In 2006-2007, there were 444,879 students enrolled in K-12 with a pupil/teacher ratio of 14.7 
(Kansas Statistical Abstract 2008:169). However, by 2017-2018, the number of students had 
grown to 477,978 and the pupil/teacher ratio had increased to 15.5 (Kansas Statistical Abstract 
2018:179). And student enrollment is projected to continue growing which adds to district’s 
long-term anxieties. For instance, the Haysville school district told me, “This budget cut time has 
caused a lot of people to avoid the area of education. And one of the things we're really worried 
about on the horizon is a tremendous teacher shortage. If you look at the number of people 
enrolled in teacher programs now, there's not enough to replace those who are eligible to retire. 
That's not even people leaving the state, this is just actually enough people being trained to 
replace the normal workers that would retire. So it's got us very nervous.”208 
 
Classroom Materials 
While districts directed budget cuts away from the classroom, some “in the classroom” 
expenses, such as textbooks or software renewals, were eliminated. The North Ottawa district, 
for instance, “was spending probably $35,000 a year in software renewals. We knocked that 
down to $25,000. I said let’s go through and pick out what you think you can have and what you 
don’t need to have.”209 Likewise, the Ellsworth school district, “just didn’t order textbooks for a 
while. If you adopt textbooks for K-12 math, you could be talking $35-$45,000. That’s a 
teacher’s salary. And we felt that our people were more important than getting a new textbook 
                                                                   
208 Interview conducted December 15, 2017 
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after six years. So we just used the textbook for seven years. That was kind of the mindset; just 
save, save, save.”210 Wallace County also described this delay tactic, “So we're trying to look at 
options on how to get by for a couple years without having to chunk out a $30,000 math 
curriculum, per say. And we found avenues to still meet the requirements we need to meet 
without having to spend that money. May have to copy a few more things, things like that. That 
was kind of a biggie. Again, that's sort of a delay tactic. Hopefully we get our feet back under us 
and we can look back and renew some of the areas we have to renew, but we'll see if the moneys 
there.”211  
The decision to delay purchasing textbooks was common among school districts in 
Kansas. As Figure 5 illustrates, total textbook purchases in the state have declined dramatically 
since the recession. Textbook purchases peaked in 2007-08 before declining. By the 2015-16 
school year, textbook purchases were still below pre-recession levels. This indicates that most 
districts prioritized spending in other areas due to limited revenue. Part of the explanation for 
cutting materials has to do with the sheer cost of items like technology and textbooks. According 
to the Neodesha school district, “like many districts, technology's forcing us to spend a lot of 
money in that area that maybe, you know. It's kind of a black hole that you have to keep feeding 
I think.”212  
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Figure 5 Kansas School District Textbook Purchases, Total, 2004-2015 
Source: Testimony given to the Special Committee on K-12 Student Success; Dale Dennis, Deputy Commissioner 
of Education, December 9, 2015 
 
Economic and Cultural Consequences to School Funding Cuts 
Stagnant teacher pay or the elimination of school positions effects both the school district 
and the wider communities. As teachers leave and those positions are not refilled, it creates 
ripple effects. Political scientist Katherine Cramer notes that often, particularly in very rural 
areas, the prominence of public school employees can create resentment (2016:131). However, 
among my interviewees, there was a sense that school funding cuts were a net-negative for the 
community. As the Ottawa Chamber explained “When our taxes were cut and school funding 
was cut, we feel that in the community. We sensed resentment in our teachers who live and work 
among us and it’s like the legislature wasn’t validating them or validating the work they were 
doing.”213 But the negative aspects of school funding cuts also were economic. School districts 
are often among the largest employers in a community. To my knowledge, there is not a single 
                                                                   















source for ascertaining the largest employers across communities. However, based on 
information available from local chambers and interviews with districts, school districts are often 
in the top five largest single employers in a community. For example, in 2016 in Johnson 
County, two of the top five employers in the county were school districts; Shawnee Mission 
(3,400) and Blue Valley (3,226) (Overland Park Chamber of Commerce n.d.). Likewise, the 
Wichita Public School District is the fourth largest employer in the Wichita metropolitan area 
(Wichita Business Journal 2018). In Montgomery County, the Oswego and Yorkville School 
Districts are the second and third largest employers respectively (Bachman 2017). In interviews, 
the Coffeyville district mentioned they are the fourth largest employer in that community214 and 
the Herington district told me they are their town’s second largest employer.215 Thus, budget cuts 
to schools translate directly into fewer jobs and fewer overall resources in that community. 
 In addition to the loss of economic resources, diminished school funding has a profound 
impact on the identity and culture of a community. The loss of a school, particularly in rural 
areas, “means the loss of a very important source of community identity” (Cramer 2016:102; see 
also Kearns, Lewis, McCreanor, and Witten 2009). Often this source of identity is located in the 
physical school buildings and district activities, namely sports. As Judith Deedy, the founder of 
the public education advocacy organization Game On for Kansas Schools, noted, “A lot of 
people understand that when a school shuts down, the community shuts down. Without even 
talking about it, they understand that the schools are the center of their community in a lot of 
different ways, whether it’s cheering on the football team or it’s the nicest, biggest building in 
town for a lot of different communities.”216 In interviews, school district officials relayed the 
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distress associated with having to close school buildings. “It was a really difficult decision. 
Those schools have been around for a long time. The people that had children there were very 
passionate about those schools… We had lots of people at our board meetings not happy with 
that decision. And ultimately, our board voted a split decision. It was five to two, to close those 
buildings in the end.”217 Ultimately, in Baldwin City, the buildings were closed and sold. Closing 
these two schools, schools that many in the community probably attended, translated into the loss 
of a piece of that town’s identity.  
 District activities, such as sports, are also an important social component of communities, 
particularly for smaller communities. As one school district official told me, “The smaller the 
community, the more important [school sports] are.”218 Budget cuts put this at risk as well. Data 
compiled by the Kansas Center for Economic Growth indicates that “roughly 30 percent of 
districts have reduced or eliminated a wide range of programs and activities” such as sports or art 
and music programs (2014:6). Sports are valued enough in communities that most districts I 
spoke with avoided eliminating team sports. However, some districts did cut sports with less 
participation, such as the Perry school district who told me, “Girl’s golf was an example of a 
sport that we didn't have anymore, because we didn't have good participation. It cost us a lot 
more than what it was bringing in, in terms of paying for coaches.”219 Likewise, in Herington, 
“During the decline, about five years ago, baseball and softball were eliminated from the high 
school sports. And there was a lot of anger about that.”220  
 Again, school districts prioritize keeping the effects of budget cuts away from the 
classroom. But some districts view the “classroom” more holistically, encompassing nearly all 
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that a district offers, including sports. The principal of Hutchinson middle school, for instance, 
testified, “Athletics and activities are essential for all students, especially those at-risk. Hundreds 
of students at Hutchinson Middle School would lose the opportunity to participate after school 
with a trained coach in a positive environment. This will not only affect the students athletically, 
as we all know that students who participate in activities do much better in the classroom. For 
example, if we can get an at-risk student out for a sport, there is a great chance their grades and 
classroom performance will improve.”221 For some school districts, then, viewing activity 
spending as an “in the classroom” expense justified keeping the program instead of eliminating it 
for budget reasons. 
Even if a district kept a sport or activity, though, there were still aspects of sport that may 
have to change. In some cases, the changes were related to transportation to and from 
extracurricular activities. Some districts, such as the Wallace School District, mentioned they 
will now “combine vehicle trips on some of their trips instead of whatever they had planned.”222 
Likewise, the Haysville school district also recalled that cutting transportation for students who 
stay late for athletics or other activities  
was one of the first ones that the committee and everyone agreed, those are 
extracurricular, so they're not directly affecting the classroom. And that was the big point 
on that, so they felt like they could take away those activity routes and not pay for those 
anymore and use those savings because it wasn't necessary for a kid to get a good 
education to participate in those. Now it's not that they weren't important. It's not that 
everybody here doesn't like activities, doesn't like sports. Heck, we've got a home 
basketball tonight and it'll be packed. But everybody looked at that and said, ‘We don't 
want to cut anything else in the classroom, and we don't want a cut that affects every 
student. This would only affect those involved in activities, those involved in sports, 
athletics. And parents can come pick their kids up after practice.’ So it was tough, 
because the community was a little upset, and it took some educating there.223 
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Budget cuts create tensions within school districts as administrators prioritize programs. In the 
case of Haysville, administrators determined that cutting transport routes would create less 
impact than another cut to an “in the classroom” expenditure. But “in the classroom” spending, 
while the primary logic guiding how schools respond to budget cuts, districts also are aware of 
the broader community. Districts are acutely aware that community members will respond, often 
with derision, at any changes the district makes. While this required some education on the part 
of the district, it is also further evidence that the changes occurring in school districts alerted the 
wider community to the severity of the state’s fiscal crisis.  
 In other cases, however, districts rely on the community to help support changes to 
school activities. This is particularly true if districts implement activity fees. According to the 
Haysville school district, “I will tell you when we cut back on the activity routes, the athletics 
and activity routes in the evening, I actually received some checks from individuals. One from an 
individual who lives in Texas that had attended school here and had heard we were cutting those 
out. And he thought his $100 could help us to keep those. And he said in his letter, he wrote a 
letter to the board that said, ‘I know my $100 is not enough to keep it all, but maybe if we get 
enough people to participate, you can keep those evening routes.’ So there was some outpouring 
from the public.”224 Likewise, the Coffeyville school district noted, “We relied a little bit more 
on the booster club and things like that and they stepped up and helped out. So that provided 
additional supplies, materials and stuff for our athletic programs which allowed us to reduce 
those budgets down more to augment what we had reduced in the classroom supplies.”225  
But, of course, not all districts are in communities with the capacity for strong 
community financial support. The Galena School District, among the poorest in the state, 
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explained, “fees are a huge inequity and I don't know what you do about it. Nobody talks about 
fees but it's a big deal.”226 Some other districts, like Perry-Lecompton, instituted fees for athletics 
in response to budget cuts but tried to offer support for students disadvantaged by the new fee 
structure: “I think ours ended up being pretty modest, I think around maybe $50 per sport or 
something like that… We had some people donate money so if kids really couldn't afford it and 
they wanted to play, they kind of filled out a scholarship application. If they qualified, then we 
used that money that was set aside to go for them.”227 The differences in fees for sports 
demonstrates an important point: budget cuts to K-12 impact all school districts, but they impact 
districts differently based on community response capacity. In wealthier districts, parents can 
volunteer time and money to school activities whereas in poorer districts this is not always the 
case. The school funding formula contains mechanisms to equalize certain per pupil 
expenditures, but it does not contain mechanisms for equalizing parental time and resources.  
Interestingly, community support for school activities, while appreciated, is still a small 
portion of the overall district budget. The Topeka School District expressed this sentiment, “[A]t 
a legislative meeting recently one of the superintendents in Shawnee County had brought up the 
point, in that period of the block grants, we had parents stepping up and saying ‘We’ll pay for the 
bus to the state championship for baseball.’ But he said, ‘I didn’t have one person step up and 
say don’t let go of that custodian.’ I don’t have a group that says hey let us buy the toilet paper 
for the school for January through June. It’s not human nature. Folks will get on board to support 
those extracurricular things but you gotta have a clean building. And no parent organization is 
going to go let’s have a fundraiser for custodial supplies.228 While community groups will offer 
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support to schools in times of budget cuts, sometimes the effects of the cuts are more invisible, 
hidden away in fewer custodial supplies or in the increased demand on a diminished staff. These 
effects are, by the design of school district officials, often the first causalities of budget cuts. But 
they are also less visible. When budget cuts begin to effect student experiences, even if it is 
extracurricular activities, this makes the effects of the cuts more visible and salient for 
community members.  
 
Conclusion 
 Brownback’s efforts to reshape the state were constrained by formal institutional 
obligations enshrined in the constitution. However, these efforts were also constrained by the 
informal, and symbolic place of schools in Kansas. The opacity of school budgeting was an 
institutional barrier to communicating the severity of the fiscal crisis. This was made even more 
difficult by the accounting maneuvers the Brownback administration undertook to funnel 
different funds to school district general funds to make it look as if funding to schools had 
increased. However, the visibility and severity of the effects of budget cuts eventually overcame 
any techniques meant to misdirect attention away from the tax cuts. In communities across 
Kansas, the effects to schools highlighted the financial challenges facing the state. And in 
response, people mobilized to protect the institution and eventuated the reversal of the tax cuts. 
This ultimately affirmed what school advocates in the state believed. As Judith Deedy of Game 
On explained, “I thought maybe we’re wrong, maybe Kansans really do care more about tax 
policy than they care about their public schools. And the 2016 election, to me, was the 
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bellwether on that. I mean that was the answer. And, no we don’t put tax policy first. We put our 
communities and our schools first.”229  
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“It’s time for Kansans to demand an honest answer to a simple question,” wrote the 
editorial board of the Topeka Capital-Journal (2015). “Why don’t we have any money?” By 
mid-2016, the fiscal crisis in Kansas was particularly acute. During the 2015 legislative session – 
the longest in state history – the conservative-dominated legislature struggled to balance the 
budget and, instead of addressing the income tax cuts, instead raised sales taxes and other sin 
taxes in a desperate attempt to salvage Brownback’s experiment. As the fiscal crisis worsened, 
pressure mounted on Brownback to explain why the tax cuts had not produce the promised “shot 
of adrenaline” to the state’s economy.  
In this chapter, I explain how the Brownback administration obfuscated the effects of the 
tax cuts on the state budget. The pursuit of honest answers among the media, policy makers, and 
activist groups developed into an clash between competing knowledge claims expressed through 
various presentations and interpretations of that data. In legislative committees, blog posts, and 
reports, the clash of data in pursuit of answers to the fiscal crisis was embedded in a set of 
bureaucratic practices that political actors use to construct or generate ‘truths.’ Focusing on these 
micro-level political practices is key for uncovering how certain political ideologies, specifically 
neoliberalism, have “the means of making itself true, empirically falsifiable” (Bourdieu 
1999:95). In other words, this set of practices are “aimed at creating the conditions for realizing 
and operating of the ‘theory’” (Bourdieu 1999:95). The state did not start to see effects of the tax 
cuts reflected in the state’s budget for at least a year as state officials were able to draw on state 
cash reserves and accounting maneuvers to buy even more time. However, Kansans eventually 
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recognized and experienced the effects of the tax cuts. In response, the Brownback 
administration attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully, to divert attention from the tax cuts and 
towards other explanations for the state’s fiscal crisis.  
 
The Red-State Model: Building and Managing Expectations 
A commitment to tax cuts has been the central, unifying position of the Republican Party 
since Ronald Reagan (Martin 2008:126-145; Block 2009). As current Senate Republican leader 
Mitch McConnell noted, “The one thing that unites Republicans from Maine to Mississippi is tax 
cuts,” (Kenworthy 2009:30). As such, there were enormous expectations that the Kansas tax cuts 
would “create a red-state model that allows the Republican ticket to say, 'See, we've got a 
different way, and it works’,” as Brownback told the Wall Street Journal (King Jr. and Peters 
2013). National Republican figures, such as Mitch McConnell and Grover Norquist, initially 
gave favorable, glowing endorsements of the policy. McConnell said, “This is exactly the sort of 
thing we want to do here, in Washington” (King, Jr. and Peters 2013). Similarly, Norquist 
exclaimed, “Kansas is the future. Kansas is the model” (ReasonTV 2015).230 And Arthur Laffer, 
who worked with the governor, asserted “Brownback and his whole gang there, it’s an amazing 
they’re doing. Truly revolutionary” (Gowen 2011). “It’s a revolution in a cornfield,” said Laffer.  
Governor Brownback, also, essentially staked his political future on the success of the tax 
cuts. Several pundits observed that Brownback was likely pursuing such dramatic tax cuts in part 
to position himself for another presidential run. Likewise, by bringing in Arthur Laffer, 
Brownback was symbolically associating himself with Reagan’s tax-cutting legacy.231 And in an 
                                                                   
230 Elsewhere, Norquist also remarked that Kansas “provided a model, a successful model, that will phase out the income tax” 
(Lillis 2014). 
231 Brownback even travelled to the Reagan Ranch, Rancho del Cielo in Santa Barbara, California to celebrate the 35 anniversary 
of the Reagan tax cuts in the summer of 2016. Governor Brownback was the featured speaker of the event hosted by the Young 
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op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Brownback described his policy as “rooted in the Reagan 
formula” (Brownback 2014). In other words, he cast the tax policy in Kansas as carrying the 
torch of Reagan and Republican tax policy.  
The excitement surrounding the tax cuts lead supporters to make enthusiastic predictions. 
At a small business forum in Overland Park, Kansas just months after Brownback signed the tax 
bill, Arthur Laffer predicted the tax cuts would produce “enormous prosperity” in Kansas and “in 
a decade” (Wistrom 2012b). Elsewhere, however, Laffer and Stephen Moore had suggested they 
advised states like Kansas and Oklahoma to cut taxes because tax cuts produce “near immediate 
and permanent” economic impact (Laffer and Moore 2012). Secretary of Revenue Nick Jordan, 
however, was more optimistic and aggressive, predicting the tax cuts would produce noticeable 
economic growth in three years (Winstrom 2012b). And, of course, Brownback famously 
described the tax cuts as a “shot of adrenaline,” indicating near-immediate results. But 
enthusiastic predictions were not only found in exaggerated claims, they were also ensconced in 
concrete and quantitative predictions for economic growth. As mentioned earlier, the Brownback 
administration claimed the tax plan would create 22,900 new jobs, bring in 35,740 new state 
residents, and generate $2 billion in disposable income for state residents. During his re-election 
campaign in 2014, Brownback doubled-down on these estimates, increasing promised job 
growth from 22,900 to 100,000 – 25,000 per year during his second term.  
Brownback and his supporters claimed these numbers were the product of economic 
models and analysis, not ideological posturing. “It’s not a left-wing, right-wing thing. It’s 
economics,” Laffer said (Winstrom 2012b). A handout submitted to House and Senate tax 
committees in early 2012 titled “The Brownback Pro-Growth Tax Plan,” boasts that economic 
                                                                   




data “show states with zero personal income tax significantly outperform states with the highest 
personal income tax rates.”232 This claim comes directly from Arthur Laffer’s Eureka! How to 
Fix California (2012). In Eureka!, he claims that states without income taxes grow their 
economies faster than states with income taxes. He also contends that zero income tax states 
outperform other states’ gross state product, job growth, and population growth. True to his 
supply-side approach, Eureka! also claims that the nine states without a state income tax 
generate over 120 percent more state and local tax revenue compared to states with an income 
tax. Laffer’s claims were used by the Brownback administration to justify and legitimate the 
policy and several pages from the book were included in various policy materials. Laffer never 
produced any analyses directly for Kansas, though he was paid $75,000 to consult and make 
appearances in Kansas. However, his supply-side assumptions were built directly into the Kansas 
tax cuts. This is even more apparent when it came to forecasting future state revenue.  
 
Fiscal Notes: Static and Dynamic Scoring 
 Lawmakers often approve budget expenditures prior to the arrival of tax revenue. This 
temporal imbalance means lawmakers rely heavily on revenue forecasting to set state budgets. 
Revenue forecasting refers to “the predicted impact of a change in policy on aggregate revenues” 
(Auerbach 2005:423). It is the “lynchpin” that holds together the process of determining who 
pays and who benefits from government services (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2013:273). 
However, revenue forecasting, like other forms of forecasting, is an uncertain and imprecise 
process. Economic sociologists have grown increasingly interested in forecasting as an epistemic 
and political practice (Beckert 2016; Dix 2019; Reichmann 2013). In this literature, forecasts are 
                                                                   
232 Presented to the House Taxation Committee, January 12, 2012 
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“a special case of expectation building” (Reichmann 2013:854) which inspire political and 
economic actors to make decisions about future outcomes they cannot know (Beckert 2016:218). 
Their imprecision coupled with the power to shape the future means forecasts are “inherently 
political” (Beckert 2016:239). 
Before the tax cuts were passed the Kansas Legislative Research Department (KLRD) 
produced numerous forecasts estimating the cost of the tax bill. The KLRD estimated the tax cuts 
would reduce revenues by $4.5 billion, generating expected budget deficits between $712 million 
and $2.5 billion over the next six years. The Brownback administration, however, rejected this 
forecast and the KLRD’s methods, opting instead for the more optimistic forecast from the 
Department of Revenue (Hanna 2012c). Brownback’s spokesperson, Sherriene Jones-Sontag 
issued a statement accusing the KLRD of producing misleading numbers, charging that “The 
KLRD outlook cited by those who support the status quo is simply wrong, and they know it” 
(Carpenter 2012c). After the tax bill passed the legislature (but before Brownback signed it), 
budget director Steve Anderson also announced he would release an alternative budget 
projection based on “dynamic scoring” (Rothschild 2012y).  
Dynamic scoring refers, essentially, to incorporating macroeconomic effects into 
estimating how policy changes will impact the budget beyond just the initial cost to government. 
Other forms of revenue forecasting, so-called static scoring, simply calculate the expected cost to 
government if a tax cut is passed. In static scoring, other macroeconomic factors, or changes in 
behavior attributable to the policy, are not calculated in the revenue estimation. However, in 
dynamic scoring, forecasters attempt to estimate how a tax cut will incentivize either consumers 
to increase their spending or businesses to invest more. These estimates are fed into the model to 
produce a more “accurate” cost to government. In other words, a tax cut lets people keep more of 
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their money which should increase economic activity. The state can then recapture some of the 
cost of a tax cut from increased sales tax revenue. As one of Brownback’s former advisors 
explained to me, tax cut dollars are kept “in the sphere of Kansas economy, not just buried in the 
ground somewhere, which we knew that no one’s burying it in the ground. That’s why when 
people talk about, well, they did dynamic scoring, well, that’s why we did dynamic scoring. 
Nobody buries it in the ground.”233  
Dynamic scoring is itself not necessarily partisan. However, the main draw for dynamic 
scoring is that it potentially makes large tax cuts appear cheaper. This is suggestive of one its 
biggest weaknesses: its susceptibility to political influence (Auerbach 2005). Because dynamic 
scoring relies so heavily on assumptions of how individuals and businesses will respond to 
changes in fiscal policy, if supply-side assumptions are fed into the model then supply-side 
outcomes are “proven” by the model. Dynamic scoring, in other words, is the technique often 
used to justify the commonly heard phrase that tax cuts will pay for themselves. And as Monica 
Prasad notes, it is “essentially the Laffer curve under a different name” (2018:153).234   
Kansas employs static, rather than dynamic, scoring is used in official state forecasts.235 
Thus, the Brownback administration relied heavily on outside organizations to produce dynamic 
                                                                   
233 Interview conducted February 2, 2017 
234 Nationally, Republicans have waged a quiet campaign to get dynamic scoring instituted in official forecasting at the CBO 
since the early 1990s. As Monica Prasad explains, “Republicans had been trying to get dynamic scoring made officials since the 
days of the Contract with America, but there was too much skepticism about it, including among audiences that Republicans 
cared about, such as financial markets” (2018:153). However, in 2015, Republicans were able to realize this goal and 
implemented a new rule which now requires the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
to build forecasts and estimate effects using dynamic scoring. Dynamic scoring is also a highly contested device. For instance, in 
2018, the Democrats regained the U.S. House of Representatives and as part of their proposed rule changes are proposing to 
eliminate the use of dynamic scoring. In the states, too, dynamic scoring has become more common. One analysis found that 21 
state legislative bodies used dynamic scoring in budgetary and policy analysis (Bluestone and Bourdeaux 2015). Moreover, the 
report notes that “state level dynamic models are largely ‘supply side’ models” (Bluestone and Bourdeaux 2015:8). 
235 Various bills have been introduced to try to institute dynamic scoring in the state’s forecasting process, but they were never 
referred out of committee. One such bill was HB 2351, introduced February 2011, but died in committee without a hearing June 
2012. But the wording of this bill is instructive. The bill would have required the preparation of fiscal notes to “include estimated 
changes in economic output, employment, capital stock and tax revenues expected to result from enactment of the proposed 
legislation. Such analysis shall include behavioral assumptions regarding how consumers, businesses and other economic entities 
would be expected to react if the proposed legislation were to be enacted.” 
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estimates while simultaneously attempting to discredit and delegitimize the KLRD. Reliance on 
outside organizations for favorable estimate was necessary because the numbers being produced 
by the KLRD were based on the administration’s own numbers. The KLRD does not have the 
independent capacity to estimate the fiscal impacts associated with changes in a law, they must 
be directed by a lawmaker and provided numbers by different parts of the administration, namely 
the Department of Revenue and the Division of the Budget. The dynamically scored analysis 
Anderson claimed he would produce was purchased from one of the major dynamic scoring 
companies, which was never publicly released because the models’ fiscal estimates were so 
incoherent. Thus, it is difficult to determine exactly where the numbers Brownback released at 
the bill signing actually came from. 
However, other outside groups, namely the Kansas Policy Institute (KPI), produced and 
released dynamic analyses of Brownback’s tax cuts. The KPI used the KS-STAMP (Kansas State 
Analysis Modelling Program) model, developed by the Beacon Hill Institute, a free-market think 
tank located at Suffolk University (Davidson, Tuerck, Bachman, and Head 2012). The KPI ran 
two dynamic analyses, a “standard” model and a “pass-through model.”236 The KPI’s dynamic 
analysis dramatically reduced the size of the tax cut compared to the static forecast (Table 14). In 
the “standard” model, dynamic scoring reduced the overall cost of the tax cut by $533 million 
over six years compared to the KLRD estimate. The “pass-through” model reduced the cost of 
the tax cut even more, by $612 million over six years. Moreover, these models forecast job 
growth, population growth, and other metrics. For instance, in the “standard” model, the tax cuts 
were predicted to increase employment by 41,690, increase population by 34,907, increase 
wages by $364 a year, and increase disposable income by $1.8 billion. The “pass-through” 
                                                                   
236 The “standard” model applied to individuals while the “pass-through” model tried to capture the dynamic effects of the 
elimination of the income tax on pass-through businesses. The “pass-through” model was modelled as a corporate income tax cut.  
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model, likewise, predicted increased employment of 33,430, increased population to the state by 
28,516, gross wage growth of $277 and $1.6 billion in new disposable income. The numbers that 
Brownback released (22,900 new jobs, 35,740 new residents, and $2 billion in disposable 
income), while different, are very similar to the dynamic analysis produced by KPI. However, 
again, these were not official estimates and were not used in official state forecasts. Rather, many 
in the Brownback administration used these outside numbers to simultaneously bolster the tax 
plan and discredit official forecasters. 
 
Table 14 Static vs. Dynamic Scoring of the Kansas Tax Cuts 
 KLRD KPI Standard KPI Pass-through 
6-Year Total (4,539.1) (4,006.1) (3,927.4) 
Amount Above KLRD N/A $533.0 $611.8 
Source: Kansas Policy Institute, “A Thousand  Flowers Blooming,” 2017 
 
 
Consensus Revenue Estimates 
The battle over fiscal note estimates was only the start of an antagonistic relationship 
between supporters of the tax plan and official state forecasters. Once the KLRD determines the 
fiscal impact of a bill are determined, those estimates are incorporated into the larger forecast for 
the overall budget. Kansas generates state revenue forecasts through the Consensus Revenue 
Estimating Group (CRE), a group made up of representatives from the Department of Revenue, 
the Division of the Budget, the Legislative Research Department, as well as economists from 
Kansas State University, Wichita State University, and the University of Kansas. The activities 
of the CRE include what sociologist Werner Reichmann terms “epistemic participation,” 
meaning the CRE incorporates “knowledge about an object that aims at the object itself 
participating in the epistemic process” (2013:872-873). This group meets twice a year, first in 
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November to issue the fiscal year forecast, and again in April to revise the estimates. These 
meetings are private and not open to the public or subject to open records requests.    
Every state has a process to estimate expected tax revenue. Kansas forecasts ahead two 
years, while some states, such as Alaska, forecast up to a decade in advance (Reuben and 
Randall 2017). In general, there are three ways states estimate revenue: either the legislative and 
executive branches independently generate a revenue forecasts, a single state agency produces a 
forecast, or multiple agencies come to a consensus (Mikesell and Ross 2014:190-192). Twenty-
five states, including Kansas, use the consensus approach, which is what most experts 
recommend (McNichol 2014). The objective of the consensus approach is to “produce a single 
forecast that emerges from cooperative work between legislative and executive branches, thereby 
producing a reliable and accepted budget constraint for development and adoption of state 
expenditure programs” (Mikesell and Ross 2014:192). There is not a clear link between which 
process a state uses and its accuracy (Pew Center on the States and the Nelson A. Rockefeller 
Institute of Government 2011:5). However, often the consensus process is designed to shield the 
forecasting process from political interference.  
Revenue forecasting must strike a delicate balance. Since budgets are built on expected 
revenues, revenue forecasters face the dilemma of either issuing more conservative forecasts that 
underestimate the amount of expected revenue (which would make potential mid-year budget 
adjustments less painful), or more optimistic forecasts that allow lawmakers to appropriate more 
money to more parts of the budget. Overly optimistic forecasts, however, mean budget cuts are 
more drastic if revenues do not meet expectations. The professional norm among revenue 
forecasters is to forecast conservatively. In budget forecasting, politics is viewed as potentially 
biasing estimates since politicians are incentivized to push for more optimistic forecasts which 
182 
 
allow them to appropriate more money for electoral promises (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 
2013). This strategy is particularly prevalent with term-limited lawmakers in the legislative and 
executive branches (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2013:272). But overestimation is less common 
and state revenue forecasters tend to bias their forecasts downward (Mikesell and Ross 
2014:189). However, there are contextual factors that influence estimation. For instance, during 
recessions, states often overestimate. During the 1990-1992 recession, 25 percent of state 
forecasts were short by five percent or greater. However, by the Great Recession, 70 percent of 
state forecasts overestimated by five percent of higher (Pew Center on the States and the Nelson 
A. Rockefeller Institute of Government 2011:4) with the median overestimation at 10.2 percent 
(Pew Center on the States and the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government 2011:8).   
A consensus approach is largely designed to weaken the direct influence of political 
power on revenue forecasts. However, in some cases, as in Kansas, members of the estimating 
group are political appointees. In Kansas, the heads of the Department of Revenue and the 
Division of the Budget are both appointed by the governor. Thus, even a consensus revenue 
approach is never fully shielded from politics. Moreover, Brownback’s appointees for both 
Revenue (Nick Jordan) and the Budget (Anderson followed by Sullivan) were outspoken 
supporters of the tax cuts. By statute, only the head of the Research Department and the Budget 
have to come to consensus.237 While the proceedings of the CRE meetings are closed, apparently 
given the outcome, the Governor’s appointees secured unreasonably optimistic projections for 
the policy.  
 
Missed Projections 
                                                                   
237 Interview with Shawn Sullivan, conducted July 7, 2016 
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Starting with the November 2014 revenue estimation report, missed revenue projections 
became highly politicized. The November 2014 revenue estimate, released shortly after 
Brownback’s re-election, necessitated immediate action and in December, Brownback 
announced another round of budget cuts. These cuts pushed the current shortfall into the 
following fiscal year, making it easier to balance the current budget but increasing the deficit for 
the coming year, from $436 million to $648 million.  
Part of the reason for the missed revenue projections was Kansas’s new, unique tax 
structure. No state had exempted pass-through business income before which made estimating 
the effects of the policy challenging. As Nick Jordan told The Wall Street Journal, “Our out-year 
forecasts are pretty much guesses” (King Jr. and Peters 2013). This was confirmed in a 
November 2018 CRE memo (after the repeal of the tax cuts), which explained, “A recent 
analysis of tax year 2017 returns conducted by the Department of Revenue confirms that the 
restoration of the tax to non-wage business income is an important part of the story with respect 
to growth in this tax source that has occurred since FY 2017; just as the exemption of such 
income was the major reason receipts were not meeting expectations during the years it was in 
place. The analysis also confirmed that a large portion of the liability associated with taxing non-
wage income is coming from taxpayers in the recently restored upper income bracket” (Kansas 
Legislative Research Department 2018). Moreover, Raney Gilliland, Director of the Kansas 
Legislative Research Department, reported that revenue estimates during the tax cut years “did 
not accurately reflect reality” (Hancock 2018). He added, “We were significantly 
underestimating the tax policy changes. We do believe that the estimates for the impact of 2012 
tax law changes were understated” (Carpenter 2018). 
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Of course, the irony of missed revenue projections is that they are based on information 
provided by the Budget Director and the Department of Revenue. As former state budget director 
Duane Goossen wrote, “Nothing gets into the CRE without agreement from the governor’s 
budget director. Everything in the CRE is based on tax information brought by the Secretary of 
Revenue” (2016). This fact was also mentioned in the November 2012 CRE memo, where the 
consensus group noted “there is no evidence that the fiscal notes provided by the Department of 
Revenue at the time the legislation was enacted should be changed significantly relative to the 
short run or through the end of the current forecast period in FY 2014” (Kansas Legislative 
Research Department 2012b). Thus, the Brownback administration’s attacks on the revenue 
estimation process ignored, perhaps knowingly, the role of his own administration in producing 
the forecasts. Moreover, these revenue projections were made using static scoring. Had official 
state forecasted been producing with dynamic scoring, as the Brownback administration 
proposed, revenue forecasts would have been larger by hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Sociologist Jens Beckert (2016) notes that economic forecasting is not an exact science 
and precision is unlikely. However, the political expectation is that forecasts be at least 
“directionally correct, such that the revenues on balance are able to meet that expenditure 
commitment that is there and not have a chronic direction of either being over or under.”238 
During the period of the tax cuts, and particularly after the November 2014 memo, Kansas 
chronically underestimated revenue (see Figure 6). This meant Brownback had to balance the 
budget through a combination of cuts, fund transfers, and using cash reserves. Mid-year budget 
cuts particularly affected schools and universities while fund transfers came almost exclusively 
                                                                   
238 Interview with Steven Johnson conducted February 1, 2017 
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from the highway fund.239 Indeed, the governor transferred so much money out of the highway 
over the course of the tax cuts that the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT) was forced 
to delay or cancel several planned road work projects. For instance, in April 2016, KDOT either 
delayed or cancelled 25 projects through fiscal year 2019. “Previously-programmed 
modernization and expansion projects will be delayed until remaining State Highway Fund 
revenues allow or new money is made available,” KDOT said in the news release.240 Later that 
year, in November, KDOT announced the delay or cancellation of 24 more road projects (Shaar 
2016). Ten more delayed or cancelled projects were again announced in December (Moxley 
2016). Sweeps from the highway fund dramatically reduced KDOT’s ability to address the 
infrastructure needs of Kansas. According to testimony by Kansas Secretary of Transportation 
Richard Carlson, KDOT projected by fiscal year 2019 they would have enough funding to only 
repair 235 miles of road, a decrease from over 1,800 miles in fiscal year 2014. 
 
                                                                   
239 Fund sweeps were not the only fiscal consequences for KDOT or the highway fund. In 2015, the Brownback administration 
increased the amount of bonds KDOT could issue, and thus the amount of outstanding debt that KDOT could issue. Kansas then 
immediately sold $400 million in bonds which increased KDOT’s debt limit. Many critics saw this as using KDOT as a “credit 
card,” increasing debt at KDOT in order to keep sweeping funds from KDOT, thus balancing the budget and preserving the tax 
cuts.  
240 Kansas Department of Transportation. 2016. “KDOT to Delay Expansion, Modernization Projects” April 20 





Figure 6 Difference between Forecasted Revenue and Actual Revenue (Total Taxes Only ), FY 
12-17 
Source: Kansas Division of the Budget, State General Fund (SGF) Revenue Receipts  
 
For many in the state, missed revenue projections amplified the fiscal crisis. As Mike 
O’Neal told me, “Whatever their reasons… they’re being overly optimistic with the revenue 
projections and it’s making us look bad.”241 O’Neal continued, “[T]his month after month after 
month of the estimators missing that and missing it on the high side, it makes the state look 
terrible. Number one, at the very minimum, it makes our estimators look like idiots, and they’re 
not, by the way. But it also sends a message that there’s something fundamentally wrong in the 
state and we need to fix it when in fact if you look at the big picture we’re going, no, actually 
we’re growing. We’re just not growing at the pace that these estimators thought we would be 
growing.”242 For supporters of the tax cuts, missed revenue projections were undermining the 
rhetoric that the tax cuts were working. And a minority of conservative legislators suspected that 
                                                                   
241 Interview conducted October 21, 2016 


















































































































forecasters were purposefully underestimating revenue in order to sabotage the policy. 
Conservative senator Julia Lynn, for instance, suggested, “you’ve got some pretty good brain 
power in there [the CRE], but the estimates were always set too high. There were many of us 
who thought, after we kind of figured it out, that that was done on purpose, for political reasons 
because a lot of people didn’t like what our governor was doing.”243  
 
Media Coverage 
More common among supporters of the tax cuts than charges of conspiracy was 
frustration with media coverage of the missed monthly revenue projections. As Ty Masterson 
explained, “you hear this every month in the media, we missed our revenue projections. So the 
perception built in the public is that we’ve lost money.”244 Media coverage was indeed important 
to communicating the scope of the fiscal crisis. For instance, at the “Rally to Restore Revenue,” 
held in Lawrence,245 many attendees explained they got their information about the state budget 
from local news sources, such as the Lawrence Journal-World, Kansas Public Radio, and the 
Topeka Capital-Journal.246 While attendees were not necessarily representative of Kansans 
across the state, it still demonstrates the importance of media coverage to the salience of the 
fiscal crisis.247 
There was an unresolved tension in the Brownback administration’s relationship with the 
media. On one hand, media coverage was important for publicity. As Nick Jordan explained, 
“We’ve had a lot of articles in the Wall Street Journal about this tax policy—positive articles. 
                                                                   
243 Interview conducted February 20, 2017 
244 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
245 The rally was held March 25, 2017 
246 Some at the rally also indicated they received information about the state’s budget crisis directly from their senator and 
representative in the form of the lawmaker’s newsletter.  
247 Of course, the media was important to communicating the fiscal crisis and those at the rally were not there because of the 
media coverage. Those at the rally were primarily there because of a concern with what the tax cuts had done for school funding. 
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Forbes has done several articles—positive—about the tax policy. I know the governor has been 
on almost every one of the major networks in talk shows and stuff in New York and that area. So 
nationally we’ve gotten fairly good media coverage of the tax policy. Our state media has been 
more on the negative side, but nationally it’s been pretty good.”248 But the administration also 
blamed the media, primarily local media, for negative press coverage. This was particularly true 
of the coverage of missed monthly revenue projections. As Brownback lamented in an interview 
with The Kansas City Star, “I guess Missouri doesn’t even do a monthly [revenue projection] 
because I never see their numbers coming out on a monthly basis … and every month it’s a huge 
headline in The Kansas City Star about it’s off this much. Well, that has impact on people” 
(Lowry and Woodall 2016). While Brownback emphasized the negative coverage from The 
Kansas City Star, it was not only the newspaper critical of the governor. Indeed, as one journalist 
observed, “They [the Brownback administration] may be pissed off at the Capital-Journal, the 
Journal-World, the Kansas City Star,249 but those are not the only papers that are critical of the 
governor and particularly tax policy. If you look at some of the rural Western Kansas papers, 
they are far more aggressive. The Garden City paper, the Hutch250 paper and so on, they are 
brutal, and these are rural Kansas papers. They are brutal in their condemnation of the governor’s 
tax policy.”251  
Negative, “brutal,” coverage of the policy did have an effect. Clay Barker, executive 
director of the Kansas Republican Party, explained “A lot of Republicans pride themselves on 
                                                                   
248 Interview conducted March 29, 2016  
249 The Kansas City Star, in particular, drew the ire and condemnation of many in the Brownback administration. The Kansas 
City Star, along with The Wichita Eagle, are owned by the same company, McClatchy. Some members of Brownback's 
administration suggested that the negative media attention that the McClatchy papers were giving Brownback stemmed from 
Brownback’s anti-LGTBQ views. Kevin McClatchy, CEO of McClatchy, came out as gay in a 2012 New York Times interview. 
For some in Brownback’s administration, McClatchy’s sexual orientation biased his view of everything Brownback did, 
including the tax cuts. 
250 Hutchinson, Kansas 
251 Interview conducted May 20, 2016 
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fiscal policy management. It makes them feel uncomfortable when they keep seeing the report, 
revenue estimate and revenue didn't match,” (Associated Press 2016a). Barker’s perspective was 
complimented by Republican Jim Eschrich, who testified that “the public’s perception, right or 
wrong, is that the state’s finances are in serious trouble.”252 Eschrich urged lawmakers to close 
the pass-through exemption for political reasons, in order to preserve a Republican majority in 
Topeka. “I want to assure everyone on the committee I do not make this recommendation 
lightly,” Eschrich continued. “I have pass through income, so depending on how you close the 
loophole I may end paying state income taxes. I’m okay with that added burden if it helps steady 
an antsy electorate and preserves the Republican Party’s legislative influence in Topeka.” 
Eschrich’s prediction about Kansas Republicans “reaping the whirlwind” of the upcoming 
elections turned out to be exceedingly accurate.253  
To curb negative coverage of the tax policy, and thus change public perception, 
Brownback met with newspaper editors around Kansas. As one journalist recounted, Brownback 
“met with [the editor] to talk about tax policy for this specific thing, to explain to him that the tax 
policy is working and here are the documents and here are the charts that show it’s all 
working.”254 Veteran political reporter Peter Hancock of the Lawrence Journal-World recounted 
a similar meeting with the governor (Hancock 2016d). In these meetings, Brownback attempted 
to shift attention away from the tax policy and toward what he regarded as the real cause of the 
budget crisis: unfavorable economic conditions. But Brownback was not alone in diverting 
blame away from the policy. Tax cut supporters made similar claims about the cause of Kansas’s 
                                                                   
252 Testimony given March 15, 2016 to the House Taxation Committee 
253 Eschrich’s later actions, however, cast a certain degree of doubt on his sincerity to roll back the tax cuts. In 2017, Eschrich 
filed to run against moderate Republican Tom Cox. Eschrich, who would be unsuccessful in his campaign, decided to run to 
unseat Cox because “[Cox] actually voted for the single largest tax increase in our state’s history and Medicaid eligibility 
expansion, the latter requiring still another tax increase” (Senter 20170. 
254 Interview conducted May 20, 2016 
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budget woes in editorials and op-eds, in online newspaper comment sections, on Twitter, and in 
blog posts. For instance, Stephen Moore of the Heritage Foundation (who also had input on the 
development of the Kansas tax cuts), wrote an editorial in The Kansas City Star refuting a 
critical analysis of the tax cuts by Paul Krugman. The Star published Moore’s column until 
another editor, Yael Abouhalkah, noted discrepancies in Moore’s data. In response, the Star 
issued a correction and vowed never to publish anything from Stephen Moore again (Lee 2014).  
Of course, for Brownback and other conservatives, the mainstream media is already 
perceived as unfair to conservatives. And Brownback’s allies believed the media was particularly 
unfair to him. Senator Ty Masterson, complained, “The media, for whatever reason, they hate 
Brownback, sure seem to. He can’t get a positive story to save his life.”255 Likewise, Mike 
O’Neal said, “And our governor, bless his heart, good man, heart’s in the right place, poor 
messaging. He got behind the messaging early on and just can’t catch a break. He’ll literally 
absolutely try to get out there. He’ll have charts and graphs. And the media just doesn’t like him, 
just doesn’t like him. Part of that is Sam’s own fault and part of it is maybe not the best 
messaging strategy or initiative or whatever.”256 Likewise, Brownback’s former Budget Director, 
Steve Anderson, blamed the media for unfair coverage of the policy, testifying “Every time a bill 
like this gets traction the media sends out a ‘tax cuts aren’t working’ message that we would be 
naïve to believe is not heard by both existing businesses thinking of expanding in Kansas and 
those pondering a potential move to the state.”257 
In addition to efforts to manage public perceptions through the media, Brownback also 
convened a task force to examine how to “reform” the revenue estimation process. The taskforce 
                                                                   
255 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
256 Interview conducted October 21, 2016 
257 Testimony given to Senate Assessment and Taxation Committee, March 12, 2015 
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consisted of representatives from private sector organizations who were tasked with evaluating 
and recommending improvements to the revenue estimating process. The task force’s final 
report, released October 2016, contained a number of policy recommendations, such as changing 
the composition of the CRE, investing in new software, and utilizing different statistical methods 
like time series or causal models. However, the committee also recommended ending the 
monthly reporting of revenue collection. The official reason the task force gave was to “avoid 
trend analysis bias in revising future official estimates.”258 However, it was also meant to 
eliminate negative media coverage.  
To date, though, the task force’s recommendations have not been adopted. Had 
Brownback decided to stop issuing monthly revenue estimating reports, it would not have been 
the first economic report he withheld. It is unusual for state governors to have a council of 
economic advisers, yet in 2010 Brownback created one with the mission to coordinate strategic 
planning and economic development resources, evaluate state policies and agency performances 
and conduct research on economic development-related topics, such as state, tax competitiveness 
and regulatory structure.259 Part of the council’s task was producing quarterly economic reports 
about the Kansas’s economy. However, in 2015 as the fiscal crisis worsened, the council stopped 
putting these reports online (though they were still produced for the administration). But by 
September 2016, the council stopped producing these reports altogether (Carpenter 2016).  
Brownback and his allies insisted the tax policy was not responsible for the state’s 
financial woes. Rather, they believed the tax policy was the victim of poor media coverage and a 
poor economic climate. As Nick Jordan explained, media coverage is generally “a snapshot,” 
                                                                   
258 Governor’s Consensus Revenue Estimating Working Group Final Recommendations, Final Report, October 6, 2016, P. 6 
(https://budget.kansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/fy2017-cons-rev-est-workgroup-rpt.pdf). 
259 The council of economic advisors was designed to replace “Kansas, Inc.,” a nonpartisan state agency created in 1986 to 
“strategically build a strong, diversified economy promoting new and existing industries” (Kansas Historical Society n.d.). 
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meaning it does not capture the long-term fluctuation in revenue over time. “My point being,” he 
said, “when you look month to month you go, oh my god, they’re under again, oh my god, 
they’re under, but when you look at the end of the year you’re going to find out, well, they were 
probably within a percent or less than what they had forecast. Now, there are years it’s been 
worse than that, that we’ve missed it worse than that, and the reason I say that is… sometimes 
it’s an economic situation.”260 Mike O’Neal echoed this point, saying “the Governor’s Task 
Force said, well, quit doing these monthly reports, and, of course, the first thing the media thinks 
of is what are they hiding? Why wouldn’t you tell us what the monthly reports are? Well, the 
monthly reports are meaningless, because they’re just a one-month snapshot.”261 According to 
conservatives, media reporting on missed revenue projections not only created an “unnecessary” 




Discrediting the revenue forecasting process and withholding economic reports could 
only go so far. Eventually, the Brownback administration had to explain why chronic budget 
shortfalls were not the result of the tax cuts. At the heart of the Brownback administration’s 
attempts to divert blame away from the tax cuts were a variety of techniques and arguments that 
muddled the search for an answer to the question, “Why don’t we have any money?” Did Kansas 
not have sufficient money for essential public services because of the tax cuts or, as the 
Brownback administration claimed, was the state was in difficult financial straits because of 
outside economic forces?  
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Affirming the Policy, Abandoning the Time Frame 
One of the rhetorical techniques Brownback and his allies used to divert blame away 
from the tax cuts was to simply double-down on claims that the tax cuts were working. For 
instance, Brownback claimed, “Our objective on that piece of the tax cuts worked… Record 
small business formation when it was declining nationwide” (Hancock 2017e). Fellow 
conservatives in the House and Senate also insisted on the success of the policy. Conservative 
Representative Kasha Kelley declared “this is not a tax plan that has failed. This is a tax plan that 
is taking some time to take root, as all new things do” (Hancock 2015e). And former chair of the 
senate taxation committee, Les Donovan, was still sure the tax plan would work eventually, “but 
it doesn’t happen as fast as you all would like to see it. Never has; never will” (Hancock 2015c). 
And Ty Masterson summarized the success of the policy by explaining “If the experiment was to 
leave more money with the people it’s clearly worked. If the experiment was to grow 
government it clearly hasn’t… And I would contend the purpose was not to grow 
government.”262 
Affirming the policy often involved clarifying how the policy was working. Supporters 
claimed the policy was “hobbled by a misunderstanding of what the tax cuts were trying to 
accomplish” (Boyes and Slivinski 2017, emphasis mine). They claimed the policy was about job 
growth, not overall fiscal stability.263 However, many of these claims were false or misleading. 
As mentioned previously, the number of new businesses were likely the product of tax avoidance 
measures. However, claims of record job growth were also false. The rate of job growth in 
                                                                   
262 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
263 Some supporters of the tax cuts did use growing tax revenues as evidence of the tax plan’s supply-side effects. Tax revenues 
fell over $700 million in the first year after the tax cuts were passed. Tax revenues did gradually increase, but stayed well below 
where they were pre-2012.  
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Kansas lagged other states in the region and its labor force participation also did not increase 
(Mazerov 2018). 
Conservative advocacy groups, such as the Kansas Policy Institute and the Kansas 
Chamber of Commerce, claimed the policy was a success. In a March 2015 testimony, Eric 
Stafford of the Kansas Chamber testified that “The tax cuts passed by the legislature are 
working…. We respectfully ask the legislature to fully consider a balanced budget based on 
existing resources before resorting to increasing the burden on Kansas taxpayers.”264 The KPI 
also asserted the policy success in committee testimonies, but also expanded its reach online. In a 
series of blog posts, it sought to refute and discredit the claims of tax cut opponents. One such 
instance is a blog post from October 20, 2014 titled “Debunking distorted claims about tax 
reform and the Kansas budget” which claims to refute the “most egregiously misleading claims” 
of tax cut opponents by discrediting opponent’s methods and presenting various data from the 
U.S. Census to support their conclusions (Kansas Policy Institute 2014).  
Affirming the Kansas policy as a successful model for other states and the national 
government was exceptionally important for the tax cut movement. Arthur Laffer and Stephen 
Moore not only defended the Kansas tax plan (which they both helped advise), but claimed the 
plan was delivering “sweet supply-side revenge for tax cutters” (Laffer and Moore 2016). 
“Superman, Wyatt Earp and Dorothy are cheering like mad in heaven” because of the tax 
reforms, they insisted. “Just wait and see what happens when these pro-growth policies have had 
sufficient time to have their full supply-side effects materialize” (Laffer and Moore 2016). In 
private conversations, Laffer preached patience as well. According to the Washington Post, 
Brownback called Laffer worried about whether the tax cuts were performing as expected. Laffer 
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counseled Brownback to be patient and the growth will come. “Kansas is doing just fine,” he 
said (Tankersley 2015).  
Brownback’s past statements, particularly his use of the word “experiment,” became an 
obstacle for supporters. Indeed, he expressed regret at using the term “experiment” to describe 
the tax policy. “I wish I could take that back, because I don’t consider this an experiment” 
(Goldfarb 2014). Additionally, in an interview with PBS Newshour, Brownback remarked, 
“Yeah, I shouldn't have used that word [experiment]. But the good news is, it's working well” 
(Benen 2014). Brownback’s “shot of adrenaline” comment likewise backfired. When the tax cuts 
failed to produce immediate economic growth, in order to affirm the policy was working, tax cut 
supporters dramatically shifted their time horizons. Instead of a “shot of adrenaline,” supporters 
argued it would take decades for the tax cuts to produce growth. Budget director Shawn Sullivan, 
for instance, explained, “this is more of a long-term deal or investment.”265 Likewise, Dave 
Trabert argued, “There’s an economic lifecycle. It doesn’t happen overnight. Politicians might 
wish that it would be a shot of adrenaline. In terms of enthusiasm, I’d need to start thinking about 
things differently, sure, but is it going to show up on the job reports? No, not right away. It’s 
going to take years—years! Bad messaging, bad, bad messaging.”266 And Mike O’Neal was even 
more pointed, saying “Shame on the governor for saying this will be a shot of adrenaline to the 
Kansas economy… You can turn your car in a pretty tight radius. You can’t turn an aircraft 
carrier in a real tight radius. It just takes longer. This is a big machine we’re talking about here 
and for us to get this economy turned around where it needs to go this is not going to take days 
or weeks or months, it’s going to take years.”267 
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The most sustained attempt at affirming the policy is found in a KPI report titled “A 
Thousand Flowers Blooming.” In it, the authors suggest that “in tax policy, patience is a virtue. It 
can take upwards of five years for tax policy’s effects to be fully seen” (Boyes and Slivinski 
2017:4). While the report was released nearly five years after the policy was enacted, the authors 
try to salvage the policy by arguing policymakers were measuring its impacts incorrectly. The 
reason the tax cuts had not produced the expected job growth, particularly from pass-through 
businesses, was because job growth was being measured with Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
data and not Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) statistics. However, as former Republican 
representative Mark Hutton pointed out, this is essentially a meaningless distinction because 
there is “no perceptible change in employment trends” between the two sources. 268 However, 
setting aside whether BLS or BEA statistics are more reliable, what this technique accomplishes 
politically is to introduce confusion and delay political judgement on the policy. 
 
Blaming Outside Economic Forces 
Another technique Brownback and his allies used to divert blame away from the tax 
policy was to cast the policy as a victim of a bad economy. “You recall the comment about the 
Kansas economy is a three-legged stool,” Brownback explained. “You’ve got agriculture, oil and 
gas, and aviation… So your three primary legs of the Kansas economy have been in great 
difficulty all together.” (Hancock 2016e).269 Budget Director Shawn Sullivan echoed the three-
legged stool metaphor as well, saying “[Farm income and oil and gas] are two sectors we rely 
heavily on… and both are in a significant downturn. Then aviation is kind of our third rail… So 
                                                                   
268 Testimony given to the House Taxation Committee, January 19, 2017 
269 Brownback repeated this again, saying, “The base of the Kansas economy is the old three-legged stool, and that continues to 
be the base of the economy. And that base has really been struggling,” (Hancock 2016f). 
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we’re in a significant challenge because of those three things.”270 The Brownback administration 
invoked the state’s economic conditions whenever there was bad budgetary, particularly when 
Moody’s and S&P downgraded Kansas’s credit rating in 2014 and 2016. After one downgrade, 
Brownback said, “We've got a lot of financial strain that's going to be continuing just because of 
oil and gas, and agriculture in particular” (Hancock 2016g). Likewise, Secretary of Revenue 
Nick Jordan argued it was “pretty obvious that it’s oil and ag economies. Those people, they 
aren’t working. They’re being laid off or their profits are down” (Associated Press 2016b). 
It is true that oil and gas, as well as agricultural commodity prices, have declined in 
recent years. For instance, in 2011, Kansas farmers received $7.03 for a bushel of wheat. By 
2016, that price had declined to $3.20 (Institute for Policy and Social Research 2017:55). 
Likewise, the overall number of barrels of oil produced in Kansas declined from 43,750,558 in 
2012 to 37,939,713 by 2016 (Institute for Policy and Social Research 2017:267). However, taken 
together these two industries are only a small share of the overall Kansas economy and thus 
contribute only a small portion to the state’s general fund. In fiscal year 2012, revenue from oil 
and gas was only 1.7 percent of all tax receipts and just 3.8 percent of all excise tax receipts 
(Kansas Legislative Research Department 2013). Additionally, analysts for Moody’s indicated 
they did not consider Kansas’ economy to be “energy reliant” (Hancock 2016e). 
Yet party experts invoked dynamic scoring to claim reduced commodity prices produced 
larger negative effects on the budget. For instance, a Kansas Department of Revenue economist 
explained, “You have to consider dynamic effects. How is a person going to react with less 
money in their pocket? How is that going to affect a consumer’s behavior? And when we say 
that, that’s what we’re speaking of when we talk about oil and gas hurting, is that obviously 
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we’ll see decreased severance taxes, but it also does not help in terms of income taxes, it does 
not help in terms of sales taxes, because simply those workers will have less money to spend.”271 
All of this is, no doubt, true. Reduced commodity prices do create ripple effects through the 
whole economy. However, as former budget director Duane Goossen explained, “The income 
that people are making from farms, it’s not so much the recession that’s pulling things down, 
because that income is exempted anyway. All farm income, no income tax on it, and many, many 
agriculture-related businesses that feed off of farm economy stuff are set up as LLCs or in some 
way structured so that the income coming through those things and passing through to 
individuals is not taxed.”272 In other words, declining farm commodity prices were irrelevant to 
the state’s overall budget because farm income had already been exempted from income tax. But 
the search for alternative explanations for the budget crisis was driven by confidence in supply-
side theory. As the same Department of Revenue economist explained, “Think about the theory. 
Tax policy is not supposed to hurt. Lowering taxes isn’t supposed to hurt anyone. So the theory 
says that in no way, shape or form are tax cuts going to impede growth. So if growth is slowing 
down, what effects could be lurking that are stunting our potential growth?”273 In other words, if 
supply-side theory states that tax cuts in no way could impede economic growth, the cause of 
problem must lie elsewhere.   
Articulating a divide between supply-side theory and a specific tax policy deemphasizes 
the policy. Brownback and his allies spent years predicting immediate and explosive growth, but 
as the fiscal crisis continued, supporters changed tact and began to describe the relative weakness 
of tax policy in the face of economic forces. According to Stephen Moore, tax cuts “don’t have 
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magical powers” (Sheppard 2014). And Arthur Laffer also claimed that “taxes are not 100 
percent of everything” (Curry 2017). By deemphasizing the policy and highlighting economic 
forces, party experts protected the underlying supply-side idea. It was important for supporters to 
cast the policy as a victim of “abnormal” economic conditions because, as Brownback explained, 
the theory stated “if you get a kind of normal economic situation, that as you cut income taxes, 
you’ll gain it back in sales. That was the theory” (Hancock 2016d). The tax cuts were not to 
blame, rather the state was the victim of economic circumstances beyond its control.  
 
“We Do Not Have a Revenue Problem, We Have a Spending Problem” 
 Finally, supporters of the tax cuts highlighted unrestrained government spending as the 
true cause of Kansas’s budget crisis. As KPI’s Dave Trabert explained, “Kansas has a budget 
problem because you can’t have a conservative tax plan and a liberal spending plan. That’s it in a 
nutshell.”274 Blaming unchecked government spending dovetailed with the related argument that 
the tax policy was not what Brownback had originally intended. According to supporters, the 
original tax policy was revenue neutral because it included a variety of “pay fors” which were 
eliminated by moderate Republicans during the 2012 session. Put simply, Kansas would not be 
in a budget crisis if spending had been cut to match lower revenues. This argument was summed 
up in the oft-repeated phrase that the state “does not have a revenue problem, it has a spending 
problem.” Conservatives have long condemned the size of government. However, in the context 
of the state’s fiscal crisis, this refrain became an explanation for the policy’s outcome. As 
Jonathan Williams of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) wrote, the true 
problem with Kansas was “the failure to rein in state spending that would ultimately lead to 
                                                                   
274 Interview conducted April 20, 2016 
200 
 
revenue problems for Kansas down the road” (Williams and Wilterdink 2017:4). However, 
according to supply-side theory, Kansas should have seen increased tax revenues after the tax 
cuts were enacted. Indeed, Brownback initially described the tax plan as “close to revenue 
neutral” despite projections showing otherwise (Associated Press 2012d).  
As lawmakers struggled to balance the budget, conservative Republicans, collectively 
assembled as the “Kansas Truth Caucus,” increasingly asserted spending should be cut before 
any tax increases were considered. For instance, in response to an early 2017 bill to repeal 
Brownback’s tax cuts (a bill he later vetoed), the Kansas Truth Caucus stated, “This week, liberal 
Republicans275 and Democrats, voted to raise taxes on hard-working Kansans who are already 
struggling to make ends meet… Instead of living with its means, the Kansas Legislature, decided 
to pass the largest tax increase in state history… Raising taxes without any real effort to reduce 
spending is counter not only to Republican principles, but also to common sense” (Kansas Truth 
Caucus 2017a). Likewise, conservative Senator and Truth Caucus member Ty Masterson 
explained, “When people talk about currently the budget crisis of the state being related to this 
massive tax cut, well, it’s a crisis to the government, but it’s not a crisis to its people. So when 
they say, ‘Kansas is in a budget crisis,’ you’re not talking about Kansans, the people, you’re 
talking about Kansas, the government… As long as you match your revenues and expenditures – 
that’s what the crisis is, is making sure those two sides match.”276  
 While the Truth Caucus’ claim is perhaps actuarially true, in practice it ignores that 
Kansas did cut spending dramatically after the Great Recession. For instance, after the recession, 
Governor Parkinson made approximately $1 billion in budget cuts and Brownback issued nine 
                                                                   
275 The phrase “liberal Republican” is a key misnomer because it echoes, but goes beyond, another common phrase, RINO 
(Republican in Name Only). Many of the moderate Republicans were labelled RINOs or liberal Republicans by conservatives. 
Some of the conservative’s suspicions were confirmed in early 2019 when several moderate Republicans, chiefly senator Barbara 
Bollier and representative Stephanie Clayton switched from the GOP to the Democratic Party  
276 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
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rounds of budget cuts between May 2011 and June 2016. Furthermore, state general fund 
expenditures only increased 0.3 percent between FY 2012 and FY 2016 (Mazerov 2018). 
However, conservatives charged the budget crisis was driven by lack of political will. According 
to Dave Trabert, “the budget deficit means we want to spend more than our revenue is going to 
be. That’s a budget deficit. I want to spend more. Be honest with people. Just be honest. I want to 
spend more.”277 Likewise, Steve Anderson, former budget director, testified that “Spending must 
be reduced to levels that are in line with the resources available.”278 And the Kansas Chamber 
testified, “The Kansas Chamber remains a strong advocate of the tax cuts passed by the 
legislature and supports efforts to continue with statutory reductions in income taxes. 
Unfortunately, the tax cuts of 2012 and 2013 were not accompanied by sufficient reductions in 
government spending which resulted in the draw-down of cash reserves and a budget deficit next 
fiscal year.”279 This point, however, belies the supply-side justification that tax cuts “pay for 
themselves.” More cynically, blaming government spending is about “starving the beast,” an 
approach made famous by Grover Norquist who remarked that he did not hate government, he 
just wanted to shrink it to the size where he could “drown it in a bathtub.”   
 State governments are legally required to balance their budgets. While Kansas did cut 
spending, ultimately tax increases were needed to balance the budget. The intra-party battle 
between cutting spending and balancing the budget played out most dramatically during the 2015 
legislative session, which, at 113 days, is the longest in state history. The large downward 
revenue forecast in November 2014 put the conservative-dominated legislature in a structural 
bind. How much could the budget be cut without raising taxes? And if taxes had to be increased, 
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which taxes? To escape this contradiction, the Brownback administration justified ex post facto a 
shift from taxes on production towards taxes on consumption.280 In his 2015 budget, Brownback 
signaled that Kansas “will continue our march to zero income taxes. Because the states with no 
income tax consistently grow faster than those with high income taxes.”281 However, 
Brownback’s proposed budget also called for dramatic tax increases on cigarettes (from 79 cents 
to $2.29 a pack) and liquor (from 8 percent to 12 percent).  
Brownback’s anti-tax allies were unimpressed. His former budget director, Steve 
Anderson, testified against the governor, saying “First, we should look at cutting spending” 
(Associated Press 2015d).282 Grover Norquist also remarked, “The fact is, so called ‘sin taxes’ 
like the cigarette tax and alcohol tax disproportionately impact consumers who can afford the tax 
increase least” (Shorman 2015b). Norquist is not wrong on this point. Sales tax generally, and sin 
taxes specifically, are regressive and target those with the least disposable income. However, 
Brownback defended the tax increase on the grounds that sales taxes allowed consumers to 
exercise choice. His spokesperson, Eileen Hawley, remarked their “approach for the budget is 
philosophically aligned with what the governor has said before, that Kansas will be a low-
income tax state. In the long-term, consumption taxes are a better, more reliable option than 
income taxes and the governor will continue the transition from a tax on productivity to 
consumption taxes. Sales taxes remain the one tax that people have the most control over, 
choosing how and when to spend their money” (Shorman 2015b). And Secretary of Revenue 
Nick Jordan said “You can't get out of a tax on productivity, but you can on consumption… You 
                                                                   
280 There is evidence Brownback’s discourse shifted to talking about “production” and “consumption” taxes as early as 2013. 
Brownback was quoted in February 2013, saying “Going from a slow growth to pro-growth state involves tax policy that is 
difficult. You’re moving really from taxing the production side of the equation to the consumption side of the equation, and that 
is difficult,” (Rothschild 2013b). This quote, however, was made in the context of proposing to make Parkinson’s sales tax 
increases permanent.  
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can decide how you're going to spend your money and what you're going to spend it on” 
(Associated Press 2015e).  
However, as the former budget director Duane Goossen noted, “people don’t have a 
choice on whether to buy food, and people don’t have a choice on whether to buy basic 
necessities, and all those things are subject to a sales tax right now, which is why this gets lower-
income people much harder.”283 Economic studies confirmed higher sales taxes, especially on 
groceries, incentivized Kansans who live on the border to make more purchases in neighboring 
states. A one percent increase in the difference in sales tax on food was associated with a $101 
per person per year decline in food consumption, costing the state $345 million in forfeited tx 
revenue (Srithongrung 2016). Republicans did increase sales tax during the 2015 legislative 
session, from 6.15 percent to 6.5 percent. To save face, Brownback reckoned, “Some would have 
you believe this bill represents a tax increase, and that is not accurate. When looked at in totality, 
from 2012 to 2015, as I stated at the outset, Kansans are paying less in taxes and continue to 
move off of income taxes to consumption-based taxes” (Hancock 2015d).284  
 
Counter-Voices 
 A coalition of moderate counter-voices emerged in response to efforts by conservatives to 
divert attention away from the tax cuts. This coalition, comprised of various public sector and 
industry groups, assigned blame for Kansas’s budget crisis solely to the tax cuts. The 
administration’s blame diverting techniques were meant to safeguard the income tax cuts from 
repeal by limiting the range of options available to lawmakers for addressing the budget crisis. In 
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284 Brownback’s 2015 statement here echoes his statement from 2013 when the legislature also raised sales taxes. After 
Brownback signed the law that permanently set the sales tax rate at 6.15 percent, Brownback, trying to quell dissent in the 
conservative ranks, declared the sales tax increase was still “an absolute tax cut” (Rothschild 2013c).  
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other words, if the administration could convince legislators that Kansas really did have a 
spending problem, then the policy solutions would avoid repeal. This became clear during a 
tense 2015 Republican caucus meeting where budget director Shawn Sullivan gave lawmakers 
three options for balancing the budget: the governor could veto the entire budget, he could line-
item veto certain items in the budget, or he could issue allotments. All three options were 
“horrible” Sullivan said (Lowry 2015c).  
 In response, various groups such as the Kansas Center for Economic Growth (KCEG), 
Kansas Action for Children (KAC), the Contractor’s Association, and Kansas National 
Education Association (KNEA), American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and Kansas 
Organization of State Employees “came together and said there’s a fourth option here that 
nobody is talking about, and that’s repeal the Brownback tax plan.”285 The “Option Four” 
coalition was led primarily by the KCEG. Founded in January 2013 after the tax cuts had passed, 
the KCEG acted as an ideological counterweight to groups like the Kansas Policy Institute. The 
former head of KCEG explained, “There wasn’t a counter-voice, a true counter-voice to Kansas 
Policy Institute or other proponents of the march to zero.”286 Duane Goossen, also of the KCEG, 
explained that “KPI and others are telling a different story, and certainly the Department of 
Revenue when they say the story is oil prices are down and it’s Obama who has killed the 
economy which has then affected Kansas, that’s a different narrative which we try to punch holes 
in and say, no, it’s not, that’s not how it happened, that’s not what’s going on here.”287 
 Groups like the KCEG shaped another story about the Kansas tax cuts through testimony 
in House and Senate committees, in reports and blog posts, and in presentations in communities 
                                                                   
285 Interview with Heidi Holliday conducted October 5, 2017 
286 Interview conducted February 25, 2016. 
287 Interview conducted July 21, 2016 
205 
 
across the state.288 As Annie McKay explained, the KCEG had “a three-pronged approach, which 
was continuing to work at the statehouse and producing research and analysis, but getting out on 
the road and kind of building those bases out around the state… I’ve spent a lot of time on the 
road in the last three years.”289 Among moderate legislators (Republican and Democrat), the 
KCEG was an invaluable resource. For instance, Democratic representative Monica Murnan said 
“I cannot stress enough – stress, stress, stress, stress – the importance of the Kansas Center for 
Economic Growth and their part in changing the tide.”290 But even more than providing 
information for lawmakers, getting everyday Kansans involved and educated about state 
government was critical for building support for repeal. For McKay, public ambivalence around 
tax issues was part of how the policy was passed in the first place: “One of the reasons why this 
sailed through in 2012 and to some extent was greased in 2013 was because we didn’t have 
enough people participating in the conversation… So, we just started talking about it in ways, I 
think, that made it very plain, very easily accessible for folks, and you slowly started seeing 
people catch on and talking about it in ways that they hadn’t before.”291 In other words, a deficit 
of fiscal citizenship prepared the ground for the Brownback tax cuts.  
 Another organization, Game On for Kansas Schools, also formed with the purpose of 
providing information on school funding to counter KPI’s information.292 “To me, very clearly, 
there was a game being played, but we just weren’t fielding a team,” Deedy explained. “At that 
point, Kansas Policy Institute were very active. They were running ads in newspapers with 
                                                                   
288 During Brownback’s tenure, politically moderate organizations began to hold numerous events around the state. Many of 
these events involved several of the same groups, such as the MainStream Coalition, KCEG, Kansas InterFaith Action, Women 
For Kansas, as well as others.  
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292 In a symbolic victory, Deedy described, “Our first walk, Heather was mentally and emotionally drained and the weather had 
stunk, it was like freezing rain and her feet were killing her. And on the last day of her walk, I was texting her as our Facebook 
likes passed Kansas Policy Institute’s Facebook likes.” 
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distorted statistics on school testing… We were trying to push back with accurate 
information.”293 Similar to KCEG, Game On also travelled around Kansas giving presentations 
to local school boards and communities. As their reputation grew they were invited to site 
council meetings and engaged directly with communities. Deedy recalled, “The superintendent 
had us out to Pratt, so we visited Pratt and talked to that community and went to the rotary club 
meeting at noon, and spoke to school board members in the evening and the community after 
that. So we just did a number of things like that. And we just continued to push back against the 
spin that was coming out of Topeka and just trying to encourage parents to be active 
participants… Then we started lobbying and testifying directly on bills.”294  
 In addition to meetings with legislators, testifying, and travelling around the state, groups 
like the KCEG and Game On were also a resource for the media.295 The Brownback 
administration became infamous for its lack of transparency. Indeed, a series of reports about the 
secretiveness of the Kansas government netted the Kansas City Star a series of industry 
awards.296 In reflecting on covering Brownback, one reporter explained, “Mostly what I get fired 
up about is not necessarily the policy but the misdirection, the concealment, the lack of 
transparency in exactly what they’re cooking up...”297 As the Brownback administration 
concealed reports and obfuscated the political process, groups like the KCEG became important 
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audience.”  
296 The series won, among others, an Eppy, the “First Amendment” category of the national Associated Press Media Editors 
(APME), and was a finalist for a Pulitzer prize.  
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resources for reporters. As the former head of the KCEG explained, “If you go back to 2012 and 
you look at the conversation in the statehouse press corps amongst media about what the 
proposal was, it was not widely understood… But you didn’t have media saying ‘boy, that 
sounds a little like over-promising,’ or ‘I’m going to need you to show me the numbers on this.’ 
And three years later you have statehouse press corps that the moment the revenue numbers 
come out, they are pulling it apart. Oftentimes they’re texting me saying, ‘Do you have it yet? 
We want to see it,’ or ‘Have you seen the spreadsheet yet?’ They’re trained to get on this 
stuff.”298 
 Counter-voices both amplified and provided evidence for the perspective that the tax cuts 
were to blame for the state’s fiscal crisis. Counter-voices also helped foster a more critical media 
in the state.299 As Annie McKay explained, “in effect this failed experiment has also created a 
whole new set of voices, beyond the Kansas Center for Economic Growth. It’s created a whole 
new set of voices and trained individuals to pore over and scrutinize the evidence as it comes out. 
I think, whether it be this policy or any policy, it’s actually done a great deal for transparency 
and for bringing more information out into the light of day and helping not just policymakers but 
I think Kansans make more informed decisions.”300 Counter-voice groups provided the media 
and the general public with explanations for the fiscal crisis when the Brownback administration 
provided only obfuscation. 
                                                                   
298 Interview conducted February 25, 2016 
299 Conservatives, such as Ty Masterson, lamented that “Kansas still has old-school media: your local paper, your evening news. 
It is not as prolific with the alternative sources of information as some of the rest of us. So you have those dominant media 
sources, and, to give some credit, they don’t particularly know either. They’re reading somebody’s version of what happened.” In 
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explain The Sentinel, one of the first Kansas-specific “alternative news” sources that began in January 2017. Founded by the 
Kansas Policy Institute, The Sentinel claims it “examines statements from state and local government officials and mainstream 
media outlets, providing supplemental information so that readers are better able to make their own informed decisions about 
matters of public policy.” But it primarily is about rooting out what they see as bias in mainstream media reporting. 




Lawmaker’s Decision-Making Processes and the Search for Honest Answers  
Counter-voices, particularly in legislative committees, provided valuable information for 
lawmakers that they may not otherwise have had access to. In other words, counter-voices 
increased lawmakers’ range of options for addressing the fiscal crisis. However, this also created 
a dilemma: lawmakers were now hearing opposing claims about the tax cuts. One side was 
providing evidence that the tax cuts were not working and were solely responsible for the fiscal 
crisis. The other side provided evidence that the tax cuts were working, but the state’s budget 
crisis was the result of outside economic forces or unrestrained spending. Lawmakers in Kansas, 
as in many other states, are part-time citizen legislators, meaning they are not professional 
politicians. Lawmakers are also usually not experts in a given area, particularly on tax. Thus, in a 
context of competing claims, how do lawmakers search for “honest answers?” 
 
Committees and Testimonies 
 Committees are an important part of the legislative and policymaking process. Committee 
hearings, in particular, are key sources of information for lawmakers (Burstein 2014:135). As 
Baumgartner and Jones explain, “While there are other avenues of access for information and 
ideas to enter the legislative process… committees remain the major institution for bringing 
information to bear on lawmaking matters” (2015:88). Moreover, information provided through 
testimonies “does indeed affect enactment” of a policy (Burstein 2014:158). In short, a 
legislative committee, while certainly not the only method lawmakers gain information, “remains 
the lynchpin” of lawmaking in legislatures (Baumgartner and Jones 2015:88). The role of 
information in committees has received little sociological attention until recently. Sociologist 
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Paul Burstein’s analysis of the impact of testimony on policy enactment is, as he claims, “the 
first study of information provided at hearings” (2014:158). However, opening the black box of 
committees can help political sociologists understand how lawmakers use resources and make 
decisions. Burstein encourages future researchers to address “more about how legislators acquire 
information… and what types of information matter most” (2014:158). In this section, I take up 
this goal and examine how lawmakers decide between differing testimonies.   
Committee hearings usually proceed in a standard way; the committee chair will call the 
meeting to order and welcome everyone before a revisor summarizes the bill. Those in 
attendance are a usual cadre of lobbyists and local reporters. Occasionally, other lawmakers will 
attend if the hearing is on a particularly important bill. After the revisors summarizes the bill, the 
chair invites conferees to provide testimony before allowing lawmakers to ask questions of the 
conferees. Before a session begins, lawmakers indicate their committee preferences. The Speaker 
of the House or the Senate President take lawmaker’s preferences into account when doling out 
committee assignments. However, lawmakers do not always get their preferred committees. 
House members usually serve on three committees and senators serve on a variety of committees 
and subcommittees. Conferees must submit their testimony in advance of the hearing, though 
rules vary slightly between committees on how many copies must be provided and how far in 
advance they must be submitted. Some committees require only electronic versions while others 
require anywhere from 10 to 50 hard copies delivered to the office of the committee chair. 
Burstein’s (2014) analysis of committee testimonies finds supporters and opponents make 
differing arguments. Supporters of a bill are more likely to highlight the importance of 
addressing the problem while opponents are more likely to cast doubt on the efficacy of 
supporter’s proposed solutions to the problem (Burstein 2014:158). However, I argue the 
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sequence of supporters and opponents matters just as much as the content of the testimony. 
Because committees are important sources of information, the chair of the committee is in a 
position to influence the flow of information. As representative Monica Murnan explained, 
“Never, never, never underestimate the power of a committee chair.”301 One veteran lobbyist 
explained “You will have committees that will be meeting on taxes or the budget or something 
and they will allow these very conservative organizations, say the Chamber of Commerce, 
Americans for Prosperity, Kansas Policy Institute, they will give them a lot of time. Sometimes 
they’ll give them their entire meeting to make a presentation. And then when they have 
legislation, everybody wants to testify, those who would be in opposition to those positions and 
that legislation get maybe two or three minutes apiece. So the leadership has been able to control 
a lot of the information that happens in front of legislative committees.”302  
Other conferees also described the asymmetries in allotted time during their committee 
experience. Game On’s Judith Deedy recalled the hostility she faced while giving testimony: “In 
2014, those years, it was not receptive. And you could see they weren’t listening. They wouldn’t 
look at you.”303 Another conferee reflected on his experience testifying on a bill that would have 
moved school board elections to the fall, making them more partisan. It was a bill that generated 
controversy and thus, generated several testimonies: 66 in fact. Of those, only 7 were proponents 
of the bill. “In spite of the overwhelming opposition, Senator Holmes started oral testimony with 
the 7 sole proponents of SB 171… When this was done, Senator Holmes only had time for two 
opponents. When they had spoken, he noted that time was up” (MainStream Coalition 2015b). In 
other words, Holmes leveraged his position as committee chair to control how and when 
                                                                   
301 Interview conducted April 25, 2019 
302 Interview conducted September 1, 2016 
303 Interview conducted March 12, 2018 
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information was presented to the committee, both for the sake of fellow lawmakers and for those 
in attendance, particularly political reporters who often report on legislative committee activity.  
In 2017, after moderates retook the legislature, new House tax committee chair Steven 
Johnson ran committee hearings much differently than Senator Holmes and even differently than 
his predecessor, Marvin Kleeb. For instance, in a January 19 committee hearing, Johnson 
remarked, “To have more give and take, and to recognize that some folks travelled from just a bit 
of a distance, we’ll move back and forth between proponents and opponents. My idea, roughly, 
is to have 30 minutes of proponent testimony followed by 30 minutes of opponent testimony so 
there’s a chance to have some dialogue through that.”304 Johnson, was consciously structuring 
the order of testimony to appear fair and not shut out either side. 
 The order of testimonies is also important because there are different types of 
testimonies. Some testimonies come from legislative experts, namely the Kansas Legislative 
Research Department or the Department of Revenue. There are also testimonies from advocacy 
groups and individuals. Often, advocacy organizations augment their committee testimonies with 
individual meetings with legislators. Thus, legislators are not only hearing information or their 
perspectives in committees. However, for individuals, the committee is often their only point of 
communication and contact. In the following sections, I focus on the advocacy testimonies 
because these are the testimonies where interpretation is particularly prevalent.   
 
Do Testimonies Matter? 
 Advocacy groups provide testimony in order to exert some influence on the outcome of a 
bill. Groups or individuals appear before the committee as either proponents or opponents, 
                                                                   
304 House tax committee, January 19, 2017 
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though occasionally conferees will be listed as neutral, meaning they are simply providing 
information. While researchers have found that testimonies influence policy outcomes, critics of 
this perspective tend to view committee testimonies as “stage-managed spectacles” where 
testimony is simply a rehearsed performance and power is really exerted behind closed doors 
(Burstein 2014:136). If the staged-performance perspective is true, then lawmakers should not 
find testimonies meaningful. However, based on my interviews, I find most lawmakers believe 
testimonies matter. Yet, they matter in different ways. Most commonly, testimonies matter 
because they communicate what lawmakers see as “real-world” impact; that is, lawmakers value 
testimony because they value understanding how a proposed bill will affect people across the 
state.  
Burstein notes that conferees will often tell anecdotal stories instead of relying on 
empirical evidence (2014:148). For some lawmakers, anecdotal and personal stories are a 
preferred form of testimony. Representative Hawkins, for instance, explained, “Tax is a boring 
subject. How do you make tax sexy? How do you make it to where anybody is interested in it?... 
If you can tell a story and you can put emotion with it, and it touches people, then you’re going 
to move that needle whatever direction you’re trying to move it.”305 Another representative, John 
Eplee, echoed this sentiment, explaining “I like to have one proponent come in and present the 
big picture data, the trend in the data and their opinion and how they spin the data. Then to have 
examples that are up close and personal how it effects one business or how it effects a group of 
businesses owned by one individual. I think that’s pretty compelling because then it personalizes 
                                                                   
305 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
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it.”306 Senator Masterson also viewed testimonies from the general public as more valuable, 
saying “some of the most effective ones are the citizenry that show up and testify.”307  
For other lawmakers, however, testimonies matter only occasionally. Representative Tom 
Sawyer, for instance, said “On some issues [testimonies] matter a lot. On issues where people 
aren’t very familiar, committee members, it can make a big difference. Most of the time I would 
say, though, it’s small. There may be something in that testimony that causes somebody to move 
a little bit in one direction when there’s something they just didn’t know that’s kind of earth-
moving, but for the most part the testimony makes very little difference.”308 Likewise, 
Representative Eplee noted, “There are some issues in which, I’m not going to lie to you, my 
mind is made up before I walk in the door that day. Generally I try really hard to fight that… But 
I’m not going to fib to you there are times when I think I bring more to the table than that 
opponent or proponent does in their testimony and I may kind of shut them out or I may be on 
my iPhone checking messages or I may not listen very well. But generally I feel like that’s what 
I was voted in to do, so I try hard to listen even if I have forgone conclusions.”309 Still for other 
lawmakers, they will tune out because they know the political perspective of the conferee. 
Representative Wolfe Moore, for instance, explained, “Every bit of evidence points to the fact 
that [the tax cut] is not working but it’s destroying our state… I’ve never been in a situation 
where the truth was so obvious, yet we still have a group of people saying ‘Oh no, it’s working.’ 
To me it’s like looking up in the sky and I’m saying ‘Oh, that’s a blue sky’ and they’re saying ‘I 
know you think it’s blue, but that’s really a green sky.’ I mean, it’s that obvious to me.”310  
                                                                   
306 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
307 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
308 Interview conducted February 6, 2017 
309 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
310 Interview conducted February 20, 2017 
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Lawmakers use testimony to gauge possible policy impacts. For instance, Representative 
Francis explained, “For instance, a lot of times we’ll have people testify that will be personally 
affected by the tax change. Sometimes their passion makes a difference. You know, we’re all 
compassionate people and that can make a difference. Sometimes we have a preconceived notion 
of how something works and how it effects different things and the testimony will change our 
preconceived notion.”311 The personal perspective was a major reason that lawmakers valued 
testimony. Representative Thimesch explained, “Oh yeah, [testimony] does [matter] because 
they’re making statements about how it’s affecting them.”312 Likewise, Representative 
Ohaebosim said, “you have to understand, any action that we take on the committee, it effects 
the entire state… So if we’re talking about taxes on businesses, you want to hear from people 
who are in it before you actually make a decision. We can speculate and we can read reports and 
all of that, but if we don’t have testimony from people who actually do the work it won’t be 
helpful to make a decision.”313  
For some lawmakers on the committee, however, repetition becomes a problem. 
Representative Hawkins explained, “Where [testimony] hurts is when you have an issue where 
you have thirteen conferees all saying the same thing. After about the first two, it’s hard to pay 
attention when they’re talking about the same exact thing, saying the same thing, objecting to the 
same thing… After a while it doesn’t make any difference.”314 In many ways, it should not be 
surprising that legislators value committee testimony. The Kansas legislature is made up of part-
time legislators and often members are assigned to committees based on tangential 
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qualifications.315 For instance, a legislator from a farming community might be assigned a spot 
on the agriculture committee while an accountant might be assigned to the tax committee. Thus, 
many legislators find themselves in need of information provided by conferees.  
 
Discerning Between Testimonies 
Testimony is not only about providing information: it is about providing conflicting 
information. That is, there are proponents and opponents both trying to affect the outcome of a 
bill. And in the case of taxation, this often involves interpreting data for the committee. As 
Representative Eplee, remarked, “The one thing that I have been just blown away by since being 
here is how people can take fairly similar datasets and arrive at polar opposite conclusions… It’s 
mind-blowing.”316 And because many lawmakers who sit on specialized committees are 
themselves not specialists in the area, how do lawmakers understand the information they receive 
in committees?  
Within the taxation committees, tax cut supporters and opponents cast doubt on each 
other’s claims and sometimes their character. For instance, Dave Trabert of the KPI testified 
“Those who oppose tax reform will likely continue using misleading information to claim that 
the Kansas economy is not better off since tax reform… It’s easy to make unchallenged claims 
sound legitimate, so we encourage the Committee to gather those with differing views and allow 
us to question each other’s claims. We have a standing invitation to Duane Goossen and the 
                                                                   
315 In the House, the speaker of the house asks what committees members are interested in being on and then takes that into 
account. Another thing the speaker has to take into account is time. Committees meet at pre-determined times, so members need 
to choose committees they can be placed on. All representatives, for instance, must sit on a 9am, a 1:30pm, and a 3:30pm 
committee. 
316 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
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Kansas Center for Economic Growth to join us in a public discussion but they refuse. Kansas 
Policy Institute stands ready to defend our work at any time.”317  
Between these two extremes, lawmakers commonly pick a middle point to help them 
decide. As Democratic representative Jim Kelly explained, “you’ve got two version of what 
actually happened. One saying [the tax cuts were] successful and one saying it’s not… So you 
have to try to sort out, I have in my mind what I think happened. And I think parts of it that 
maybe there’s been some success with. You hear testimony from individuals who say this has 
helped my company, this has done this. You hear testimony and comments from other business 
people who say it hasn’t made that big a difference I should be paying tax. It’s just kind of a 
balance and just trying to look at what they’re comparing because it’s never apples to apples that 
I see.”318 In other words, Kelly, a critic of the tax cuts, does not doubt the testimony of conferees 
who believe the tax cuts helped their business. Instead, he uses their testimony in contrast with 
opponent testimony to construct an understanding of the situation. Senator Masterson also 
adopted this approach, saying “The truth is always somewhere in the middle, it seems like, 
between the two sides.”319 
The mid-point strategy assumes conferees come in with a bias or agenda that colors their 
view of the issue; that it is all about framing. Representative Hawkins explained this view well, 
saying “Everybody has a bias. So you got to sift through that. And I would say probably 
somewhere in between is where the truth lies. This side is not necessarily telling all the truth; this 
side’s not telling all the truth. So we have to come up with somewhere in between where we 
believe the truth is.”320 Likewise, Representative Francis made a similar point when he 
                                                                   
317 Testimony given to the House Taxation Committee, May 7, 2015 
318 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
319 Interview conducted February 14, 2017 
320 Interview conducted March 24, 2017 
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explained, “I think every time we’re dealing with an issue, we discern between the different 
competing testimonies differently based upon what the subject matter is. You know, one of my 
favorite sayings up here, one of the things that I hold in my mind, is Mark Twain that one time 
said there’s ‘lies, damn lies, and statistics.’ And at the Capitol, and I’m sure it’s much worse in 
Washington D.C., the people with competing interests are very good at framing their issue and 
selecting the data that supports their case.”321 For lawmakers, assuming a bias or agenda or the 
part of conferees is particularly important in tax debates which heavily rely on statistics. 
Freshman Republican representative Adam Smith explained, “You know, I learned early on in 
my time as a county commissioner, it’s kind of like quoting the Bible, people will pull what they 
want to out of statistics and data. You can analyze anything to make it say what you want to.”322 
In short, lawmakers assume conferees provide information in testimony which makes the best 
case for their side while hiding information that challenges their position. Lawmakers also 
believe no single conferee possesses a full view of the issue being debated. Instead of being 
arbiters of which claim is totally correct, lawmakers assume there must be some truth in every 
testimony; that a conferee is each providing a piece of the puzzle.  
However, lawmakers also do not assume each conferee is providing equally truthful 
claims. Thus, a second approach lawmakers use in committees is a “trust, but verify” 
approach.323 Many lawmakers will accept there is a degree or truth in what any conferee is 
saying, but will then try to verify those claims with non-partisan sources, such as the Legislative 
Research Department. While some of the most conservative members of the legislature 
                                                                   
321 Interview conducted March 23, 2017 
322 Interview conducted February 20, 2017 
323 The dictum “trust but verify” was made famous by Reagan during negotiations with Russia over disarmament. Barton Swain 
explains the phrase “entered American usage when Reagan’s adviser on Russian affairs, Suzanne Massie, was preparing the 
president for talks with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Perhaps Reagan ought to learn a few Russian proverbs, Massie suggested, 
and the one he liked best was “Doveryai no proveryai” — trust, but verify” (Swaim 2016). 
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expressed doubt about the nonpartisan nature of the KLRD, accusing them of intentionally 
inflating the revenue estimates to sabotage the tax policy, most legislators understood the KLRD 
allows them to do their jobs properly. Representative Adam Smith, for instance, said, “We have 
a great resource in the Legislative Research Department… You can say ‘Hey, this guy gave me 
this number and said it was doing this, this guy gave me a different number, which they’re both 
accurate numbers but this guy said it means the trend is going this way, so give me the history, 
like the last five or ten years, on both these numbers so I can analyze them and see where they’re 
going.’ None of us could do this job up here properly if it wasn’t for the Research 
Department.”324 In this case, the value of the KLRD is their lack of affiliation with an interest 
group.  
Other agencies beyond the KLRD were also important in verifying conferee testimony. 
Democratic representative Tom Sawyer, for instance, explained “Kansas Department of Labor 
puts out a monthly jobs report, and Kansas has been lagging month after month after month this 
past year and has been for most of the last four years lagging the nation, but particularly in the 
last year it’s been pretty bad. So we see those actual job stats. So when Dave Trabert comes in 
and tries to say, ‘We’re creating all these jobs,’ we’re like, ‘Well, wait a second, our own Kansas 
Department of Labor stats don’t jive with what you’re trying to tell us.’ That’s kind of what we 
have to look at when anybody comes in with their stats is also compare them to other sources and 
see how they hold up.”325 The tax committee chair, Steven Johnson, likewise emphasized the 
importance of job numbers. “If you’re going to tell me [the tax policy] has produced jobs, there’s 
a quarterly report on wages and employment from the Department of Labor. You should be able 
to show me where the jobs are. If you don’t show me where the jobs are I’m going to assume 
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they’re not there, particularly if you’re in a position to be able to access that information. So if 
you’re in the Department of Revenue you would have access to data from the Department of 
Labor.”326  
But seeking verification is an uneven practice because in many cases the conferee is 
already known already to committee members. This is particularly true of advocacy 
organizations who are regularly in the statehouse. Sometimes this familiarity breeds boredom 
because lawmakers anticipate the conferee’s perspective on the bill. However, this level of 
familiarity also reveals another important aspect to the relationship between testimony and 
lawmakers: lawmakers come to trust certain voices. Democratic representative Wolfe Moore, for 
instance, explained that “When the League of Kansas Municipalities comes forward and gives 
testimony, that’s a group that I can trust. I don’t have to agree with them, but I can trust that what 
they’re saying, I can take it to the bank.”327 Likewise, representative Richard Proehl, noted, “Part 
of it, you learn the people that are testifying. Some of them are brand new and that’s different. 
But the ones that you’ve known for a period of time then you build a comfort zone with them 
and that makes a lot of difference. Because they’re not just there on one issue, you’re seeing 
them day in and day out on a whole array of issues and you pretty well learn which ones you can 
count on to tell you the straight and narrow if it.”328 The chair of the House tax committee, 
Steven Johnson, also remarked, “I try to boil it down and say whose frame of the numbers do I 
believe is the most accurate and truthful? Now, two equally competent people can come down on 
different sides of that issue, and that is not certainly the only way to measure it. Some will 
measure it through relationships and talking with people and knowing how they think and react, 
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and that’s another very valid way to do it, but that’s what I then seek.”329 For Johnson, it is a 
combination of trust in people and trust in numbers. In other words, numbers are not produced in 
a vacuum; lawmakers tie the production and interpretations of numbers directly to the source of 
those numbers and the person delivering them. To decide whose frame is more truthful, 
legislators first determine if they find the conferee trustworthy.  
 The importance of trust is demonstrated by efforts to undermine the trustworthiness of 
certain conferees. For instance, Duane Goossen, a former Kansas budget director under both 
Republican and Democratic governors, became a preeminent critic of the Brownback tax policy, 
gaining recognition through his popular blog posts and he eventually joined the KCEG as a 
fellow. In the view of many lawmakers, Goossen’s professional biography as a former budget 
director under both Republican and Democratic governors made him a trustworthy figure. For 
instance, Representative Tom Phillips said, “For me, this has gone on since 2012, so five years. 
And Duane Goossen, has pretty much said the same thing from day one and everything he has 
said has come to pass. So, I think his credibility has been on target.”330Yet, Goossen’s stature 
also meant efforts to undermine his trustworthiness increased as repeal efforts grew. Budget 
Director Shawn Sullivan, for instance, wrote an op-ed in The Emporia Gazette, claiming 
Goossen’s “budget record is abysmally flawed.” Sullivan criticized Goossen’s record, writing, 
“He is the only budget director in history to have ignored the constitutional requirement for a 
positive state general fund balance when he ended the 2010 state fiscal year with a negative $27 
million balance” (Sullivan 2014). This was a criticism echoed by other conservative groups, such 
as KPI, who noted “The Goossen era not only saw reserves drop by more than $750 million, he 
and Governor Parkinson gave Kansas an illegal negative ending balance in their last full fiscal 
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year in office!” (Kansas Policy Institute 2016). These attacks were meant to undermine the trust 
lawmakers and the media had in Goossen. Supporters of the tax cuts sensed repeal was imminent 
and by obfuscating the public’s search for answers and attacking the other side, supporters 
ultimately hoped to delay the inevitable. 
 
Conclusion 
 Joseph Schumpeter, who first proposed the program of fiscal sociology, memorably 
translated Rudolph Goldscheid’s claim that “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all 
misleading ideologies” (Schumpeter 1991:100). Schumpeter suggested that studying a state’s 
budget is the best starting point to investigate government action as opposed to the rhetoric or 
ideology of state actors. However, there is an alternative way to understand Schumpeter’s point. 
True, in one sense a state’s budget is stripped of ideology. After all, if the government claims to 
be increasing funding to education, for example, and yet budget numbers prove the opposite, 
then the budget is a truer reflection of state priorities. But in another sense the budget is never 
stripped of ideology and instead reflects ideology.  
I argue this was the case in Kansas. By building supply-side ideology into the budget 
process using dynamic scoring, Brownback ultimately hoped to obscure the cause of the fiscal 
crisis. However, this was an imperfect process. In obfuscating the search for the cause of the 
budget crisis, Brownback possibly delayed the policy’s reversal, but it was not enough to save it 
from being repealed. The effects of the tax cuts, witnessed through missed revenue projections, 
budget cuts, and credit downgrades, undermined conservative’s claims. Brownback’s allies 
offered competing explanations for the budget crisis, but these explanations did not satisfy the 
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public or legislators, primarily due to efforts from newly organized groups who built trustworthy 




Chapter Six:  
The Experiment Implodes 
 
 
The preceding chapters have explained how important political actors constrained the 
Brownback administration’s ability to radically remake the state’s tax structure. From small 
businesses and schools, to lobbyists and lawmakers were impacted by Brownback’s tax policy 
and responded it. In short, the Brownback administration promised too much and delivered too 
little to all these sectors, actively harming them by imposing draconian austerity measures. After 
five years, Kansans had had enough. Many critics of the tax policy predicted early on that the 
experiment would not survive because the tax cuts created an unsustainable and structurally 
unbalanced budget. However, the effort to repeal the policy was not straightforward and nearly 
failed. In this chapter I detail the final legislative struggle to repeal the experiment.   
 
Battle Lines 
Democrats and moderate Republicans made significant electoral gains in the 2016 
primary and general elections. The vast majority of these new legislators campaigned on 
repealing the tax cuts. This immediately reconfigured the battle lines for the 2017 session. Since 
2013, Brownback had enjoyed overwhelming conservative support in the legislature. However, 
the absence of this support after the 2016 election made Brownback and the policy vulnerable. 
During his 2017 State of the State Address, Brownback anticipated the fight to come and sought 
to stifle any expectation he would easily comply with altering or eliminating his signature 
pokicy. “As a state,” Brownback said in his address, “we have pioneered new ground on small 
business policy. Kansas was the first state in the nation to pass such a small-business tax policy 
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focused on lifting the income tax burden from job creators… President-elect Trump’s tax plan 
targets small businesses. Speaker Ryan’s tax plan targets small businesses in much the same way 
as we did. Other states, most notably Missouri, are looking at how to create an economic 
atmosphere for private sector job growth. The biggest creators of jobs in Kansas and America are 
small businesses. Hurting them puts us at a competitive disadvantage. The purpose of our small 
business tax cut has been to increase the number of small businesses and increase private sector 
job growth. That policy has worked.”331 
Brownback’s determination on the eve of the 2017 session, however, was not an isolated 
sentiment. Since the tax cuts took effect, he had made it clear he would veto any attempt at 
repealing them. As mentioned earlier, Brownback went into the 2013 session declaring “What I 
am not going to do – and what I won’t sign – is putting taxes back on small businesses and 
raising the income tax rate back up” (Associated Press 2012c). However, as the 2017 session 
began, it was clear to many that Brownback faced a serious threat of losing his signature policy. 
What was less certain was the shape the repeal of the policy would take. It seemed likely that the 
pass-through exemption would be eliminated. Republican Senator Jim Denning, who became the 
majority leader in the Senator for the 2017 session, for instance, remarked he was “100 percent 
confident” Brownback would allow the repeal of the pass-through reduction (Hancock 2016h). 
Even other traditional Brownback allies, such as Koch Industries, seemed to acquiesce to the 
repeal of the business exemption. In an interview with the Kansas City Business Journal, Koch 
Industries CFO and executive vice president Steve Feilmeier remarked that Koch did not support 
Brownback’s efforts to preserve the exemption and accused the governor of “mismanaging the 
fiscal condition of the state” (Roberts 2017). 
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While allies such as Koch were advocating a narrow repeal focused only on the business 
exemption, other groups were advocating the repeal of all aspects of the policy: eliminating the 
pass-through exemption, ending the march to zero, restoring a third income tax bracket, and 
reinstating many of the credits and deductions.332 Those advocating this position organized 
behind the “Rise Up, Kansas” coalition headed by the KCEG, the backed by education groups, 
public employee groups, and infrastructure groups.333 The “Rise Up, Kansas” tax plan was 
developed with input from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) and called for a 
“comprehensive” repeal of the tax cuts.334 The Brownback administration, however, attacked the 
plan, saying “Liberal special interest groups have long called for ‘wealthy’ small business 
owners to pay their ‘fair share.’ But today, the true victims of their tax and spend proposals were 
revealed. They are the receptionists, nurses, police officers, and others members of the middle 
class, working hard every day to put gas in the tank and money in their pockets to provide for 
themselves and their families” (Hancock 2016i). Thus, the battle over the tax plan became a 
battle over some conservatives allowing a narrow repeal versus moderate opponents advocating 




                                                                   
332 Brownback seemed to be aware he stood a good chance of losing the policy. At the start of the 2017 session, senator Jim 
Denning observed that Brownback “knows that there’s a strong will to completely repeal the pass-through policy.” And 
Brownback, while not publicly offering any suggestions, noted he wanted to work with the legislature to make sure he could keep 
that part of the policy specifically. “We want to maintain the heart of this, which is small business,” Brownback said (Lowry 
2017b). 
333 As the former head of the KCEG explained to me, this coalition formed first in April 2016 as the “Option Four” Coalition. 
The name, “Option Four,” was named in reference to Brownback and his budget director laying out three options for how to 
address the state’s budget crisis. However, none of these options involved repeal of the tax cuts. Thus, the “Option Four” 
coalition formed with the message that repeal of the tax cuts could balance the budget. The coalition renamed itself the “Rise Up” 
coalition with the unveiling of the plan.  
334 The KCEG ran 72 different models with ITEP in Fall 2016 to find a plan that would be the most appealing to lawmakers.  
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The First Repeal Effort 
Lawmakers set their sights on addressing taxes early in the legislative session. In 
February 2017, conservative chair of the Senate Taxation Committee, Caryn Tyson, announced 
hearings on a bill that repealed only the business exemption.335 During testimony on the bill, 
conferees were split between those who thought this plan still went too far in reversing the tax 
cuts and those who suggested it did not go far enough. Brownback, however, blasted the bill, 
saying it “needlessly harms the real people that serve as the lifeblood of Kansas. It punishes the 
middle class — teachers, police officers and nurses — working hard to provide for their families 
and serve their communities. It punishes job-creators, the backbone of our Kansas economy” 
(Hanckock 2017f). The bill advanced out of the committee on a voice vote, however support 
among legislators soon fell away and the party leadership scrapped a floor debate on the bill.  
Despite this temporary setback, legislative momentum was growing towards ending the 
Brownback experiment. Brownback lamented that the early moves by the legislature were 
“going against national trends. It’s going against what’s in the best interest of Kansas to grow” 
(Hanna 2017a). After the party called off the senate debate, they returned to committee to 
consider alternative tax bills. Meanwhile, the house pushed forward with their own repeal efforts. 
Many of the early bills introduced in the House Taxation committee were versions of the “Rise 
Up, Kansas” tax plan, and were thus more comprehensive than the narrower senate plan. The 
House bills largely did three main things – reinstated a third bracket and raise the rates, 
eliminated the LLC exemption, and ended the march to zero. The “Rise Up, Kansas” coalition 
projected their proposal would raise $700 million dollars, an amount closer to what 
                                                                   
335 The bill was SB 147 
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representatives believed was needed to balance the budget.336 The House Tax committee quickly 
referred the bill to the floor of the House for a vote, which occurred February 15. Voting on a 
major piece of legislation so early in the session is basically unheard of in Kansas. Thus, the pace 
which the bill advanced to the floor of the House signaled that the newly elected legislators were 
serious about address the tax policy. After surprisingly little debate on the bill, the House passed 
it by a vote of 83-39. Ranking Democrat on the House Tax committee, Tom Sawyer, remarked 
that the vote sent “a clear message to the governor that the House is serious, and we’re going to 
try to fix this mess that he’s created” (Hancock 2017g).  
In the Kansas legislature, bills are often voted on twice; an initial vote to gauge support 
and then a final, official vote. By statute, there must be a day between votes, though this rule can 
often be suspended. After the initial vote, Republican Steven Johnson remarked, “We had 83. 
We’ll certainly see what it is tomorrow. I’m sure there will be a lot of discussions that continue 
from here until tomorrow’s vote” (Shorman 2017b). The number 83 was significant because it 
was one vote shy of a veto-proof majority. Lawmakers in both chambers anticipated 
Brownback’s veto and thus had the task of not only building majority support for a repeal, but a 
veto-proof supermajority. This meant the House had to secure 84 votes and the Senate had to 
secure 27.  
Brownback, again, voiced his displeasure after the House vote, singling out the newly 
elected moderates. “While on the campaign trail many of these representatives pledged to raise 
taxes on the wealthy, but now they are attempting to tax everyday Kansans. It doesn’t have to be 
                                                                   
336 As the Topeka Capital-Journal reported, members on the House taxation committee, by an informal show of hands, indicated 
that they want to raise between $900 million and $1.2 billion over two years, with some Democrats and GOP moderates willing 
to raise $1.5 billion (Shorman 2017a).  
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this way. I will continue the fight to keep your income taxes low.”337 Brownback also blamed the 
small business community for not doing enough and urged the NFIB to lobby lawmakers to 
reject the House bill. The lobbying pressure appeared to work since the following day, on the 
bill’s final action, support for the bill dropped to 76-46. This was still enough for the bill to pass, 
but was further away from a veto-proof majority.  
Senate debate on the House bill began February 17.338 Conservative senators mostly 
lambasted the bill and accused fellow lawmakers of not cutting spending. However, moderate 
Republicans urged their colleagues to vote for the bill, saying they thought this bill was the best 
chance they would have. The bill garnered enough initial support to pass, prompting Republican 
senator Jim Denning to make a motion for emergency final action, meaning the Senate would 
vote immediately rather than waiting until the following day. The bill passed on final action, 22-
18, below the 27 needed for a veto-proof majority.  
After the bill passed both chambers, commenters across the state began speculating how 
Brownback would respond. Some wondered whether, to save face, Brownback would let the bill 
stand, meaning the bill would automatically become law without his signature. The Lawrence 
Journal-World urged the Governor to do this. “In this case,” the editorial team wrote, “the right 
thing for [Brownback] to do is nothing at all” (J-W Editorial Staff 2017). The Topeka Capital-
Journal also editorialized that he “should recognize that his state is ready try something new. He 
should let the bill pass” (Capital-Journal Editorial Board 2017a). And The Emporia Gazette 
wrote that “Hopefully, instead [Brownback] just signs it” (Hacker 2017). 
                                                                   
337 Kornada, Stephen. “Gov. Brownback’s statement on the House tax plan. He doesn’t explicitly say he would not sign it, which 
he said earlier today. #ksleg.” February 15, 2017, 2:31pm. (https://twitter.com/kprkoranda/status/831994420232933380). 
Accessed April 7, 2019. 
338 In a slightly unusual move, 2178 went straight from the House to the Senate floor and bypassed the Senate tax committee. 
Senate President Susan Wagle, however, defended the move by saying that the Senate tax committee had already held numerous 
hearings on tax bills and was familiar with the contents. 
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The hope that Brownback would sign the bill was wishful thinking. The Kansas Chamber 
of Commerce held its annual dinner on the evening of February 21, the day he officially received 
the bill, and used this high-profile setting to announce his veto. During his remarks, Brownback 
announced, to enthusiastic applause, that he would veto the bill. “I won’t sign it and I will veto 
this bill,” the Governor said, adding that policy like this “is what causes people to move to other 
states” (Carpenter 2017a). He continued, asking “the people in this room to help us sustain this 
veto. This is bad policy for Kansas. This will hurt growth in this state. At the same time the 
administration in Washington is moving to cut taxes, we’d be raising” (Carpenter 2017a). 
The next morning, Brownback officially signed the veto.339 “I've been against income tax 
increases as long as I've been in public life,” he said during the public signing (Hanna 2017b). 
He was particularly incensed at the portion of the tax bill that repealed the pass-through 
provision. “I don’t think there’s been a fair presentation of [the policy]. We’ve offered 
adjustments, as I’ve noted. We pioneered this field. You’ve seen other places go to it now” 
(Hancock 2017h). He continued, “Income tax increases aren’t being considered, that I can find, 
                                                                   
339 Brownback’s veto statement, titled “Protecting Kansas Workers and Families,” said, “Since the pioneers moved westward 
across the country and settled this fertile ground, our state has always held a promise for those who came here—that through 
dedication and hard work your standing in life can improve. One of my primary goals as Governor is to make it easier for 
Kansans to thrive and to accomplish their dreams. That is precisely why we cut income taxes on all Kansans several years ago, 
working to make Kansas the best state in America to raise a family and grow a business. Last week, both chambers of the Kansas 
legislature voted to raise taxes on Kansans making over $15,000. Not only did they raise taxes on single Kansans earning more 
than $9.74 an hour, but they did so before even passing a budget. By doing this, legislators said that the hard-working people of 
Kansas must find savings in their own personal budgets before their elected representatives can be bothered to find savings in the 
state’s budget. This mindset is unacceptable. I am vetoing HB 2178, the punitive tax increase on working Kansans. I am vetoing 
it because the legislature failed to fulfill my request that they find savings and efficiencies before asking the people of Kansas for 
more taxes. I am vetoing it because Kansas families deserve to keep more of their hard-earned cash. I am vetoing it because it is 
retroactive and thus incredibly unfair. Legislators who voted for this largest tax hike in Kansas history will try to persuade you 
that it is primarily a tax on wealthy business owners. This is false. Rather, this bill is an assault on the pocketbooks of the middle 
class. These legislators campaigned saying they were going to raise some other guy’s taxes. But when the votes were finally cast, 
they raised yours. Above all else, we must remember that tax dollars do not belong to the government. They belong to the 
families, individuals, and job-creators who earn a paycheck. It is wrong for government to take more tax dollars than are 
absolutely necessary to provide for the core functions of the state. Should the legislature override this veto, Kansans are the ones 
who will pay the price. It doesn’t have to be this way; there is another option. My budget proposal does not target Kansas 
families or the working class, but still achieves structural balance. I urge you to call your legislator and tell them to find savings 
in government before asking you and your family for more money. After all, it’s your money, not the government’s. As the 
stewards of your tax dollars, legislators must be fiscally responsible with your money. It is not too late; the legislature still has 
time to choose fiscal responsibility over tax increases on Kansas families.” 
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in any red state… Speaker (Paul) Ryan and President Trump both have a small business tax 
proposal that would cut small business taxes in half, because that’s your job-creating machine” 
(Hancock 2017i). 
After Brownback’s veto, the bill returned to the House. After reading out the governor’s 
veto message, Steven Johnson made the motion to override the veto. After a short floor debate, 
the House voted 82-41 for override, short of what was needed. However, two representatives 
were absent during in the first round of voting, so lawmakers initiated a call of the house, forcing 
everyone to cast a vote. One lawmaker, Republican Bradley Ralph, voted to support the override, 
increasing the votes to 83. Only one vote more was required. The other missing lawmaker, 
Republican Pete DeGraaf, returned to the chamber and cast his vote in support of override and 
applause broke out in the chamber. However, it was quickly stamped out as DeGraff 
immediately changed his vote back to a “No,” saying that he had been “joking.”340 The vote 
count still stood at 83. The voting period was being held open as lawmakers furiously lobbied to 
get one more vote. These appeals eventually worked and Republican Clay Aurand switched his 
vote, breaking the necessary 84 vote threshold. Explanations of vote continued afterwards, 
inspiring more lawmakers to switch to “Yes,” such as Republican Blaine Finch. The final vote to 
override Brownback veto was 85-40. 
The House had demonstrated there was enough support to both pass a repeal bill and 
protect it from Brownback’s veto. There was still uncertainty, however, about how much support 
override had in the senate. Around 2pm that same afternoon, Senate Republicans caucused to 
discuss their veto override strategy. Senator Longbine indicated he would vote for override, 
                                                                   
340 Shorman, Jonathan. “DeGraaf initial aye vote was apparently a joke #ksleg.” February 22, 2017, 8:20am 




however senators Jim Denning and Susan Wagle indicated they would not. They also made clear 
it clear, however, they were unhappy with Brownback’s proposed budget. Senator Denning, for 
instance, said Brownback’s budget was “insulting to me. I don’t even want to waste my time 
with it” (Hancock 2017j). Contrary to House rhetoric that this bill was the best shot at repeal, 
Denning suggested it would not be “the last train out of the station.”341 When the Senate came to 
order, Senator Ty Masterson introduced the motion for override (even though he did not support 
repeal) and after about an hour of debate, the Senate voted 24-16 in favor of override, three votes 
shy of the 27 votes necessary. The effort to repeal the Brownback tax cuts had failed.  
 
The Second Repeal 
 After the unsuccessful attempt of lawmakers to override Brownback’s veto, legislative 
action on taxes grew quiet. However, around this time, rumors began to spread of a possible 
appointment for Brownback in the Trump administration.342 These rumors weakened what little 
influence Brownback still had in the statehouse. For instance, Susan Wagle responded to the 
news of Brownback’s possible departure, saying “We're feeling that we have the responsibility to 
fix the budget — without him” (Hanna 2017c). 
 After the veto, and with speculation of a possible Brownback exit,343 lawmakers began to 
entertain a wide variety of possible tax bills, including a flat tax.344 For instance, the Senate tax 
committee passed a flat tax bill which only generated an estimated $296 million in the current 
fiscal year and $356 million the following fiscal year (well short of the amount needed to address 
                                                                   
341 Shorman, Jonathan. “Denning: this isn’t the last train out of the station #ksleg.” February 22, 2019, 12:15pm. 
(https://twitter.com/jonshorman/status/834496909821747200). Accessed April 7, 2019. 
342 Initial rumors suggested Brownback might be up for the position of U.S. ambassador to the United Nations agency for food 
and agriculture in Rome.  
343 Or a “Brexit.” 
344 A flat tax refers to a tax system in which everyone is subject to the same tax rate. Flat tax supporters argue this is a fair 
system, however, like a sales tax, in practice it is regressive and overburdens lower income taxpayers. 
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the budget shortfall). The flat tax bill eliminated the pass-through exemption and established a 
flat income tax rate of 4.6 percent. Unlike the previous House bill, this bill actually gained 
Brownback’s endorsement. “The Senate’s flat tax legislation creates a single low tax rate for 
Kansans, solving today’s budget challenges without unnecessarily harming economic growth in 
Kansas. If the legislature sends a bill to my desk similar in nature to 214, I will sign it,” he 
announced (Hancock 2017k). This was noteworthy because it was the first time Brownback 
signaled any willingness to modify his tax policy. “I’d rather have the LLC exemption,” 
Brownback said. “What I'm saying is there are other pro-growth concepts in your tax policy, and 
one of the things that I think we need to have long-term for the state of Kansas is as much pro-
growth opportunity as possible” (Hancock 2017l). 
Despite Brownback’s apparent willingness to sign a flat tax bill, there was little interest 
among senators for it. Support quickly fell away during floor debate and the bill was defeated. 
After the vote, Jim Denning was asked what was next, replying, “Beats me,” (Hancock 2017m). 
After the flat tax defeat, the legislature adjourned for their spring recess, during which the CRE 
released their revenue forecast adjustments showing an $889 million dollar budget shortfall for 
the following two fiscal years.   
The increased shortfall added extra urgency to the repeal effort. As lawmakers returned 
from their recess, senate Republicans revealed they had moved on from the flat tax. The new 
senate tax bill was strikingly similar to the House bill Brownback had already vetoed, but did not 
include the retroactive portion that Denning had originally objected to (Shorman 2017c). Part of 
the reason the legislature returned to the House bill was institutional: both chambers had already 
voted on it. “We voted to pass something like that already. This will probably be something 
similar,” said Dan Kerschen, the vice chairman of the Senate tax committee (Shorman 2017c). 
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Additionally, because this bill had already passed both chambers, the House bill could be used as 
a vehicle for a conference committee.  
The first tax proposal to come out of the conference committee was indeed a modified 
HB 2178 bill.345 Unlike the House bill, however, this plan phased in the top tax rate over two 
years and eliminated the retroactive portion, which made new tax rates effective July 1, instead 
of retroactive to January 1. The plan also eliminated the pass-through exemption. As a result, this 
bill raised $879 million over the next two years (less than the $1 billion that HB 2178 raised). 
This was a problem for some legislators. Nevertheless, the committee agreed to the plan and the 
Senate debated it first. In the Republican caucus meetings prior to the debate, however, it became 
clear that senators had misjudged the level of support the bill had and cancelled the debate. “At 
the beginning of the day we thought we had consensus, and at the end of the day we didn’t,” said 
Jim Denning (Hancock 2017n).  
In their caucus, the Democrats also announced they would not support the bill because it 
did not raise enough to cover the shortfall. With the exception of the failed flat tax, conservatives 
were going to oppose any bill that repealed the tax policy. This meant moderate Republicans and 
Democrats were in a position of power. However, this coalition also created tension. Democrats 
believed they could hold out for a bill that fully addressed the budget while moderate 
Republicans did not want to raise taxes more than necessary. As Senate vice president Jeff 
Longbine described the situation, “We have people who don’t think the tax bill raises enough 
and we have people, if it raises more than that, they don’t want to vote. So we’ve got a teeter-
totter and we’re trying to find the balance” (Shorman 2017d). Striking this balance would require 
a lot of negotiation and false starts over the next several months.  
                                                                   
345 This bill would have set the lowest bracket still at the current 2.7 percent, taxed income of $30,000 to $100,000 at 5.25 percent 




False Starts and Stalemates 
The current projected budget deficit of $900 million did not include the anticipated 
funding needed to satisfy the school funding lawsuit. Elsewhere in the legislature, lawmakers 
were working on a plan that increased school funding to $750 million (an amount that the 
attorney for the school districts said was still not enough). Democrats were adamant that any tax 
bill should generate enough money to cover both the budget shortfall and the increase in school 
funding. “We ought to be able to put a revenue package together that will solve the self-inflicted 
budget crisis that we’ve had as a result of the income tax cuts while at the same time 
appropriating enough money to comply with the court order in the Gannon case,” Democratic 
Senate leader Anthony Hensley explained (Hancock 2017n). However, Senate leadership 
disagreed and Senator Jim Denning indicated that he was going to pursue separate bills to 
balance the budget and fund education (Shorman 2017d). 
The next conference committee bill generated $1.1 billion over two years. The House 
debated the bill first, but again leadership scrapped debate because of Democratic opposition. 
Democrats continued to withhold their support because they wanted to know how much revenue 
the school funding bill would require. Republicans, even some moderate Republicans, began to 
balk at what they saw as Democratic overreach. “That was the Democrats’ best bill,” said House 
Speaker Pro Tem Scott Schwab (Hancock 2017o). Tom Sawyer conceded that the move by the 
Democrats was “a risk,” but they were holding out for something better (Shorman 2017e).346  
                                                                   
346 What Democrats were holding out for was “a 2-percent pay raise for state employees” as well as “more beds at Osawatomie,” 
the state hospital. However, Democrat’s insistence to address taxes only after school funding created a stalemate in the 
legislature. In the new stalemate, the Senate tax committee again began to consider a flat tax bill of 4.4 percent (Hancock 2017), a 
move that baffled and surprised many. “You understand the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and 





The next tax debate was held on May 10. This bill was another version of the previous 
House bill. Again, however, this bill was defeated in the Senate, 18-22. Two Democrats voted in 
favor of this bill, though the rest voted against it as they held out for school funding. 
Conservative Republicans also voted against it, though notably, Jim Denning voted in favor of 
this bill, saying it was “Probably the most difficult decision I’ll make in my career.”347 This bill’s 
defeat was disheartening for many moderates. Senate Vice President Longbine said afterwards “I 
think we went backwards today” (Hancock 2017p).  
The tax stalemate was creating ripple effects across the legislature. For example, when 
the education committee reconvened, they dramatically cut the amount of funding allocated for 
the new school funding formula. Previously, the committee provided an increase of $750 million 
dollars over five years. But in the absence of a tax bill, lawmakers questioned whether they 
should commit to that level of funding. Based on previously debated tax bills, as well as a view 
of what was politically possible, the education committee slashed the amount of money allocated 
to the formula to $280 million over the next two years.  
To try to break the legislative impasse, the next offer made in the tax conference 
committee was simply a straight repeal of the 2012 tax law. “I’m speechless,” said Senate tax 
committee chair Caryn Tyson (Hancock 2017q). “Definitely, not a move I anticipated based off 
of previous votes. This is a considerable increase on individuals, not just businesses, which I’m 
sure you’re fully aware,” Tyson continued (Carpenter 2017b). Ranking Democrat, Tom Holland, 
was also suspicious of this proposal, saying "I'm really disappointed, quite honestly, this offer is 
being brought to the table today because we have in no way resolved what we want to spend on 
schools” (Hancock 2017r).  
                                                                   
347 Shorman, Jonathan. “Denning will be YES. ‘Probably the most difficult decision I’ll make in my career’ #ksleg.” May 10, 
2017, 2:40pm (https://twitter.com/jonshorman/status/862422029915521030). Accessed April 7, 2019. 
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The conference committee did not reconvene again until three days later and, despite the 
original shock of the proposal, the committee agreed to debate the bill. Newspaper editorials, 
namely The Topeka Capital-Journal, voiced their support of this proposal and urged lawmakers 
to pass it (Capital-Journal Editorial Board 2017b). However, in conference committees, both 
sides must agree on which chamber will vote on the bill first. While the conference committee 
agreed to the bill, House negotiators suddenly withdrew their offer because they were under the 
impression the bill would be heard simultaneously in the House and Senate. However, senate 
leadership wanted the House to vote first, a position they rejected and pulled their support for the 
bill.  
The conference committee scheduled their next meeting on May 22, which was the fifth 
anniversary of Brownback signing the tax law. The House offered their latest plan, SB 30, which 
raised as much revenue as any tax bill that had been previously debated, about $1.2 billion. 
Again, many Democrats were hesitant to support the bill because of outstanding school funding 
issues. However, in the Democratic caucus before the debate, Democrats were told to vote their 
conscience.348 The conference committee signed off on the bill and the House debated it that 
evening. However, the bill was defeated, 53-68. Both parties could not agree within their own 
ranks on the bill; 14 of 40 Democrats and 39 of 85 Republicans supported this bill. The coalition 
of moderate Republicans and Democrats began to strain. Prior to the House debate on SB 30, 
moderate Republicans allegedly told House Democratic Leader Jim Ward they needed between 
20 and 25 Democrats to support this bill. If not, Ward recalled, they said “it probably means they 
would do the rest of their work with the conservatives as much as they could” (Shorman 2017f).  
                                                                   
348 Shorman, Jonathan. “Ward speaking now. Says Dems were concerned about not doing schools first, says Dems were told to 




Moderate Republican’s threat to work with conservative Republicans was reinforced by 
the Kansas Truth Caucus’ tax plan. Supported by 40 conservatives in the House and Senate, the 
Truth Caucus’ tax plan, named the “Republican Balanced Budget Solution,” was the 
conservative’s way of saying “there is another way” (Carpenter 2017c). “As we approach 
Memorial Day, those controlling this Legislature are no closer to a solution than they were in 
January. We have a simple, straightforward plan that balances our budget without increasing the 
burden on hard-working Kansans,” Truth Caucus representative Ty Masterson said (Carpenter 
2017c). The Truth Caucus tax plan was designed on the conservative notion that Kansas had a 
spending problem, not a revenue problem. “The benchmark of the Kansas Republican Balanced 
Budget,” the Caucus proclaimed, “is controlling the growth of government by eliminating new 
and unnecessary spending” (Kansas Truth Caucus 2017b).  
 
The Women’s Caucus and Breaking the Legislative Stalemate 
On May 24, the hundredth day of the session, legislative leadership scheduled debate for 
both the latest tax bill and the school finance bill.349 The previous evening, the tax conference 
committee had agreed to a bill that raised $1.2 billion in revenue, eliminated the LLC exemption, 
and reestablished a third bracket.350 The Senate reconvened for a debate on taxes at 10:15pm 
and, within an hour, passed the tax bill, 26-14. Minutes later, the House took up the same bill. 
                                                                   
349 When the House came to order, they debated school funding first. During the debate, Democrat Ed Trimmer offered an 
amendment to increase school funding to $600 million. Without this amendment, the Democrats argued, the Supreme Court 
would continue to rule against the state in the Gannon lawsuit. Trimmer’s amendment failed, however as Republicans argued it 
would require an even greater tax increase than any tax bill that had previously come out of the tax conference committee. After 
over four hours of floor debate, the House voted to pass the new funding formula, 81-40. After the Memorial Day weekend, the 
Senate took up their own school finance bill. While the Senate was debating school funding, the tax conference committee met 
again met and negotiated the next bill. As Trimmer did in the House, Democratic Senator Anthony Hensley offered an 
amendment that would have increased the funding level for the Senate school funding bill; but again, just like in the House, this 
amendment went down 16-23. However, the Senate did pass a school funding bill, 23-16. Because the two bills, differed, 
however, the school bill also went to a conference committee.  
350 This bill set bracket rates at 2.9 percent, 4.9 percent, and 5.2 percent. The bill also automatically increased rates in 2018 to 3.1 
percent, 5.25 percent, and 5.7 percent. 
238 
 
The initial vote count was 59-59. Bills need 63 votes to pass, so a call of the House was initiated, 
forcing wayward members to cast a vote. However, during the call votes began to drop off and 
the bill failed, 37-85. This latest defeat signaled that the stalemate was now in the House, rather 
than the Senate. “We sent [the house] a solid bill with basically a veto-proof message last night, 
and they turned it down. So the tax policy is all on their shoulders at this point in time,” said Jim 
Denning, who had voted for the bill in the Senate (Shorman and Woodall 2017a).  
 The legislature had just entered June and frustrations among lawmakers were 
intensifying. The deadlock was testing the relations between lawmakers and leadership and 
between moderate Republicans and Democrats. Representative Stephanie Clayton, for instance, 
remarked on Twitter, “I do currently have unprintable thoughts re: Leadership” (Shorman and 
Woodall 2017a). Additionally, relations between the house and Senate were souring. Senate 
leadership believed they had done their job by passing a near-veto proof tax bill. “The Senate’s 
got its work done for the most part. Just waiting on the House… They’re stuck on tax policy,” 
said Jim Denning (Shorman and Woodall 2017b). Moreover, each day beyond the expected 
session length further strained the budget. “It’s $43,000 a day. We’re out of money. People are 
going to have to start compromising and figuring out what they can live with,” said Senate vice 
president Jeff Longbine (Carpenter 2017d).  
In this climate of frustration, tax bills that had little political support were being 
introduced to try to move the process forward. One such tax bill, introduced by Democrat Jeff 
Pittman, would incrementally increase tax on each dollar for those in the upper income bracket. 
“This is straight out of the Communist Manifesto. Is Karl Marx the original author of this new tax 
proposal?” retorted Jeff Glendening of Americans for Prosperity (Carpenter 2017d). Another 
proposal which emerged during this stalemate was the so-called “mega bill” which was 
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fashioned to address taxes and school funding in the same bill. This proposal increased school 
funding by $280 million and raised approximately $1 billion in new revenue over two years. 
However, it also directly tied income taxes to school funding. The conference committee 
approved the bill, though the Democrats on the committee refused to sign off on the proposal. 
The House debated the mega bill first, though it had very little support from both conservative 
Republicans and Democrats. Democrats objected claiming it still did not allocate enough for 
school funding. Conservative Republicans, however, opposed directly tying income taxes to 
school funding, which they believed would make it impossible to cut income taxes in the future. 
After a short floor debate, the mega-bill was defeated, 32-91. 
The mega-bill’s failure is important because it created the opportunity for lawmakers to 
introduce the “women’s caucus’s” tax bill. The women’s caucus was a bi-partisan, informal 
group of women lawmakers in the House that began meeting in late May during the legislative 
stalemate. Many lawmakers, particularly newly elected Democrats and moderate Republicans, 
were frustrated not only with the legislature’s inactivity, but also with the lack of information 
coming from Senate and House leadership. As Monica Murnan explained, “There was nothing to 
vote on, there was nothing to have as a solution. So a couple of women, Stephanie Clayton and 
Cindy Holscher, they knew each other from the Kansas City area and at that time Stephanie was 
in the Republican Party and they sent out a text to a bunch of women and said, ‘Hey let’s just 
talk’.”351 Once this group of women began meeting, they realized they were hearing different 
explanations for the stalemate from leadership. “I kind of equate it to a bunch of moms who get 
together after school and realize their kids aren’t quite telling them the truth,” Monica Murnan 
recalled.352 Over the course of several meetings, the women’s caucus grew in number as more 
                                                                   
351 Interview conducted April 25, 2019 
352 Interview conducted April 25, 2019 
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women were invited and the group eventually began proposing solutions for how to break the tax 
deadlock. During meetings, women in the group discussed what was important for them to 
include in a tax policy and, using sticky notes, the women ranked the issues and voted on them, 
eventually coming to a kind of consensus. While the women’s caucus never formally wrote a tax 
bill or introduced an amendment, they crafted a tax policy that raised approximately $1.3 billion, 
removed the pass-through exemption, and reinstated a third income tax bracket (at 5.9 percent). 
Importantly, the women’s caucus bill also reinstated several important tax credits, such as the 
child care credit and renter’s credit, which were eliminated in 2012. This is consistent with 
sociological research that argues women are more likely to advocate for children’s issues 
(Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). 
Once the women’s caucus settled on a plan, they invited others into the group, such as 
Representatives Steven Johnson and Tom Sawyer, as well as analysts from the Kansas 
Legislative Research Department to produce fiscal notes and revenue projections for their 
proposal. When the mega bill was defeated, women’s caucus members regrouped with members 
of the tax committee who were representing the House in the conference committee. During that 
meeting the top rate of the women’s caucus bill was lowered to 5.7 percent in order to ensure the 
plan appealed Republican senators who believed 5.9 percent was too high. The House 
negotiating team agreed to adopt the women’s caucus position as the official House position and 
carried it into the next conference committee meeting.  
After the conference committee signed off on the bill, the parties caucused before the 
debate. In the House Democratic caucus, Democrats agreed they would support the tax bill. In 
the Republican House caucus, there was some disappointment that the Democrats appeared to 
have come out the winners. “I feel like we’re rolling over and giving up,” Representative 
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Thimesch said.353 The House reconvened around 6:30pm and debated the school funding 
formula (now separated from the income tax bill) first. After a short debate, the House approved 
the funding bill, 67-55.354 After the House passed school funding, it moved to the Senate. In the 
Republican Senate caucus before debate, the two majority leaders, Susan Wagle and Jim 
Denning, both indicated they would support the school funding bill. Denning said he would not 
vote for the tax plan if the school funding plan failed.355 This essentially sealed the success of 
both taxes and school funding. The Senate reconvened around 8:30pm to debate school funding 
while the House began debate on the tax bill. Several senators still voiced concern that the 
amount of money appropriated to the new funding formula was inadequate, however the debate 
was short the Senate passed the funding bill 23-17.356  
Simultaneously in the House, debate on the women’s caucus tax plan had started. 
Representative Tom Sawyer indicated he would support the plan, signaling Democratic support. 
The initial vote on the tax bill was 62-57. After a call of the House was initiated, the vote tally 
increased to 69-52. After the House approved the tax policy, the Senate began debate on the tax 
bill around 10:30pm. Conservatives in the Senate threated to filibuster in a vain attempt to sink 
the tax increase. This never materialized, however, and after a two hour debate, the Senate 
approve the tax increase, 26-14.  
                                                                   
353 Salazar, Daniel. 2017. “‘I feel like we’re rolling over and giving up,” another GOP rep. says. #ksleg.” June 5, 2017, 4:09pm 
(https://twitter.com/imdanielsalazar/status/871866561644171273). Accessed April 13, 2019. 
354 The debate lasted only about thirty minutes. Democrat Ed Trimmer voiced his concerns again, saying that the bill will not 
satisfy the courts. Melissa Rooker countered, saying “I share concerns about the funding level and the tax credit scholarship 
expansion, but am more alarmed at the uncertainty we face without a constitutional funding formula. Absent an approved 
formula, the state would not be allowed to distribute even one dollar on July 1” (Carpenter 2017e). 
355 Salazar, Daniel. 2017. “Denning and Wagle say they’ll vote for school finance bill. Denning notes he won’t vote for tax plan 
if school finance bill fails. #ksleg.” June 5, 2017, 6:10pm (https://twitter.com/imdanielsalazar/status/871896986554912768). 
Accessed April 13, 2019. 
356 The initial vote tally was 20-14. A call of the senate was initiated, forcing senators into a vote. Senators Hilderbrand, Lynn, 
and Sykes all votes yes, Senator Masterson voted no. This brought the final tally to 23-17. 
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Brownback had announced his first veto with flair during the Kansas Chamber of 
Commerce dinner. However, his second veto announcement was less conspicuous. Two minutes 
after the Senate approved the repeal bill, at 12:22am, Brownback tweeted his intention to veto it. 
“I will veto SB 30 for the sake of Kansas workers, Kansas families, and Kansas job creators,” he 
tweeted (Zeff 2017).357 The relatively meager response from Brownback at this vote indicated to 
some lawmakers that an override was basically assured.  
The following day, June 6, Brownback officially signed the veto and House and Senate 
leadership announced they would again vote to override. The senate convened at 6:30pm and 
Senate Vice President Longbine announced the veto override attempt, saying he saw no other 
path forward. In February, the first veto attempt had failed in the Senate by three votes. 
However, during this round of voting, the Senate approved the override with 27 votes, the 
minimum necessary. After the Senate overrode Brownback’s veto, the motion moved to the 
House. The initial vote tally stood at 84-35, the exact minimum needed to override the 
                                                                   
357 The tweet linked to a longer veto message which read, “I appreciate the efforts of legislators as they continue to work towards 
balancing the budget, building a school funding formula that puts students first, and ultimately closing out the 2017 legislative 
session. Given that this tax package was assembled and passed just today, I hope to avoid any unnecessary delays by announcing 
that I will veto Senate Bill 30, allowing the legislature sufficient time to address its many deficiencies and harmful impacts on 
Kansas families. We have worked hard in Kansas to move our tax policy to a pro-growth orientation. This bill undoes much of 
that progress. It will substantially damage job creation and leave our citizens poorer in the future. Earlier this year, I vetoed a tax 
increase that threatened to crush the Kansas economy, punishing individual Kansans and their families. Today, with Senate Bill 
30, the legislature is looking to hike rates on Kansans even higher. Senate Bill 30 is a $1.2 billion tax hike, making it the largest 
in state history. This is bad for Kansas and bad for the many Kansans who would have more of their hard-earned money taken 
from them. Additionally, this tax increase is still retroactive and will affect individual families and small businesses in the 2017 
tax year. Retroactively applying new taxes in the middle of the year is irresponsible and will harm families and individuals who 
are working to make ends meet. The people of Kansas deserve clarity in understanding how this bill will impact their families:  
Senate Bill 30 is the largest tax increase in state history.  
This bill hikes taxes $1.22 billion over two years, compared to the previously vetoed $1.04 billion tax hike in HB 2178.  
Low-income Kansans will be hit hardest because the low-income exclusion is cut in half.  
The bottom bracket marginal tax rate will increase by 14.8%.  
The middle bracket marginal tax rates will increase by 14.1%.  
The top bracket marginal tax rate will increase by 23.9%.  
Small businesses will lose their exemption for non-wage business income, instead paying up to 5.7% as they strive to 
create jobs and economic growth. Instead of imposing draconian tax increases on Kansas families, we must enact a pro-growth 
tax policy. Many alternative ideas have been discussed, and I believe there is a better solution. I have made many proposals, and 
several ideas have been considered by the legislature. We can and we must balance our budget without negatively harming 
Kansans. Once again, I remain committed to working with the legislature to develop a plan that balances our budget without 
permanently harming hard-working Kansans. Senate Bill 30 and its $1.2 billion tax hike is not the solution, and I will veto it for 
the sake of Kansas workers, Kansas families, and Kansas job creators.” 
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Governor’s veto. After it became clear the measure would succeed, lawmakers began to switch 
their votes to support the override and the final vote in the House was 88-31. The Kansas 
legislature had officially repealed the 2012 Brownback tax experiment.  
The following morning, Brownback somberly addressed the veto override. Drawing on 
many of the themes he and his administration had been using to justify the policy over the past 
three years, Brownback remarked,   
 
It’s been a long, difficult session. Unfortunately, when you get towards these sort of 
sessions, at the end, things sometimes don’t go as well as they should. My estimation I 
think the tax policy move last night with the legislature was the wrong move. I think it’s 
wrong for the long term view of the State of Kansas, I think it’s wrong for growth. I don’t 
think it’s going to be a positive for this state moving down the road. What we’ve tried to 
do the last number of years is get Kansas in a more pro-growth position. We’ve been 
declining as a percent of the population in the country. We haven’t had a robust 
economic activity and we tried to move in a place and in a way that would be pro-growth 
so that we could attract more people, attract more businesses, attract more opportunities. 
And that was working and we were seeing that attraction and particular attracting in the 
region and in particular on the Missouri border. We’ve seen record small-business 
creation taking place. We’ve seen record private-sector employment. We’ve seen record 
low for the last 17 years unemployment rates for the state of Kansas. On the private 
sector side at the same time that the public sector side has not been growing or has been 
smaller because long-term growth and the key to America isn’t building government; it’s 
providing more opportunities for people. That’s the long-term opportunity, that’s the 
long term vision, that’s the long term opportunity this country and what’s always been 
the best for it is to provide that chance, provide that choice, let a person get out there and 
try and they may fail. But you hope to get a lot of people trying and eventually end up 
with your good, large employers like Garmin, other groups in the state. Or, what’s more 
typical, a whole lot of small businesses that are having three people or five people that 
work with them. And for years I’ve heard people say, ‘Well, you give all the subsidy to 
big business, what about me?’ And this is somebody that hires two people, that’s been in 
their community for 50 years and they’re saying ‘You know, I’m kind of struggling out 
here and you guys have put a lot of regulation and taxes on me.’ And so what we did, 
coming into office, is to say ‘Let’s give the small business guy a break. Let’s not tax him.’ 
And in all our economic modeling that showed a very strong growth of jobs taking place 
with it. So we did; took the tax off small business. Record number of small businesses for 
six years in a row. As I mentioned, record private sector job growth in the state of 
Kansas off of that policy. People saying they didn’t like that policy, they said ‘No we 
don’t like that model, we think that gets abused and wanted to tighten that up,’ which I 
was fine with doing. But instead, what happened was it was not tightened up, it was taken 
away altogether. And now you’re going to see small businesses taxed at 5.7 percent 
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income tax rates, and you’re going to see the creation and the number of them go down 
substantially. And you’re going to see the migration from other neighboring states into 
Kansas slow down substantially. And this is not to our long-term benefit. This isn’t the 
right way to go. There was another way. And we kept working with people but that just 
wasn’t in the cards and was difficult to happen, and you get late in the session and I think 
a number of people threw their hands up and said ‘This is the only way to go.’ And the 
unfortunate thing is it’s a bad way to go and we’re going to have long-term negative 
consequences for the economy of the state, for the people of Kansas, going this route. I 
regret that. I think that’s bad for the long-term trajectory of this state. It’s a decision that 
was made. It’s a decision that will be implemented. And we will handle and deal with 
that. A lot of people made it about me, but it’s not about me – it’s about Kansas, it’s 
about the future of this state. It’s about which way we want to go. Do we want to be a 
high tax, low growth or no growth state? Or a pro-growth state that over time – and 
these things take time, you have to take the variables of commodity prices and the 
complexities of an economy, which are substantial. Economies aren’t single entity 
creatures that one thing happens and everything blossoms off of it. It’s multiple sets of 
factors and we’ve had commodity crisis prices over the last three or four years. And 
those have a big impact on us and we continue to have slow performance in our aviation 
sector, the business jet sector. Those sales, they continue to be down. So you have 
fundamentals of this economy that have poorly performed over the last several years, but 
you can’t blame a tax policy on that. Those are global forces that create and cause that. 
So I think we’ve taken a big step backwards. I think it’s the wrong philosophy to 
implement, but you get late in the session and things like this happen and move forward 
as people don’t see another option or another way. And I understand that. I’ve been a 
legislator and I can understand the difficulties of doing that job and we’ve got a number 
of fine people in the legislature trying to do their level best that they can. I just think this 
is the wrong way for us to go. 
 
Brownback Exits 
After the repeal of Brownback’s signature policy, conservatives began predicting the dire 
consequences of the tax increase. Brownback issued a statement saying, “This session marks a 
drastic departure from fiscal restraint. I trust that future legislatures will return to a pro-growth 
orientation that will once again set Kansas on the path toward becoming the best state in America 
to raise a family and grow a business.” (Koranda 2017). The new Secretary of Revenue, Sam 
Williams, wrote an op-ed criticizing the “largest in state history” tax increase (Williams 2017). 
Conservative Senator Ty Masterson also wrote an op-ed, predicting that small businesses “will 
see significant reductions to their bottom lines… This means all small businesses in Kansas, 
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from your hair dresser to your lawn mower, will now be burdened with a retroactive tax increase, 
which is sure to cripple job creation and economic growth” (Masterson 2017). Moderate 
Republicans, however, explained their vote for a tax increase as the responsible thing to do. Don 
Hineman, moderate Republican leader in the House, wrote, “Though raising taxes is never easy, 
it was unfortunately the only responsible option available” (Hineman 2017).  
 Brownback bet his political career on the success of the tax cuts. But as the tax policy 
failed, Brownback’s popularity plummeted. Brownback left office with an approval rating of 
only 27 percent. Perhaps mercifully, Donald Trump nominated him to serve as the ambassador 
at-large for religious freedom. Though his nomination would be a long, drawn-out process, 
Brownback was confirmed in January 2018. Prior to exiting the role he held since 2010, the 
governor declared a day of prayer and fasting for his last day in office. He asked Kansans to pray 
for him “before God takes me on to the next part of my journey.”  
 Structurally, much of the 2012 tax experiment was undone. The pass-through exemption 
and the “march to zero” trigger mechanism were both eliminated, and a third bracket was 
reinstated. However, the state’s tax structure is still not the same as it was prior to Brownback. 
The top tax rate remains lower than before the cuts. Moreover, while the women’s caucus plan 
reinstated several key tax credits and deductions, not all of them were restored. Thus, elements of 
Brownback’s tax changes persist. But as much as Brownback’s legacy has shaped the state, the 
Kansas tax cutting experiment has helped shaped the national debate on taxes nationally. In the 
aftermath of repeal, political figures and pundits across the country and across the political 
spectrum debated the efficacy and meaning of the Kansas tax cuts. Politically, the Kansas 
“experiment” has imposed is now itself as an integral part of the contemporary debates over 








This dissertation has examined a critical case of one of the most significant issues in 
American politics. Tax cuts, and particularly supply-side tax cuts, have become entrenched in the 
Republican Party since Ronald Reagan (Martin 2008; Prasad 2018). And the Republican 
allegiance to supply-side has persisted, despite overwhelming evidence that tax cuts do not 
perform as promised (Tanden 2013; Atkinson 2006). This contradiction – between evidence of 
supply-side failure and Republican allegiance to tax cutting – was particularly acute in 2017. The 
Kansas tax cuts were repealed in June 2017 and only a few months later, Trump and 
congressional Republicans unveiled their latest tax reform proposal, a supply-side policy with 
strong, identifiable connections to the Kansas tax policy. In this concluding chapter, I briefly 
sketch how Kansas has shaped the national discourse on taxes and discuss what the Kansas tax 
cutting episode might mean for the politics of tax cuts going forward. 
 
Kansas and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
 “It’s amazing to me that a tax cut in Kansas was the dominant tax debate in this nation 
over the last five years,” Brownback remarked (Hanna 2017d). Since they were passed in 2012, 
the Kansas tax cuts have arguably shaped the national debate on taxes. The commentaries and 
debates about taxes increased in the period after the repeal and preceding Trump’s tax reform. 
The similarities between the TCJA and the Kansas tax cuts are not coincidental. Indeed, 
Brownback himself gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal after Donald Trump’s election 
urging him to follow the Kansas model (Rubin and Connors 2016). Brownback further predicted 
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that “you will see a lot of places start to tinker with, how do you stimulate small-business growth 
using this pass-through tax model” (Hanna 2017d). And in September 2017, Donald Trump 
unveiled his tax reform proposal, a sweeping overhaul of the federal tax code that drew 
components from Kansas. Like the Kansas tax cuts, Trump’s tax proposal reduced rates but did 
not eliminate any brackets. Rather, it eliminated or reduced various tax credits and deductions, 
and lowered the corporate tax rate. However, the loudest echoes of Kansas in the TCJA is the 
reduction of income taxes for pass-through business owners, the signature component of 
Brownback’s policy.  
Media framing of Trump’s tax proposal highlighted the role of Kansas. Several media 
outlets all ran variations of the same headline: Is Donald Trump about to turn America into 
Kansas?; Trump’s Tax Plan Has Echoes of the Kansas Tax Cut Experiment; The GOP Tried 
Trump-Style Tax Cuts in Kansas. What a Mess; Trump Models U.S. Economy on Kansas. That’s 
a Mistake; and Kansas Tried a Tax Plan Similar to Trump’s. It Failed. Additionally, the Kansas 
tax cuts have also deemed a “cautionary tale” that lawmakers should learn from: Kansas' 2012 
Tax Cut Experiment Could Serve as a Cautionary Tale; What Happened in Kansas is a 
Cautionary Tale for Connecticut; Brownback’s Kansas Should be ‘Cautionary Tale’ on Taxes, 
says Missouri’s McCaskill; and Kansas's Ravaged Economy a Cautionary Tale as Trump Plans 
Huge Tax Cuts for Rich.  
Democrats in Washington also capitalized on the comparison. Senate Democrats, for 
instance, held a mock trial for the Kansas tax cuts in November 2017. Key Democratic local 
political figures, such as state representative Jim Ward, and other experts appeared before the 
committee and answered questions about what happened in the state. Chair of the Democratic 
Policy and Communications Committee, Debbie Stabenow, remarked that, “Today, we heard 
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from experts including Kansans who lived through and fought back against a hurtful tax 
experiment that is very similar to today’s Republican tax plan.” Likewise, Democratic Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, who sat on the committee, claimed that what happened in Kansas is “exactly 
what the Republicans in Washington are trying to do now for the whole country.” “We’ve seen 
the movie and we know how it ends,” she concluded. 
Republicans, on the other hand, have distanced themselves and the TCJA from the 
Kansas experiment. In the aftermath of the Kansas repeal, national Republican and anti-tax 
figures disarticulated any comparisons between Kansas and their new tax proposal. Efforts to 
disarticulate the comparison between Kansas and the Republican tax proposal feel particularly 
hard on congressional Republicans from Kansas. Two of the most high-profile Kansas 
Representative wrote opinion pieces claiming the TCJA was nothing like what happened in 
Kansas. Kansas Representative Lynn Jenkins, for instance, claimed in a press release that “While 
some may try to compare this tax reform framework to what was tried in Kansas, the truth is 
these two reforms could not be more different” (Jenkins 2017a). Further, she wrote in a Fox 
News opinion column, “Let me say this again: we are not zeroing out the pass-through rate as 
Kansas did” (Jenkins 2017b). Likewise, in the Wall Street Journal, Kansas Representative Ron 
Estes repeated many of the same claims related to oil and gas revenues and unrestrained 
spending to assure readers the tax cuts were not responsible for the state’s fiscal crisis. “The truth 
is that Kansas’ tax cuts simply aren’t comparable with the GOP’s pro-growth national plan 
because they aren’t structured the same,” he claims (Estes 2017). Alfredo Ortiz, the President 
and CEO of the Job Creators Network, echoed this point in another Fox News op-ed writing, 
“This isn’t to say that Kansas’ income tax cut could not have been designed better. Rather than 
eliminating the small-business tax rate entirely, policymakers should have simply cut it deeply, 
249 
 
so it could still capture revenue from ensuing economic growth.” Yet, Ortiz still affirms the 
overall policy, writing favorably that revenues in the state did start to increase after an initial dip. 
“Kansas demonstrates that even an imperfect tax cut can still raise incomes and revenues,” he 
writes. “Imagine what a great one could do” (Ortiz 2017). 
 Other experts distanced themselves completely from the Kansas experiment in the wake 
of repeal. For instance, only two years after Grover Norquist declared that “Kansas is the 
model,” he reversed course, saying, “Kansas is an outlier… If you’re a Republican looking for a 
model, Kansas is not the model” (Berman 2017). And Arthur Laffer, after praising the 
“revolution in a cornfield,” also reversed course, saying the state “sucks.” “Look at it,” he 
continued, Kansas “doesn’t have beaches, it doesn’t have palm trees. It doesn’t really have a low 
tax, what is it now, 4.9%, something like that” (Rushe 2017). Instead of focusing on Kansas, tax 
cut supporters championed the experience of other states, primarily North Carolina (Norquist 
2018; Williams and Wilterdink 2017:17). This was summarized succinctly in a column written 
by the Kansas and North Carolina directors for Americans for Prosperity. “By pairing tax cuts 
with fiscally responsible spending, North Carolina is showing the nation the right way to do tax 
reform,” they wrote (Glendening and Gravely 2018). 
 Perhaps nowhere does the rehabilitation of the Kansas tax policy get as sustained a 
treatment as in KPI Director Dave Trabert’s book, What Was Really the Matter with the Kansas 
Tax Plan. The subtitle of the book, The Undoing of a Good Idea, is telling in this case. The book 
was favorably reviewed by supply-side advocates such as Grover Norquist and Stephen Moore 
and copies of the book were sent to every legislator in the country (Smith 2018). This book built 
on the work that Trabert and the Kansas Policy Institute had been doing in the statehouse for 
years. The Heritage Foundation also held a symposium on the Kansas tax cuts organized around 
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the release of Dave Trabert’s book. This panel featured not only Trabert, but Stephen Moore and 
Grover Norquist. Moore, who introduced the panel, said at the start that the Kansas tax cuts 
became “a cause célèbre for the left that somehow everything had gone wrong in Kansas… This 
idea that this was some kind of a massive failure is simply a mythology.”358 
 The Republican Party continues to embrace massive tax cuts and Kansas has, at least in 
the near-term, not been a deterrent. Yet the experience at the local level has diverged sharply 
from the national tax cut story (Prasad 2018:158-159). For many observers, the Kansas 
Republican Party’s ties to the tax cut were a political liability. The Republican nominee for 
governor, Kris Kobach, began his campaign on June 8 – the day after the legislature voted to 
repeal the tax cuts – by promising to reinstate the Brownback tax cuts if elected (Lefler 2017). 
Kobach’s opponent, Democrat Laura Kelly, was an outspoken critic of the tax plan and after 
Kelly’s victory, many observers attributed Kobach’s loss, in part, to his embrace of the tax cuts. 
Additionally, several Kansas Republicans made national headlines in December 2018 when four 
moderate Republican women announced they were leaving the Republican Party and joining the 
Democrats, in large part because of their experience with the tax cuts.359 
  
An End to the Permanent Tax Revolt? 
Joseph Schumpeter argued that the “full fruitfulness of [fiscal sociology] is seen 
particularly at those turning points… during which existing forms begin to die off and to change 
into something new, and which always involve a crisis of the old fiscal methods” (1991:101). It 
is my contention that we are at one of these turning points. And if Schumpeter is correct, the 
                                                                   
358 “What Was Really the Matter with the Kansas Tax Plan: The Undoing of a Good Idea,” YouTube Video, 53m 29s, “The 
Heritage Foundation,” April 11, 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=286&v=vBZtq3Wn-fw). 
359 The four Republicans who switched were Stephanie Clayton, Dinah Sykes, Barbara Bollier, and Joy Koesten.  
251 
 
policy reversal in Kansas may be indicative of a crisis of the “old fiscal methods” of 
neoliberalism and supply-side economics. In this dissertation, I have posed this question by 
asking whether Kansas represent an end to the permanent tax revolt. Fiscal sociologists argue 
that the conservative tax cut movement was born out of local economic and political concerns. 
Homeowners, dissatisfied with modernized assessment techniques, and exposed to the harsh 
realities of the housing market, mobilized against the property tax (Martin 2008). Entrepreneurial 
politicians seized on the dissatisfaction of property taxes to build a movement based around tax 
cutting more generally. A cohort of conservative leaders, forged in the Proposition 13 battle, 
have kept this policy alive against the odds (Martin 2008:133). Structurally, inflation provided an 
opportunity for supply-side tax cut ideas to be implemented (Krippner 2011). The Reagan tax 
cuts did not create the economic growth promised or hoped for, and instead ballooned the deficit. 
However, buoyed by foreign investment, Republicans learned the valuable political lesson that 
deficits did not matter.  
Tax cuts became an ideal policy for lawmakers looking to appeal to an ambivalent 
electorate that professes to like small government, but loves the services government provides 
(Prasad 2018:214-215). As sociologist Monica Prasad notes, “when a democracy is not forced to 
choose between higher taxes and lower spending, it chooses neither” (2018:15). The case of 
Kansas, however, is one in which, structurally, people were forced to choose. Recent work in 
fiscal sociology and political science has noted that, contrary to political rhetoric, people 
generally hold pro-tax views (Pearson 2014; Williamson 2017). This research has contributed to 
this literature by illustrating that people not only hold pro-tax views, but will act on those views 
in certain contexts.  
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However, this choice came at an enormous cost. The state’s economy and institutions 
suffered terribly over the course of the Brownback experiment. The Kansas tax cuts represent a 
neoliberal policy, in this case supply-side, taken to its most extreme. Political debates over the 
economy are characterized by “precisely how far efficiency may be allowed to govern social 
life” (Streeck 2012:8). In the case of Kansas, the encroachment of economic efficiency into 
social life ran up against its limits. This is not to say tax cuts have not gone too far in the past. On 
the heels of the Reaganomics revolution, the political economists Bennett Harrison and Barry 
Bluestone argued presciently that supply-side economics would fail because it violated tenets of 
human nature (1988:172). Humans, they suggest, tend to be risk-adverse and seek out stability. 
Reagan’s tax cutting program would not succeed, they suggest, because “the revolution has 
created too much personal and family insecurity and too much social and economic instability” 
(1988:175). According to Harrison and Bluestone, “as more and more citizens become aware of 
the instability of the economy and their own growing insecurity within it, the door is opened – at 
least a crack – to a radical departure from both the standard policies of the Democrats and the 
supply-side nostrums of the conservatives” (1988:170). Of the prospect, Harrison and Bluestone 
were “cautiously optimistic” (1988:195). Ultimately, however, this optimism was misplaced 
(Peck 2002:203). Supply-side approaches to taxes and the economy have persisted despite 
repeated failures.  
From the perspective of 1988, the Reagan revolution looked doomed. However, as Prasad 
argues, the politics of tax cutting succeeded in the long run because it failed in the short run 
(2018:147). “Because of that failure, Republicans came to learn over the next two decades that 
there was no longer a political or economic price to pay for creating deficits” (Prasad 2018:147). 
Debt has provided the illusion of stability, truncating the public’s capacity to experience the tax 
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state’s contradictions. However, states are structurally incapable of running deficits and this 
constraint has run up against Republican efforts to continue cutting local taxes. After Reagan, the 
GOP did not immediately become the party of tax cuts. Republican state legislators and 
governors rediscovered tax cutting in the 1990s (Prasad 2018:150-155). And with renewed 
electoral success, the national Republican Party, led by Newt Gingrich, made tax cuts central to 
the party platform. Yet continuous tax cuts are unsustainable without a turn towards finance. 
Kansas exemplifies the structural limits to tax cut when capacity for deficits is eliminated. The 
Kansas tax cuts exposed the contradictions found in the tax state (O’Conner 1973), 
contradictions that at other levels are papered over through the expansion of debt (Streeck 2017; 
Krippner 2011). Nationally, institutional capacity for debt affords “delaying” this crisis (Streeck 
2017). Kansas did not have this capacity. Had it, the tax cuts may well have continued for much 
longer. 
However, there may be limits to how long Republicans can buy tax cuts with debt at the 
national level. Prior to the GOP’s embrace of debt, Republicans were the party of balanced 
budgets (Prasad 2012). The GOP’s focus on balanced budgets was still alive even after Reagan 
signed the ERTA. The Reagan tax cuts produce a dramatic increase in deficits which, in turn, 
produced “a moment of genuine fear within the administration and the country” (Prasad 
2018:147). Yet, the deficits did not damage the GOP politically. As Dick Cheney remarked, 
“Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter” (Martin 2008:133). With the most recent Republican 
tax cuts, however, the deficit has increased to record levels. In January 2019, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) projected that the federal deficit would hit $1 trillion by 2022.360 While 
there is academic debate about the extent to which deficits negatively impact economic growth, 
                                                                   




what is indisputable is that debt reduces state capacity and continues to eat away at capacity into 
the future. Future policymakers must allocate more and more of the budget to interest payments, 
reducing the amount of discretionary money to spend on new policies or programs. In other 
words, debt is a threat to “fiscal democracy” (Streeck and Mertens 2013:27). 
Highlighting the role debt plays in affording tax cuts nationally, this dissertation has lent 
supportive evidence to the delayed crisis of neoliberalism thesis (Streeck 2017). It is not that 
neoliberalism or supply-side tax cuts are an idea that overpowers opposing economic ideas. 
Rather, the contradictions of neoliberalism are genuinely too much to bear and cause social 
damage when they are implemented. Nationally (and globally), however, this crisis has 
effectively been delayed. But in a context where the institutional mechanisms for delaying the 
crisis are exhausted or otherwise nonexistent, as in Kansas, a countermovement for social 
protection can occur. The permanent tax revolt has not persisted by fiat, but rather has persisted 
due to institutional arrangements.  
 
Fiscal Citizenship and the Social Limits of Neoliberalism 
There have been two central arguments throughout this dissertation. Neoliberalism, as 
manifest through the mechanism of supply-side tax cuts, attempts to depoliticize the economy. I 
have argued the noticeable failure of the Kansas tax cuts, in essence, repoliticized the economy. 
However, depoliticization is somewhat of a misnomer (Krippner 2011:144-145). Polanyi’s 
central insight is that economic issues are always embedded in social and political institutions 
and thus the economy is never really apolitical. However, attempts at depoliticizing, or 
disembedding, the economy do occur. In other words, neoliberal policymakers attempt to 
obfuscate the political aspect of neoliberalism equating “the economy” with neoliberal policies, a 
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constructive process where social relations are re-embedded in market institutions. As Krippner 
explains, “depoliticization is accomplished not by fiat but through institutional innovation” 
(2011:145). The Brownback administration made multiple, ultimately futile, attempts at 
obfuscating the feedback effects of the policy in order to maintain the depoliticized façade of the 
policy. The contradiction between the administration’s rhetoric and the public’s experience of 
the tax cuts became unsustainable and created the institutional conditions for the rediscovery of 
the politicization of tax cuts. 
Drawing on the historical institutionalist literature, the second central argument in this 
dissertation is that policies create citizens (Campbell 2003). In other words, policies symbolically 
create constituencies and reinforce those constituencies by allocating resources to them (Pierson 
1994). Allocating resources creates a group invested in the continuation of that policy. Cases of 
policy feedback, however, tend to focus on cases where the policy successfully creates a 
constituency invested in the policy’s survival. I have argued that not only do policies create 
citizens, but that reversing a policy can also create citizens. My point echoes similar arguments 
about how various constituencies respond to a real or perceived policy threat (Martin 2013; 
Campbell 2003). Sociologist Isaac Martin (2013), for instance, argues that policy threats, defined 
as the loss of economic or personal security attributable to a real or anticipated change in policy, 
tend to provoke social movement responses. I argue the Brownback tax cuts were experienced by 
political and economic actors in Kansas as a policy threat and institutional mobilizations in 
response to the threat fostered a renewed sense of “fiscal citizenship” (Zelenak 2013). Market 
fundamentalism is about hollowing out citizenship more generally, and fiscal citizenship more 
specifically (see Somers 2008). But in threatening the stability of the state, the policy created 
citizens - not by allocating resources to a specific group, but through the response from various 
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institutions and groups as they struggled to maintain stability. In becoming invested in repealing 
the policy, the policy fostered citizenship. These two currents – repoliticization and fiscal 
citizenship – are connected. The opposite is also true; depoliticization dulls citizenship.  
That taxes and citizenship are so tightly connected is important. Sociologist Daniel Bell 
argued in 1976 for the need to establish a liberal public philosophy to justify taxation for 
financing the public sector, what Bell termed the public household (1996:220-282). However, 40 
years later we still lack such a theory (Block 2011). For Daniel Bell, fiscal crisis extended into 
the realm of culture where Americans seemed resistant to embracing taxes. Recent work in fiscal 
sociology and political science has challenged this base view that Americans are fundamentally 
opposed to taxes (Williamson 2017; Pearson 2014; Martin and Nations 2018), yet America still 
lacks a public pro-tax story. A fundamentally important aspect of what happened in Kansas, 
however, is the development of a philosophy of the public household. But it was not a 
philosophy articulated by academics, politicians, or journalists. Instead, it was developed out of 
practice in response to the absence of taxes and the structural threat to the public sector. Kansas, 
of all places, may provide an unlikely blueprint for answering Daniel Bell’s call in our 
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